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This thesis investigates the influence of economic preferences, in particular time preferences,
on health behavior and health-related decision-making. In addition, it explores the sources
of individual variation in time discounting. The thesis is composed of three stand-alone, but
related chapters, in which multiple empirical strategies are applied. Each chapter focuses on
a particular subject and contributes evidence to our knowledge on economic preferences in the
field of health economics.
Chapter 2 examines the relationship between maternal (time) preferences and the demand
for preventive health care services that favor child health. Specifically, the uptake of vaccinations
and developmental screenings (‘U Screenings’) for children is analyzed. In Chapter 3, the link
between time discounting and smoking behavior is addressed. However, the intergenerational
context is retained which has been barely considered in the existing literature. Hence, we test
whether parental time discounting is associated with child’s smoking behavior. Finally, Chapter
4 examines whether preferences are rather exogenous or endogenous. In particular, the genetic
variation in time preference is explored. The analysis sheds light on the discussion on whether
people are born with innate preferences or whether economic preferences are mainly shaped by
environmental factors.
In order to put the papers of the thesis into context, this short introduction is provided.
In Section 1.2, examples of intertemporal choice are presented to introduce the topic. The
most commonly used theoretical frameworks of time discounting in (behavioral) economics are
briefly discussed in Section 1.3. Although we recognize that time discounting may be relevant
for a variety of outcomes, we stick with the field of health economics (Section 1.4). In the
1
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following Sections 1.5 to 1.7, each of the above mentioned chapters is addressed separately. The
contribution of the thesis to the economics literature is summarized at the end of each of these
sections.
1.2 Intertemporal choice
Intertemporal decision-making describes trade-offs between costs and (potential) benefits that
occur at different points in time. People are frequently faced with various intertemporal choices.
Examples include trade-offs between studying for an upcoming exam and watching TV or forgo-
ing consumption today and saving money for retirement. Both decisions include immediate costs
(learning efforts, reduction in consumption), but future benefits could be substantial (passing
the exam with a good grade, sufficient financial resources for a comfortable retirement). In-
tertemporal choices may also have an impact on personal health. For instance, a person may
decide between current satisfaction from tobacco consumption and good long-run health due to
quitting or abstaining from smoking. Moreover, getting a vaccine can also be interpreted as an
intertemporal decision. An individual faces the trade-off between costs of getting a flu shot in
the present and health benefits from being vaccinated. All of these examples have in common
that a decision has to be made between a sooner, smaller payoff and a larger, but later payoff.
How people solve such intertemporal dilemmas highly depends on the relative value they assign
to the outcomes that are realized at different points in time. In other words, it depends on their
personal time preference (rate).
Another example of intertemporal choice is the so-called “Marshmallow Test”. It is probably
one of the most famous experiments on people’s ability to delay gratification (Mischel et al.,
1972, 1989). In the 1960s, the psychologist Walter Mischel and his colleagues tested the patience
of preschoolers (4 years of age) at the Stanford University’s childcare facility. The setting of
the experiment was simple: a desirable object was offered to each child, e.g., a marshmallow.
The instructor told the child that they could eat the marshmallow whenever they wanted, e.g.,
immediately. However, if they were able to wait to eat the marshmallow for a given amount of
time (typically 15 minutes) until the experimenter came back, they would get another marsh-
mallow as a reward. More technically, the children had to make a trade-off between a sooner,
smaller reward (one marshmallow immediately) and a larger, later reward (two marshmallows in
15 minutes). Unsurprisingly, the achievements of the participants were mixed. Whereas many
children could not wait to eat the marshmallow immediately or shortly after the experimenter
2
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had left the child alone, others were able to fully resist the instant gratification.
Over the next decades, a number of follow-up studies were conducted that aimed to analyze
the children’s progress in life.1 Interestingly, children who ended up with two marshmallows, and
hence proved able to delay gratification, were more successful in life than their peers. According
to these longitudinal findings, more patient individuals achieved higher Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) scores and higher levels of social competence in adolescence. Moreover, they were rated
as more rational and planful and were able to better cope with stress and frustration (Mischel
et al., 1988; Shoda et al., 1990). Significant associations were also found with regard to health
outcomes. The longer the child delayed gratification, the lower the risk of becoming obese and
using illicit drugs in adulthood (Schlam et al., 2013; Ayduk et al., 2000). Although these findings
cannot necessarily be interpreted as causal relationships, the predictive power of people’s ability
to delay gratification is striking. This canonical experiment shows that self-control and future
orientation are likely to play a crucial role for success in life.
Although the concept of delay of gratification is strongly related to the concept of time
discounting/time preference, they are not identical. The main difference is that delay of grati-
fication tasks measure the ability to sustain a choice for a later reward while a smaller instant
reward is continuously available. By contrast, standard time discounting refers to how people
actually make intertemporal choices (Reynolds and Schiffbauer, 2005). In the following, the em-
phasis of the thesis is on time discounting and time preference in the field of health economics.
The influence of self-control abilities, however, will also be discussed whenever the context is
appropriate. Before we present some empirical evidence regarding the relationship between time
preference and different outcomes, Section 1.3 briefly discusses the theoretical concept of time
preference in economics.
1.3 Economic theory of time preference
1.3.1 The Discounted Utility Model (DU Model)
The first generalized model of time discounting was proposed by Samuelson (1937). Individuals
maximize their present utility function which is the weighted sum of the current utility in t = 0
and all future utility flows. This intertemporal utility function is defined as
U0(c0, ..., cT ) =
T∑
t=0
δtu(ct) = u(c0) + δu(c1) + δ
2u(c2) + ...+ δ
Tu(cT ) , (1.1)
1See Mischel et al. (2011) for a comprehensive overview of systematic follow-up studies.
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where u(ct) is the instantaneous utility function for each time period t, and δ
t represents the
exponential discount function. Humans have the tendency to devalue the future and therefore
discount future outcomes (Frederick et al., 2002). The personal discount factor δ (0 < δ < 1)
defines the relative weight the individual attaches to future utility streams. Alternatively, the





, with r being defined as the discount rate. Thus,
the level of individual time preference can either be captured using the discount factor δ or the
discount rate r. According to Frederick et al. (2002), the time preference parameters in this
model comprise all the factors that influence time discounting. Hence, time preference is simply
the preference for immediate utility over delayed utility. The lower the discount factor (the
higher the discount rate), the greater the preference for immediate utility outcomes over delayed
utility outcomes. In general, heterogeneity in time discounting/time preference exists (Barsky
et al., 1997). Individuals with a relatively high discount rate focus on present consumption
rather than on future outcomes. On the contrary, people who have low discount rates can be
expected to assign more value to the future consequences of their current behavior. Hence, low
time preference may be a key aspect of future orientation.
One of the main assumptions of the discounted utility model (DU model) is that the discount
factor is constant over time.2 That is the reason why the form of the discount function is
exponential. The implication of this assumption is that the discounting behavior is consistent
over time. In other words, preference reversals are not produced because the preferences are
always the same, independent of the time horizon. For instance, if a person is willing to forgo
immediate consumption in t in order to get a larger reward in t+ 1, then this person will make
the exact same choice again at any future point in time. However, this dynamic consistency was
challenged by researchers who argued that this model was not capable of accurately describing
human behavior. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that discount rates may not (always) be
constant over time (e.g., Thaler, 1981). To address this “anomaly” of the DU model, Section
1.3.2 provides an alternative specification of the discount function.3
1.3.2 Hyperbolic discounting
Over the past decades, researchers have shown that humans are often prone to discount (approx-
imately) hyperbolically rather than exponentially (see Ainslie and Haslam, 1992). Discounting
in a hyperbolic fashion is primarily characterized by a relatively high discount rate over short
2See Frederick et al. (2002) for a summary of the features and assumptions of the DU model.
3For a detailed review of other “DU anomalies”, please see Frederick et al. (2002).
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time horizons and a low discount rate over long time horizons. Thus, the implicit discount rate
is not perfectly constant but tends to decline over time (see, e.g., Thaler, 1981). This may lead
to a conflict between current preferences and the preferences the individual holds in the future.
Laibson (1997) set up a widely used model framework that captures the qualitative properties of
hyperbolic discounting.4 The intertemporal utility function of the DU model is slightly modified
and can be written as
U0(c0, ..., cT ) = u(c0) + β
T∑
t=1
δtu(ct) = u(c0) + βδu(c1) + βδ
2u(c2) + ...+ βδ
Tu(cT ) , (1.2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and β ∈ (0, 1] indicates the individual’s bias towards
the present.5 Assuming a present-biased individual (0 < β < 1), the discount rate declines
sharply between the current and the next period. Thereafter, a constant discount rate is applied
(Frederick et al., 2002). Hence, the β-δ framework implies time-inconsistent preferences for the
near future and exponential/time-consistent preferences for the distant future (quasi-hyperbolic
discounting). As a consequence, this can lead to preference reversals (e.g., Kirby and Herrnstein,
1995). People make far-sighted plans for the (distant) future which are supposed to be beneficial
for them in the long run. However, they often fail to stick to their plans and go for short-run
gratification when the future has become the present.
A simple example illustrates the dynamic inconsistency in intertemporal decision-making
when (quasi-) hyperbolic discounting is present. Today, an individual faces the decision between
exercising and watching a movie in the next period t+1 (e.g., tomorrow). Exercising produces
immediate costs such as physical effort, commuting time to sport facility, etc. However, delayed
rewards in terms of good physical health are gained in t+2. Alternatively, watching a movie
generates an instant but small reward (joy of watching a movie, no physical or mental effort,...)
while future benefits (for health) are usually negligible.
Table 1.1 summarizes the payoffs (utilities) under each option. Based on the quasi-hyperbolic
discounting framework, a change in preferences, and hence a change in behavior, may be pro-
duced. When β = 12 and δ =
3
4 (per day), the individual decides to exercise in the next period
(t+1). From today’s perspective, this is plausible since Uexercise > Umovie. More specifically,
Uexercise = u0 − 2βδ + 6βδ2 = u0 + 1516 is bigger than Umovie = u0 + 1βδ + 0βδ
2 = u0 +
6
16 .
However, as time goes by, preferences change. When the near future becomes the present, a
4See Frederick et al. (2002) for an overview of generalized hyperbolic discount functions that have been
proposed in the past.




Table 1.1: Quasi-hyperbolic discounting - an example
t+1 t+2
Exercise −2 6
Watching TV 1 0
preference reversal occurs. Now, the individual prefers watching a movie over doing a proper
workout (Uexercise = −2+6βδ = 14 < Umovie = 1+0βδ = 1). Hence, hyperbolic discounting may
explain why people procrastinate and change plans. In case of exponential discounters (β = 1),
preferences are consistent over time. If such an individual plans to do sports tomorrow, it will
stick to the initial plan and will be physically active when the moment of truth has arrived.6
Further examples of dynamic inconsistency and procrastination are presented in Akerlof (1991)
and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).7
Such behavior patterns may be familiar to most people. However, they are not compatible
with the standard DU model from above. Apparently, preference changes that occur over time
can reasonably be explained by (quasi-) hyperbolic discount functions. For instance, Read and
van Leeuwen (1998) conducted an experiment to provide evidence on preference reversals in the
context of health behavior. They showed that the majority of people who preferred healthy
foods in advance changed their mind and switched to the unhealthy alternative at the time of
actual consumption. Hence, these present-biased preferences may explain why people often fail
to stick to their healthy eating plans or why smokers who are willing to quit smoking frequently
fail to do so. Although the focus of the thesis is not on hyperbolic discounting and its (possible)
implications, this theoretical background on time discounting will facilitate the understanding of
previous findings from empirical studies linking time discounting to different (health) outcomes.
1.4 Time preference and outcomes
A number of studies have examined the relationship between time discounting and basic so-
cioeconomic outcomes such as educational attainment, income and financial decisions (see, e.g.,
Golsteyn et al., 2014). Low discount rates are positively associated with longer investments
in education (Harrison et al., 2002) and even higher cognitive abilities (Dohmen et al., 2010).
6In t=0: Uexercise = u0 +
15
8
> Umovie = u0 +
6
8
. In the next period: Uexercise = 2,5 > Umovie = 1.
7Please see O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001) for theoretical frameworks that explicitly distinguish between
(partially) naive and sophisticated individuals.
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Adams and Nettle (2009) identify a negative correlation between discount rate and financial
planning horizon. In addition, Meier and Sprenger (2010) find that present-biased individu-
als are significantly more likely to borrow on their credit cards. For example, Golsteyn et al.
(2014) investigated whether children’s time preferences at age 13 were associated with social and
economic outcomes in adulthood. The results show that time preference is predictive of many
lifetime outcomes. A high discount rate is linked to weaker performance in school, lower earnings
and disposable income and a higher probability of unemployment and welfare use. Sutter et al.
(2013) analyzed the relationship between experimental measures of risk and time preferences
and several behavior patterns among a sample of children and adolescents. Individuals with a
high time preference rate (impatience) are less likely to save money and are more likely to live
an unhealthy lifestyle. For instance, more impatient children and adolescents are more likely to
have a higher body mass index (BMI) and to spend money on alcohol and tobacco. Interest-
ingly, risk aversion is found to be only a minor predictor of these outcomes. In general, we can
state that high time preference rates, and hence low levels of patience and future orientation,
are robustly associated with unfavorable self-investments which may foster adverse social and
economic outcomes.
In the scope of this thesis, however, we put special emphasis on the context of time preference
and health. In recent years, the literature on time discounting and health behavior has grown
substantially. For instance, several studies have shown that high discount rates are associated
with smoking participation (see, e.g., Kang and Ikeda, 2014). In Section 1.6.2.3, we will present
more evidence on time discounting and smoking.8 Chapters 2 and 3 will specifically address the
role of (time) preferences in decision-making regarding health prevention and smoking behavior,
respectively (see Sections 1.5 and 1.6). As already mentioned above, Chapter 4 discusses a
different research topic. In this chapter, we examine the formation of time preference in more
detail (see also Section 1.7).
8See Story et al. (2014) for an extensive review of the association between time discounting and other health
outcomes such as BMI/obesity, (excessive) alcohol consumption and illicit drug use.
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1.5 Uptake of health prevention for children and adolescents -
do parental (time) preferences matter?
1.5.1 Childhood health and future outcomes
Early-life health is supposed to be a major determinant of various outcomes in adulthood.
Numerous studies have found a negative relationship between poor child health and health
and/or economic outcomes later in life (see, e.g., Currie, 2011; Currie and Almond, 2011).9 In
what follows, we present a selection of relevant papers and their main findings. Blackwell et al.
(2001) used data from the third wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to examine
whether childhood conditions and health conditions at age 55-65 are correlated. They find that
poor childhood health (e.g., autoimmune conditions and infectious disease) is associated with
a variety of health problems such as cancer, lung disease and cardiovascular conditions in later
life.
In their seminal paper, Case et al. (2005) studied the effects of childhood health on adult
health, employment and socioeconomic status. They used data from the 1958 National Child
Development Study (NCDS), a british cohort study which tracks individuals from childhood
into adulthood. The number of chronic health conditions at ages 7 and 16 (e.g., general physical
and mental impairments) is negatively associated with educational attainment, health status
and social status as adults. More specifically, individuals who suffered from chronic conditions
during childhood are not only in worse health in middle age, but they have passed fewer O-level
exams by age 16, have lower probabilities of employment and a lower socioeconomic status at
ages 33 and 42.
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Smith (2009) examined
the link between child health and several financial and socioeconomic measures. He applied
sibling fixed effects in order to control for unobserved family level heterogeneity. Excellent
or very good health up to the age of 16 is positively associated with household income and
wealth, individual earnings and weeks worked in adulthood.10 Case and Paxson (2010) relied
on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and sibling fixed
effects regressions. Height-for-age is being used as a marker of early-life health and nutrition.
It turns out that children’s height is positively associated with cognitive test score results and
educational achievement within childhood (e.g., math score, reading comprehension score, and
9For specific information about the fetal and infant origins of adult disease, see Barker (1990) and Almond
and Currie (2011).
10For further discussion on child health and socioeconomic outcomes, see Currie (2009).
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scholastic competence score). In addition, an increase in height is shown to be predictive of
higher earnings and a better self-reported health status in adulthood.
Similar findings are reported by Currie et al. (2010). Based on administrative data from
public health insurance records for Canadian children/siblings, the authors investigate the effects
of physical and mental health problems at different child ages on several young adult outcomes.
Overall, the results indicate that major health problems at young ages (e.g., asthma, major
injury, and ADHD/conduct disorder) are associated with a decrease in school performance and
an increase in the probability of being on welfare. Interestingly, children who have a major
physical condition early in life (ages 0-3 years) and then recover do not suffer adverse outcomes
later. However, mental disorders and physical problems that occur in late adolescence or which
persist over many years during childhood have particularly negative effects on schooling and
welfare participation.11
Although causal inference may be subject to debate, these findings indicate that child cir-
cumstances and development are important predictors of economic and health outcomes in
adulthood. Preventive health care for children and adolescents is supposed to be a key ele-
ment to good health at young age and may help individuals to remain healthy throughout their
lifetime.
1.5.2 Health prevention services in childhood and adolescence - definition,
examples and evidence
Following the standard classification proposed by Caplan (1964), health prevention can be
grouped into three main categories: primary, secondary and tertiary. Primary prevention aims
to prevent injury or disease before it actually occurs. Hence, the main goal is to reduce the
incidence of a specific condition in the population. Examples include vaccinations against infec-
tious diseases or health promotion and education about living a healthy lifestyle. The goal of
secondary prevention is the early detection and effective treatment of a disease that has already
occurred. Thus, the focus is on the reduction of the prevalence of a specific condition by restoring
health. For instance, this form of prevention includes regular and age-specific examinations and
screenings such as mammograms and children’s developmental screenings. The identification
of an existing disease at early stage is essential in order to take appropriate actions to stop its
progress. Finally, tertiary prevention focuses on the treatment of people that already suffer from




an ongoing illness. Main goals are the reduction of physical and/or mental impairments asso-
ciated with the disease, the limitation of medical complications and rehabilitation or (chronic)
disease management programs in order to restore health and quality of life.12
In Chapter 2 of the thesis, we will focus on the demand for well-child visits and childhood
immunizations in Germany. In the German Health Care System, these services are standard
and free of charge for all children and adolescents no matter if they are covered by statutory
or private health insurance. Although routine check-ups, screening tests and immunizations
are generally not mandatory, they are highly recommended by public health authorities and
medical experts. In fact, it is up to the parents if they take their offspring to the pediatrician
(or general practitioner).13,14 More information on the main preventive health care services
offered to infants, children and adolescents will be presented next.
1.5.2.1 Developmental screenings
A series of free routine examinations is offered from birth to adolescence (‘U screenings’) (Federal
Joint Committee (G-BA), 2017, 2016). In the first six years of life, nine screenings are offered
to the children (U1-U9). A well-adolescent visit is also available for individuals aged 12-14 years
(J1).15 The examinations U1 and U2 are performed immediatly after birth and usually within
the first week after birth, respectively. They include checks for reflexes, breathing, hypotonia
(low muscle tone) and heart activity. Normally, they are directly carried out in the hospital.
After leaving the hospital, the parents are primarily in charge of demanding the upcoming
preventive health care services for their offspring. Of course, screening tests vary depending on
the child’s age. In general, however, child examinations focus on appropriate physical and mental
development, motor skills and child’s speech and language development. The juvenile health
screening J1 is typically done between childhood and adulthood. Adolescents are screened
for age-specific physical, mental and social problems. Moreover, symptoms of puberty, risky
health behaviors and vaccination status are examined. Since children are continuously faced
with physical, emotional and psychological changes as they grow, regular monitoring of child’s
12In practice, however, a clear distinction between these prevention categories, especially between primary and
secondary prevention, may not always be feasible.
13A comprehensive overview of the child health care system in Germany is provided by Ehrich et al. (2016).
14In recent years, there has been debate about making preventive health care visits obligatory. For instance, the
majority of federal states has introduced reporting systems that inform parents and/or health authorities about
screenings that have been missed. Lately, screening participation has become mandatory in some federal states
(e.g., Bavaria). However, regarding our empirical analysis, participation was voluntary during our observation
period (2003-2006) (Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, 2014).
15Additional check-ups (U10, U11 and J2) have been introduced recently. However, they are optional and costs
are not covered by all health insurance companies. In Chapter 2 below, these examinations will not be taken into
account. The introduction took place after our observation period.
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development is essential. Frequent examinations of child development and health are important
in order to detect developmental delays and disabilities as soon as possible. The early detection
of (potential) disease allows the early implementation of appropriate intervention measures.
Hence, the identification of health problems helps to keep the child healthy and may also enable
him/her to become a healthy adult.
Over time, however, the use of these medical services decreases. According to representative
survey data collected from 2003 to 2006, roughly 81% of children take part in all examinations
that are provided until age 6 (U3-U9). In the first two years of life, the rate is always above
90% (95.3% at U3 and 92.4% at U7). However, the uptake rate decreases as children get older.
Four years after birth, the rate is 89% at U8. Screening examination U9, which should be done
in the sixth year of life, has a rate of only about 86% (Kamtsiuris et al., 2007). Regarding the
well-adolescent visit J1, the uptake rate is only 38% among adolescents (Robert Koch Institute
(RKI), 2008). Based on findings from a follow-up study (2009-2012), the overall use of health
screenings has slightly increased. About 82% of children take part in all child examinations.
Especially those screenings at later stage (U7-U9) have received considerably more interest and
rates are all above 90%. Although the gap has become smaller, there are still differences in
uptake across different groups. For instance, the participation rates across all U screenings
are significantly lower for children from families with low socioeconomic status than for those
with a higher socioeconomic background (Rattay et al., 2014). More evidence on factors that
are associated with low uptake rates of preventive services for child health will be presented in
Section 1.5.3 below.
1.5.2.2 Immunizations
The demand for routine childhood vaccinations represents another important pillar of health
prevention. Protective vaccinations can be considered as one of the most important and effective
health prevention measures. In the past, they have made substantial contributions to decrease
the probability of contracting infectious disease and to reduce the severity of illness. In addition,
they enabled the eradication of acute contagious diseases such as smallpox (see, e.g., Plotkin,
2014; Greenwood, 2014). Of course, the main purpose of a vaccination is to protect a person
from contracting a disease. Although protection may not be perfect, a child who is sufficiently
vaccinated is normally well protected against typical childhood diseases such as measles, mumps
and rubella. For instance, measles infection can cause serious health complications among
children including blindness, brain swelling and pneumonia. In the worst-case scenario, such
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an infection can result in death (World Health Organization (WHO), 2018). Needless to say
that unvaccinated (or undervaccinated) children are exposed to an unnecessarily high risk of
contracting these preventable diseases.
However, vaccines do have positive externalities (see Kenkel, 2000, Section 4.1). That is,
even unvaccinated individuals benefit from the vaccination decision of other individuals. Since
vaccinated persons (e.g., children) will not contract the disease, they will not pass it on to others
(herd immunity effect). Obviously, the incentive to get a vaccine decreases with the share of
vaccinated people. In general, this leads to low immunization rates. In this case, government
is frequently asked to take action. In order to increase demand for immunization, goods like
standard vaccines are typically subsidized. But as the demand for vaccines increases, the risk of
infection decreases because of lower disease prevalence. However, if the probability of contracting
the disease gets lower, it becomes less attractive to get vaccinated and vaccination rates tend to
decline again (prevalence effect). The possibility of free riding may induce some individuals to
forgo vaccinations and the disease may return. Hence, externalities from vaccines are a common
explanation for why it is so difficult to eradicate diseases. Public policy interventions such as
vaccine subsidization and mandatory vaccine programs have been challenged in the past and are
still subject of debate. Findings from previous studies have shown that such policies may not
be able to fully solve the problem of low immunization rates. Compulsory vaccination may even
reduce social welfare (Brito et al., 1991). Geoffard and Philipson (1997) provided a theoretical
framework that demonstrates that the prevalence elasticity of demand precludes the ability of
price subsidies or mandatory programs to increase the overall demand for vaccinations, and
hence to achieve disease eradication.
In Germany, (child) immunization is voluntary. Recommendations for vaccinations are made
by the German Standing Committee on Vaccinations (STIKO) which is based at the Robert Koch
Institute. The latest version of the vaccination schedule for infants, children and adolescents in-
cludes standard vaccinations to protect against tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis, polio, hepatitis B,
Hib, pneumococcal disease, rotavirus, meningococcal disease, measles, mumps, rubella, varicella
and human papillomavirus. The latter is a special vaccine for girls aged 9 to 14 years. Some
vaccines may be offered and administered at U screenings (Standing Committee on Vaccinations
(STIKO), 2017). These routine vaccinations are fully covered by statutory health insurance. In
general, private health insurance does not have to reimburse the costs of vaccination. However,
private insurance companies normally do cover the recommended vaccines.
It is generally agreed that routine childhood immunization programs are highly cost-effective
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(e.g., Zhou et al., 2014). Despite the remarkable and undeniable health benefits from immuniza-
tion, vaccination rates are often too low. According to the World Health Organization (WHO),
immunization coverage should exceed a minimum rate of 95% across all types of childhood vac-
cines. Taking Germany as an example, there is still a long way to go until all WHO goals
are met. In general, primary immunization rates for diphtheria, tetanus and polio are reason-
ably high and close to 95%. However, compliance with booster vaccinations is substantially
worse. With regard to tetanus and diphtheria, coverage rates regarding the first booster vacci-
nation are about 83%. Compliance with the second booster vaccination drops down to roughly
30% (Poethko-Müller et al., 2007). Deficits in overall immunization coverage are also identified
for other basic vaccines such as rotavirus (68.3%), pneumococcal disease (75.9%) and measles
(86.5%, 2. dose) (Rieck et al., 2018). For example, more than 900 measles cases were reported
in Germany in 2017; about one third of the reported cases occurred in children under five years
of age (Robert Koch Institute (RKI), 2018).
Although it is generally agreed that (early) prevention is better than disease treatment, evi-
dence suggests that compliance with preventive services such as child screenings and vaccination
uptake could be better. This raises the question of why the uptake of prevention for children is
often incomplete. As already mentioned above, Section 1.5.3 will give a brief overview of factors
that have been found to be directly associated with low levels of childhood immunization and
participation rates in recommended health examinations.
1.5.3 Common predictors of childhood vaccination and screening uptake
Numerous studies have investigated factors that are related to low compliance with the rec-
ommendations for childhood prevention. In the following, we briefly summarize the main
factors that are likely to affect vaccine uptake in children. Findings from empirical studies
suggest that low immunization rates are generally associated with different socioeconomic and
sociodemographic variables such as low socioeconomic status as a whole, low parental education,
low parental income, non-white race/ethnicity, young age of the mother/parents, large family
size/number of siblings, older age of the child and marital status of the mother (unmarried or
divorced).16 Structural barriers in health care were also found to be associated with suboptimal
compliance to immunization. They include the lack of health care structures, inadequate sup-
port from physicians and restricted access to preventive child health services. However, these
16The correlates of low vaccination rates and socioeconomic status (SES) often show an inverted U-shaped
pattern. That is, rates are lower among low and high SES families (e.g., Poethko-Müller et al., 2007).
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factors are likely to play a negligible role in vaccination uptake in Germany. Parental attitudes
and beliefs may be additional risk factors for undervaccination. Psychological factors such as
negative attitudes towards immunization, perceiving vaccines to cause adverse health effects
and low perceived susceptibility to illness are negatively associated with vaccination uptake (see
Falagas and Zarkadoulia, 2008; Danis et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2017).
Similar findings can be found with regard to the uptake of developmental screening examina-
tions. As was already motivated in Section 1.5.2.1, children from families with low socioeconomic
status are significantly less likely to have participated in U screenings than children from middle
and high SES families (Kamtsiuris et al., 2007; Rattay et al., 2014). More specifically, Rein-
hold and Jürges (2012) show that participation rates in selective screening exams (U3, U6, and
U9) increase with parental income. Hence, low-income parents use screenings significantly less
often than parents with higher incomes. Moreover, migration background as well as childbirth
at a young (< 26 years old) and advanced maternal age (> 35 years old) are also negatively
associated with the full use of well-child visits (Kamtsiuris et al., 2007; Rattay et al., 2014).
Little is known, however, about the role of parents’ economic preferences (e.g., time pref-
erences) in this context. We put special emphasis on the investigation of parental preferences
as determinants of vaccination and screening uptake in children. Before we further discuss the
contribution of the thesis in Section 1.5.5, we provide insight into the relationship between time
discounting and preventive health behaviors at the individual level.
1.5.4 Time preference and health prevention
1.5.4.1 Health prevention as an intertemporal investment decision
In general, preventive health behavior can reasonably be considered as an investment decision
that includes an intertemporal trade-off. The uptake of vaccinations or health screenings is
a decision problem that typically involves immediate efforts and/or monetary costs, whereas
(potential) benefits are delayed. The individual is required to engage in activities he/she may
not enjoy today. These may include scheduling an appointment with the doctor, efforts to get
to the doctor’s office and discomfort with getting vaccinated or tested. However, the expected
future benefits from primary and secondary prevention may by far exceed the current costs and
sacrifices. That is, the prevention of disease onset and the early detection of disease which
allows early intervention before problems actually occur or get worse. It should be further
noted that risk aversion may also play a role in health investments. It is shown that risk averse
individuals are less likely to engage in risky health behaviors such as smoking and drinking
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(Barsky et al., 1997; Anderson and Mellor, 2008). For instance, vaccination decisions may also
be influenced by risk preferences. Vaccinations come at an additional risk of side effects (e.g.,
nausea or dizziness) and vaccine failure. However, not being vaccinated increases the risk of
infection. Considering the possibility of becoming ill, a higher level of personal risk aversion
should increase the demand for preventive health care (Picone et al., 1998). Theoretical models
suggest that time preference may be a major determinant of investments in preventive health
behaviors and therefore in health (Grossman, 1972; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990). On average,
people who discount the future less heavily (low time preference rate) are expected to demand
more preventive health care services than people with high rates of time preference. Although
the predictions made by economic theory are rather obvious, results from previous empirical
studies are ambiguous. In the following, a short summary of these findings is presented.
1.5.4.2 Empirical evidence on time preference and preventive health care use
Evidence on the relationship between time discounting and preventive health behaviors is both
scarce and mixed. Chapman and Coups (1999) found a weak relationship between monetary
time preference and immunization. More future-oriented individuals were more likely to accept
a free influenza vaccination. However, other measurements of time discounting (e.g., elicitation
of individual discount rates in the flu context) failed to predict vaccination uptake. In another
study, Chapman et al. (2001) analyzed the association between time discounting and several pre-
ventive health behaviors. Three health outcomes were under investigation: influenza vaccination
uptake, adherence to medication for high blood pressure, and adherence to cholesterol-lowering
medication. A lower time preference rate was positively associated with flu shot acceptance.
However, this is only true for the time preference measure in the monetary domain. With
regard to medication compliance, no meaningful relationship for any of the time preference
measures was found.
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Picone et al. (2004) found signif-
icant effects of time preference on a number of medical tests such as breast self-examinations,
mammograms and Pap smears. Women with a (relatively) short time horizon were less likely
to perform self-exams or demand a mammography screening. However, a long time horizon was
positively related to the demand for cervical smear tests. Risk aversion was only marginally
associated with these health variables. Bradford (2010), using a different wave from the HRS,
also found significant associations between individual discount rates and various health main-
tenance habits. People with a high discount rate were less likely to demand basic preventive
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screenings (e.g., mammograms, prostate exams, cholesterol tests, dental visits) and were more
likely to indulge in a sedentary lifestyle in the past two years.
The paper from Nuscheler and Roeder (2016) used a sample of individuals representative of
the German population. Its focus is on time discounting and seasonal influenza uptake. A major
contribution of this study is the analysis of behavioral anomalies (e.g., the role of present bias in
prevention decisions). Interestingly, they found that the discount factor is negatively associated,
at the 10% level, with the demand for vaccination. Furthermore, no significant effect of present
bias was identified. Hence, the demand for flu shots does not differ across exponential discounters
and present-biased individuals. However, individuals that put extra weight on future outcomes
(future bias) have a higher probability of getting a flu shot than exponential discounters. Risk
aversion was positively associated with the demand for vaccination. The authors note that the
main results are primarily driven by men.
Using cross-sectional data from the Barriers to Care for People with Chronic Health Con-
ditions (BCPCHC) survey, van der Pol et al. (2017) investigated the role of time and risk
preferences in the adherence to physician advice among individuals with chronic disease. The
financial planning horizon is used as a proxy for time preference. Personal risk preference is
measured through self-assessed willingness to take risk. Individuals with a longer planning hori-
zon, and hence with higher future orientation, are less likely to not adhere to advice on physical
activity changes. Non-adherence to advice on dietary changes is negatively related to low time
preference for men but not for women. Willingness to take risk had no impact on adherence
behavior.
1.5.5 Contribution of the thesis
We have shown that individual time preference may be an important factor associated with
several preventive health behaviors. In Chapter 2 of the thesis, we examine the relationship
between parental decision-making and childhood vaccination and screening. This chapter is
based on joint work with Robert Nuscheler. As already discussed in Section 1.5.3, different
socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes of the parents have been linked to the demand for
preventive child care. However, the influence of parental preferences is still not well understood.
In this intergenerational setting, we focus on the role of economic preferences. They include
parental time preferences, risk aversion and altruistic attitudes.
First, we present a theoretical framework for parental prevention efforts (Section 2.2). It
allows us to analyze the impact of the preference parameters mentioned above on the uptake of
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primary and secondary prevention services for children and adolescents. We derive important
implications from our theoretical model. The results suggest that disentangling the influence
of different preference parameters on prevention decisions is a major challenge. Moreover, the
directional effect of parental preferences on prevention decisions is ambiguous. Finally, as we
consider both primary and secondary prevention, interdependence of these types of preventive
activities may arise. Thus, an econometric model may be required that takes into account the
issue of simultaneity. Overall, the findings from the theoretical model provide a useful guideline
for the econometric modeling of prevention decisions.
We then empirically test the relationship between economic preferences and vaccine uptake
(primary prevention) and the demand for well-child visits (secondary prevention). Based on
our theoretical framework, we opt for the joint estimation of the demand for the two modes
of prevention. We rely on representative cross-section data of children and adolescents from
Germany. As our main preference proxy, we use information on whether the mother smoked
during pregnancy. We argue that such a behavior is associated with a high time preference rate,
low risk aversion and, obviously, a low level of altruism. The results suggest that smoking during
pregnancy is negatively associated with preventive investments in child health. For example,
we find a significant reduction in the probability of having an up-to-date screening status of
3.5 percentage points (pp) when the mother smoked during pregnancy. Whereas maternal
preferences are particularly relevant for screening decisions, they also show a negative impact
on vaccination uptake for boys but not for girls (−3.6 pp for boys). In addition, stratifying by
social status, negative impacts on screening status are primarily identified for children from low
and medium SES families.
Chapter 2 of the thesis contributes to the health economics literature in many ways. First,
our theoretical framework provides guidance for the appropriate econometric modeling of pre-
vention decisions. Second, we present new empirical evidence on the determinants of parental
investments in child health. Children from socially disadvantaged families (low parental SES
and/or health) tend to be in worse health (e.g., Case et al., 2002). Maternal preferences might
contribute to a better understanding of why this gradient is present and persistent over time.
Third, our analysis further contributes to findings from previous studies which analyzed the link
between time and risk preferences and the use of preventive medical care (see Section 1.5.4.2).
However, we specifically address the intergenerational context. Since maternal preferences are
significantly associated with the uptake of primary and secondary child prevention, our findings
improve the understanding of why parents seek or do not seek preventive health services for their
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offspring. Inadequate parental investments in child health that are driven by low levels of future
orientation, risk aversion and altruism may have unfavorable consequences for the development
of children’s and adolescents’ health capital, and thus for their human capital formation.
1.6 Tobacco consumption, intergenerational transmission and
time discounting
1.6.1 The problem of tobacco smoking
Smoking is still one of the main causes of cancer development and heart and lung disease (e.g.,
lung cancer, stroke and chronic bronchitis) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
2018a). Worldwide, around 7 million people die each year because of tobacco use. Almost 900
thousand of those deaths are the result of non-smokers being exposed to second-hand smoke
(World Health Organization (WHO), 2017a,b). For example, about one in four Germans aged
15 or older smokes (Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), 2017). Roughly 121,000 people died as a
result of smoking in Germany in 2013. This equals 13.5% of the total number of deaths. Annual
costs of tobacco consumption are estimated to be approximately 79 billion Euros. This includes
direct costs such as medical expenses to treat smoking-related diseases as well as indirect costs
(e.g., reduced earning capacity or unemployment) (Pötschke-Langer et al., 2015).
Adverse health consequences and negative externalities of smoking are frequently considered
to be the main reasons for policy interventions to curb smoking prevalence. Undoubtedly,
smoking has negative impacts on the health of smokers. However, it is also bad for the health
of others that do not smoke, and thus places an extra burden on society as a whole. Typically,
smokers will only consider their private costs (e.g., monetary costs of buying tobacco products
and (perhaps) personal health risks for smoking-related diseases) and benefits (e.g., pleasure from
tobacco consumption). However, negative external effects such as bad air quality, involuntary
but harmful passive smoking and health care costs to treat smoking-related health problems are
imposed on third parties without adequate compensation.17
Taxation of tobacco products is a standard approach to make smokers pay the social costs
of smoking (“Pigouvian taxes”). The intention of such a tobacco control strategy is to reduce
tobacco (over-)consumption to a socially optimal and therefore more desirable level. In ad-
dition, excise taxes on tobacco could also correct smoking’s “internalities”. Individuals may
17As already stated by Gruber and Köszegi (2001), smoking during pregnancy and poor subsequent infant
health are probably the most drastic example of negative externality in the context of tobacco consumption.
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overlook (discount heavily) the adverse health effects of tobacco consumption they face them-
selves. Hence, if the smoker has to decide between enjoying the pleasures of smoking a cigarette
and long-term health, he or she will choose to smoke. However, the smoker may prefer to stop
smoking (e.g., quit smoking tomorrow). But when tomorrow becomes today (the future becomes
the present), the smoker will face the exact same trade-off. And again, smoking a cigarette will
be the preferred option. Thus, smoking continues although the smoker may deeply regret the
decisions made. Such self-control problems among smokers may arise due to unhealthy time-
inconsistent preferences (see Section 1.3.2).18 Smokers who would like to quit but cannot may
appreciate commitment devices such as (considerably) higher taxes to achieve a tobacco-free life
(Gruber, 2002; Gruber and Köszegi, 2001, 2004). It should be noted, however, that the demand
for addictive goods such as cigarettes is rather price inelastic. Normally, the price elasticity
of demand for cigarettes or tobacco ranges from −0.3 to −0.5 (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000).
However, it is an indication that taxation could reduce tobacco consumption.19
Around the globe, a number of tobacco control policies have been developed in order to
increase the costs of smoking. While raising taxes is still suggested to be the most effective and
cost-effective way to reduce smoking and encourage smokers to quit, other prevention policies
have received more and more attention in the past. In addition to the steady elevation of tobacco
prices by the use of consumption taxes, different measures such as health warning labels, anti-
tobacco mass media campaigns, smoking bans, and the like have been introduced and improved
over the past years (World Health Organization (WHO), 2017b). In fact, there is evidence that
these policies can play an important role in reducing tobacco consumption (see, e.g., Nesson,
2017; DeCicca et al., 2008; Carpenter and Cook, 2008; Evans et al., 1999; Anger et al., 2011;
Hammond, 2011; Emery et al., 2012; Blecher, 2008; Saffer and Chaloupka, 2000).20 They may
have contributed to an overall decrease in the prevalence of tobacco smoking. Global smoking
prevalence has declined from 23.5% in 2007 to 20.7% in 2015. Although prevalence is still higher
in developed countries than in most developing countries, average rates of current smoking
decrease faster in high-income countries than in middle- or low-income countries. However,
steady population growth is the reason why the number of smokers has remained constant over
the past decade. According to the WHO, about 1.1 billion people worldwide were smokers in
2015 (World Health Organization (WHO), 2017b).
18Empirical evidence on time discounting and smoking behavior is provided in Section 1.6.2.3.
19See also Section 2.4 of Cawley and Ruhm (2011) for more information on the price elasticities of health
behaviors.
20See Chaloupka and Warner (2000) for a review.
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Although the rates of current smoking decline, the numbers are still considerably high.
Hence, the factors from above (e.g., taxes or smoking bans) may represent some, but not all
influences on the decision to smoke. In the following, social and economic determinants of smok-
ing status are discussed which may, at least partly, explain why the “global tobacco epidemic”
is not dead yet.
1.6.2 Determinants of smoking status and behavior
1.6.2.1 The SES-health gradient
The understanding of factors that influence smoking habits is of particular interest for health
researchers, but may also have implications for policy makers. There is a large body of literature
on the relationship between socioeconomic status (SES) and health. In general, people with a
higher SES can be considered to be in better health and live longer (see Cutler et al. (2011) for a
review). For instance, education is negatively associated with the probability of being a current
smoker, the probability of being obese and the probability of being a heavy drinker (Cutler and
Lleras-Muney, 2010).
Although the empirical evidence on the SES-health gradient is robust, many findings cannot
necessarily be interpreted as causal relationships. For instance, poor health may also reduce
productivity and therefore a person’s educational attainment and income. Furthermore, third
factors such as time preferences may affect both SES and health (Fuchs, 1982). However, causal
effects of SES on health have been established in the past (see, e.g., Brunello et al., 2016). There
is some evidence that education has a direct causal effect on smoking behavior. More educated
individuals are less likely to smoke (see, e.g., de Walque, 2007). In fact, health behaviors such
as smoking are identified as mediating factors and account, at least partly, for the causal effect
of education on health (Brunello et al., 2016). Higher educated people tend to make better
health decisions and therefore live a healthier lifestyle and abstain from risky health behaviors
such as smoking. Moreover, they are more likely to manage health inputs more efficiently which
improves health production (Grossman, 1972).
The gradient may have its roots already in childhood (Case et al., 2002). That is, lower
parental SES, and thus poorer health, is predictive of poorer child health. As argued above
(see Section 1.5.1), health disadvantages in childhood are likely to have further impacts on the
child’s economic status and health in adulthood (see, e.g., Case et al., 2005). In Section 1.5.3,
we already discussed the income gradient in healthcare utilization (screening participation) for
children. Hence, health problems in children living in low-income families are at higher risk
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of remaining undetected. In order to shed more light on this vicious circle of poor SES and
health, economists have increased their attention to the intergenerational transmission of health
and health behaviors. Parental habits and characteristics may play an important role in the
commonly observable persistence of specific health patterns (e.g., smoking behaviors passed
down from generation to generation). In section 1.6.2.2, we discuss potential mechanisms of the
transmission of health behaviors such as smoking.
1.6.2.2 Intergenerational transmission of smoking behavior
The positive relationship between parental and child smoking behavior is well documented in
the literature (e.g., Wickrama et al., 1999; Bantle and Haisken-DeNew, 2002; Shenassa et al.,
2003; Göhlmann et al., 2010; Melchior et al., 2010; Loureiro et al., 2010). Overall, these findings
suggest that children of smokers are more likely to become smokers themselves. However, var-
ious mechanisms exist through which parents may transmit their smoking habits and therefore
influence offspring’s smoking behavior.21
Intergenerational similarities in smoking may be the result of the genetic inheritance of health
(Thompson, 2014). Evidence suggests that tobacco consumption and nicotine dependence are
partly determined by genetics (see, e.g., Shenassa et al., 2003). In addition to genetic effects,
offspring’s smoking behavior may also be influenced by parents serving as role models for their
children. Based on their beliefs, parents may try to shape their offspring’s values, attitudes
and preferences through direct socialization efforts. However, rather unintended actions of the
parents may further impact the child’s decision to start smoking. Exposure to second-hand
smoke or easy access to cigarettes at home may serve as examples. Hence, imitation of parental
behavior may be an explanation for why children and adolescents decide to start smoking (e.g.,
Bantle and Haisken-DeNew, 2002; Loureiro et al., 2010; Göhlmann et al., 2010). In addition,
there is some evidence that parental health shocks have an effect on offspring smoking behavior.
A smoking-related cardiovascular shock to the parent is associated with a reduction in adult
offspring’s smoking participation and intensity. However, this effect is limited to women (Darden
and Gilleskie, 2016).
Reconsidering more fundamental mechanisms, economic preferences such as risk and time
preferences may be crucial. These hardly observable factors may be common to both parents
and their children. In the intrapersonal context, individual risk attitudes and time preference
21In Chapter 3, we focus on parental influences on offspring smoking behavior. For further reading on the
effects of peers (e.g., friends or classmates), see Cawley and Ruhm (2011, Section 3.1).
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are widely considered as predictors of smoking behavior. Unsurprisingly, a higher level of risk
aversion is associated with a lower probability of cigarette smoking (e.g., Anderson and Mellor,
2008). In addition, more future-oriented individuals are more likely to abstain from tobacco
use (see Section 1.6.2.3 for more details). There is robust evidence for a positive correlation in
risk and time preferences between parents and children (see, e.g., Dohmen et al., 2012; Gauly,
2017). Genetic inheritance and/or parental efforts to form these preferences may explain the
observed correlations.22 However, surprisingly little is known about the role of time preference
in the intergenerational context of smoking.
1.6.2.3 Time discounting and smoking
Apparently, tobacco consumption is a major risk factor for smoking-related diseases (see Section
1.6.1). Moreover, it is another striking example of intertemporal choice for health. As already
discussed in Section 1.5.4.1, we consider the demand for health screenings and vaccines as a trade-
off between costs and benefits that occur at different points in time. In the context of smoking,
similar considerations can be made. People weigh immediate and future rewards of tobacco
consumption. Typically, they choose between the immediate pleasure from smoking a cigarette
(e.g., stress relief and relaxation) and good health in the future from not smoking (e.g., decreased
risk of lung cancer). According to economic theory, individuals will (continue to) smoke if the
present gains from smoking exceed its future costs (Becker and Murphy, 1988). Individuals
with a low discount rate (high patience/future orientation) are likely to abstain from smoking
which will otherwise damage their health in the future. Hence, they place more value on the
long-run gains from abstaining from tobacco use than on the short-run pleasures from smoking.
However, those who have high discount rates (low patience/future orientation) tend to select the
short-run rewards derived from tobacco consumption. The future benefits of living a tobacco-
free life (or the delayed adverse health consequences of smoking) are discounted heavily. Hence,
impatient individuals place more value on immediate pleasures and therefore sacrifice larger
health benefits in the future. Moreover, individuals with present-biased preferences (hyperbolic
discounters) are expected to smoke more than exponential discounters. Their discount rates are
higher for immediate future choices than for choices in the distant future. As a consequence,
preference reversals may occur because immediate gratification is consistently preferred over the
larger future health reward (see also Section 1.6.1).
22As we will see in Section 1.7, Chapter 4 is dedicated to the empirical analysis of genetic and environmental
influences on the formation and transmission of time preferences.
22
Chapter 1 Introduction
In the past, the relationship between time discounting and smoking behavior has received
particular interest among behavioral and health economists. There is evidence that smokers
discount future outcomes such as delayed monetary or health gains more heavily than non-
smokers (e.g., Bickel et al., 1999; Odum et al., 2002; Scharff and Viscusi, 2011). Hence, the
individual discount rate is typically positively associated with smoking behavior. In addition
to the robust relationship between time preference rate and smoking, some studies are also
able to relate tobacco consumption to hyperbolic discounting and time inconsistencies (see, e.g.,
Harrison et al., 2010; Kang and Ikeda, 2014). Based on a quasi-hyperbolic discount function,
Ida (2014) shows that both time preference rate and present bias are significantly associated
with the probability of smoking. The higher the time preference rate and the present bias, the
higher the smoking probability. Furthermore, Kang and Ikeda (2014) find that discount rates
and hyperbolic discounting are also correlated with smoking intensity. Among smokers, both
factors are positively associated with the number of cigarettes consumed per day. The empirical
analysis on discounting and smoking further extends to the topic of smoking cessation. Evidence
suggests that future-oriented smokers are more likely to quit tobacco consumption and also more
likely to permanently abstain from smoking (e.g., Brown and Adams, 2013; Goto et al., 2009).23
Although previous studies have linked time discounting parameters to smoking behavior
(at the intrapersonal level) and discussed possible transmission mechanisms of smoking, we
do hardly know anything about the role of parental time discounting in the intergenerational
transmission of smoking. Brown and van der Pol (2014) have been the first to provide some
evidence on this issue. For their analysis, they used survey data from Australia. A pooled probit
model was estimated and no correlation between maternal time preference and offspring smoking
probability was found. However, indirect effects are present. Sons of mothers who smoke and
have a shorter planning horizon are 6% more likely to smoke than sons of mothers who smoke
and have a longer planning horizon. The effects on females are similar. Daughters of mothers
who smoke and have a shorter planning horizon are 7% more likely to smoke than daughters
of mothers who smoke and have a longer planning horizon. It should be noted, however, that
these correlations cannot necessarily be interpreted as causal relationships.
1.6.3 Contribution of the thesis
It is obvious that the existing literature on this topic is extremely limited. Chapter 3 of the
thesis is based on joint work with Andreas Kucher and contributes to Brown and van der Pol
23For a review, see Barlow et al. (2017).
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(2014) by further investigating the effect of parental time discounting on child smoking. We
extend their rather tentative analysis in several ways. First and foremost, we apply validated
measures in order to distinguish between self-control abilities and general time preference. This
approach provides a more distinctive view on (slightly) different features of time discounting
(long-term discount rate vs. present bias). In addition, we control for potential confounders
such as risk aversion and parental altruism. For example, while immediate consequences are
certain, the future is inherently risky. Hence, people’s risk preferences may also play a role in
smoking decisions that may cause serious health consequences in the distant future. Moreover,
our analysis is not restricted to the influence of mothers. Characteristics of the father are
also taken into account. This allows us to study potential gender differences in parent-child
relationships in more detail. We further investigate if health behaviors such as past and current
smoking act as mediating factors of parental time discounting. Finally, we explore if the number
of cigarettes consumed is related to our time preference measures.
Our estimation results confirm findings from previous studies (see Section 1.6.2.3). Higher
levels of personal impatience and impulsivity are associated with a higher likelihood of being
a smoker. However, our findings further suggest that there is a direct effect of parental time
discounting on child smoking. A one standard deviation increase in maternal and paternal pa-
tience is associated with a reduction in child’s smoking participation of about 6-7%, respectively.
Interestingly, these effects remain robust even after controlling for additional explanatory vari-
ables and potential mediating factors (e.g., education and parental smoking behavior). Although
the coefficients of parental smoking status (ex-smoker and current smoker) are both highly sig-
nificant and show the expected positive sign, none of the parental health behaviors (smoking,
drinking, nutrition and sports) is identified as mediator between parental time preference and
offspring smoking behavior. Furthermore, we do not find significant effects of parental time
discounting on offspring cigarette consumption.
We can only speculate about what actually drives the direct effects of parental time preference
on child smoking. The analysis of other potential pathways may be a promising direction for
future research (e.g., parent-child communication). Due to limitations of our dataset, we are not
able to investigate other transmission channels in more detail. To some extent, genetic and/or
cultural linkages of time preference between parents and their offspring may further contribute
to these findings. A closer examination of the formation and transmission of time preferences
is therefore presented in Chapter 4. However, although more research on this issue is required,
the possible impact of parental time preference on offspring tobacco use should not be ignored.
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1.7 The formation and transmission of time preferences
The final chapter of the thesis covers a distinct topic in the area of time discounting. While
Chapters 2 and 3 both link time discounting to specific health behaviors, Chapter 4 takes a dif-
ferent approach. As pointed out above, a large body of literature has examined the relationship
between time preference and different health behaviors such as smoking, alcohol use and obesity
(see Story et al. (2014) for a systematic review). However, our knowledge about the transmission
and formation of time preference is still limited. In this chapter, we seek to open up this ‘black
box’ and shed some light on the basic processes that lie behind preference formation.
Economic preferences such as time preferences may be shaped by genetic inheritance and/or
learning and adaptation processes. Our study contributes to the discussion on whether time
preferences can be taken as given/exogenous or as endogenously determined. Are people born
with innate time preference rates or can they be shaped by environmental influences? In fact,
the aim of our analysis is to examine the relative contribution of genes and environment to the
total variance in time preference. Providing a better understanding of the origins of individual
differences in time discounting is important because we have already seen that preferences are
likely to act as underlying factors of various health behaviors. New insights into the composition
and transmission of time preference may also be valuable for (health) economists and policy
makers in order to evaluate how people’s choices could be influenced.
1.7.1 Endogeneity of preferences
1.7.1.1 The nature-nurture debate
The formation of human behavior has been subject of extensive discussion in the past and the
debate is still going on. Hundreds of years ago, people were already curious about the main
determinants of human mind, traits and behavior patterns. In fact, they were searching for
an answer to the fundamental question of whether nature or nurture exhibits a predominant
influence on physical, behavioral and cognitive characteristics. Whereas “nature” refers to the
formation of traits as a consequence of genetic inheritance, “nurture” sums up all the influences
associated with other sources such as environmental factors, socialization efforts and/or learning
effects. Philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries have taken rather extreme views on the topic.
The English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) proposed the idea that a child is born without
predispositions. Hence, the mind of the child is a “blank slate” (tabula rasa). Revealing a
strong bias towards nurture, Locke argued that human characteristics are mainly influenced
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by experiences and environmental effects. In contrast to Locke, the Swiss philosopher Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) emphasized the role of nature in human development. His theory
suggests that children are endowed with goodness. They mainly develop according to “nature’s
plan” (natural predispositions) and the effects of nurture or experience are of minor importance
(Goldhaber, 2012, p. 15; Harris and Butterworth, 2002, pp. 12-13).24
Based on these philosophical considerations, the stage was set for the emergence of the so-
called nature versus nurture debate. Inspired by Charles Darwin’s book The Origin of Species
(1859), the English anthropologist Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911) was the first to phrase the
nature-nurture problem which is still one of the most controversially discussed topics within
psychology. Galton had observed that genius tended to run in families and inferred that intel-
ligence was likely to be inherited (Galton, 1869).25 Moreover, his thoughts on heredity led the
way to the implementation of the twin method. Its roots trace back to the beginning of the
20th century and it is still the most widely used method in behavioral genetics (see, e.g., Rende
et al., 1990).
Despite its long tradition in behavioral genetics, the use of quantitative genetic methods
is still relatively new in health economics. These methods include twin and adoption designs
in order to understand the relative importance of nature versus nurture. Genetic and envi-
ronmental factors may both contribute to differences in traits across individuals. Quantitative
genetics offers an approach to analyze the extent to which variance in a trait is due to genetic
and/or environmental variation. The twin design, for example, compares the resemblance of
monozygotic (identical) and dizygotic (fraternal) same-sex twins. It is generally agreed that
both monozygotic and dizygotic twins share their environment to the same extent (e.g., born
at the same time, share the same womb, are raised in the same home, are the same age and are
of the same sex). However, the major difference between both twin types is the genetic related-
ness among the twins of a twin pair. Fraternal twins share (substantially) less genetic material
than genetically identical twins. If genetic influences on a trait are present, the greater genetic
similarity of identical twins will make them more similar than fraternal twins with respect to
the trait under investigation. By taking advantage of the genetic differences between both twin
types, twin studies are able to decompose and estimate the relative contribution of genetic and
environmental factors to a specific trait (see, e.g., Plomin and Daniels, 2011).26
Lately, however, economists have devoted increasing attention to the examination of genetic
24For more information on the diverging theories of Locke and Rousseau, see Gianoutsos (2006).
25See, e.g., Sherry (2004, pp. 85-89) for an overview of the history of the nature vs. nurture debate.
26The twin methodology will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
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mechanisms in health transmission. For instance, Thompson (2014) exploits data on biological
and adopted children to quantify the extent to which the intergenerational transmission of health
is due to genetic linkages between parents and their children. The focus of the analysis is on the
comparison of intergenerational correlations in health among biological and adopted children.
Since an adoptive child is genetically unrelated to the adoptive parents, the difference in the
intergenerational health correlations between biological and adopted children can be interpreted
as the proportion of parent-child transmission that is due to shared genetics. The main finding
is that the genetic transmission of chronic health conditions like asthma and hay fever is around
20-30%. Thus, the majority of health transmission is due to environmental influences.27
However, behavioral genetic methods can also be applied to estimate the heritability of
economic preferences such as risk attitudes and time preferences (see Section 1.7.3). Of course,
from an economics perspective, the impact of the environment is at least as important as the
genetic inheritance. In the following section, some theoretical and empirical considerations are
made to highlight the (potential) endogeneity of time discounting. This allows us to hypothesize
why nurture may be important with regard to time preference.
1.7.1.2 The endogenous determination of time preference
Standard economic literature assumes that (time) preferences can be taken as given or exogenous.
Technically speaking, genetic inheritance would be primarily responsible for preference formation
and transmission. However, this argument is questioned by researchers who treat preferences
as cultural traits or learned behavior.28 Preferences may be affected and formed by economic
institutions, social interactions and cultural evolution (Bowles, 1998). For instance, the effects
of markets and other economic institutions on preferences include market framing, the evolution
of norms and the design of reward systems. The process of cultural transmission involves child-
rearing, childhood socialization and schooling. According to the model framework developed
by Bisin and Verdier (2001), preferences of children are directly influenced by their parents’
socialization efforts (vertical socialization) and by social and cultural environments (oblique
socialization).
In their seminal paper, Becker and Mulligan (1997) provide a theoretical framework of en-
27A selection of twin-based findings regarding the heritability of specific health conditions (e.g., diabetes and
migraine headaches) is presented in Thompson (2014, Section 2).
28The paper by Fuchs (2000) discussed health economics as a behavioral science. His selection of promising
areas for future research included the issue of endogenous preferences. He recognized the “attempts to uncover
the endogenous aspects of [...] preferences in health and medical care” as “extremely fruitful” which “could enrich
the mainstream literature”(Fuchs, 2000, p. 146).
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dogenous time preference formation. The idea of the model is that individuals can invest re-
sources in order to alter their discount rates, and therefore become more future-oriented. Such
investments may include spending time and efforts to increase the value of future utilities. Other
examples are the purchase of commitment devices to forgo current consumption (e.g., regular
deposits into a savings account without the option to withdraw money from the account until a
certain date) or activities that raise awareness of making provisions for old age (e.g., spending
time with aging parents). However, the model also suggests that individual time preference may
be influenced by nurture. Parents could directly invest resources in order to teach their children
to better plan for the future. As a consequence, offspring discount rates should decrease.29 Ac-
cording to this model, schooling is also supposed to make young people more future oriented by
focusing students’ attention towards the future. In addition, Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue
that people make frequent experiences about what had been future utilities. This may facilitate
their anticipation of the future.
The existing literature on endogenous time preferences is limited. However, there is some
empirical evidence that time discounting could be influenced by environmental factors. Studies
that analyze the effects of plausibly exogenous shocks on time preferences show that these
preferences do change. Voors et al. (2012) conducted a series of field experiments in Burundi
to investigate the effects of exposure to violent conflicts on economic behaviors. The findings
suggest that exposure to violence increases individual discount rates.30 Callen (2015) follows
a different approach and explores whether time preferences respond to natural catastrophes.
He relies on data from a sample of Sri Lankan wage workers and exploits random exposure to
the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake tsunami. The results show that tsunami exposure increases
patience.31
As already mentioned above, schooling may also play a role for time preference formation.
Indeed, there is suggestive evidence of a causal effect of education on time preference. Perez-
Arce (2017) ran an experiment where public college applicants in Mexico City were randomly
assigned to either the treatment or the control group. Individuals who were successful in the
lottery got immediate acceptance for admission to the college (treatment group). Those who
were not picked in the lottery had to wait an entire year before enrollment was possible (control
group). On average, the immediate admission group acquired more years of education than
29Based on the model proposed by Becker and Mulligan (1997), Gouskova et al. (2010) elaborated a model
extension that explicitly considers parental investments in offspring’s stock of future-oriented capital.
30In addition, the experience of violence appears to make people less risk-averse and more altruistic towards
their neighbors.
31See Meier and Sprenger (2015) for empirical evidence on the temporal stability of time preference.
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the delayed admission group. Based on a set of hypothetical intertemporal choice questions,
the main finding is that the individuals who were successful in the admission lottery were more
patient than those who did not get early access to more education. Hence, it seems that schooling
has some influence on patience.
Although far from being conclusive, economic theory and experimental studies provide rather
plausible evidence that individual time preference is not fully programmed in a person’s genetic
code but may be prone to social and environmental influences. Based on these considerations,
we take a further look at studies that have analyzed the transmission of economic preferences
between parents and their offspring.
1.7.2 Intergenerational correlation of economic preferences
In the recent past, research on the intergenerational transmission of economic preferences has
gained increasing interest among economists. However, the empirical evidence is still limited.
With regard to risk and trust attitudes, Dohmen et al. (2012) found positive correlations be-
tween (young) adult children and their parents. In a similar fashion, Gauly (2017) identified
intergenerational correlations of proxy variables for time discounting, namely patience and im-
pulsivity. On average, children report a higher level of patience as parents’ level of patience
increases. Moreover, children’s impulsivity depends positively on the impulsivity of their par-
ents. A recent paper by Brown and van der Pol (2015) provides additional evidence on the
positive correlation in parental and offspring time and risk preferences. Although studies exist
that do not find statistically significant correlations (see, e.g., Bettinger and Slonim (2007) for a
study on patience), the majority of the literature reports positive correlations between children’s
economic preferences and those of their parents.32
However, a major limitation of these studies is that the estimation of intergenerational
correlations is not informative about what actually drives the transmission process. Observed
trait correlations for first-degree relatives (parents and children) can be due to shared heredity
as well as shared family environment. However, the nature of the correlational research design
makes it impossible to separate genetic effects from environmental effects. In Chapter 4 of
the thesis, we address this issue in more detail. It aims to explore if economic preferences are
influenced by genetics. In particular, we apply the classical twin design to estimate the genetic
and environmental influences on time preference. Surprisingly, this topic has received little
32See Brown and van der Pol (2015) for a comprehensive summary of relevant papers that have analyzed the
intergenerational correlations of time and risk preferences.
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attention in the economics literature so far. But further progress in this area is important in
order to gain a better understanding of how economic preferences such as time preferences are
actually formed. This and other contributions of our analysis will be discussed next.
1.7.3 Contribution of the thesis
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on the formation of economic preferences. More specif-
ically, we study the genetic variation in individual time preference using a twin-based research
design. We compare monozygotic twins who are genetically identical to dizygotic twins whose
genetical structure is not perfectly correlated. This approach allows us to estimate the propor-
tion of variance in time preference that is due to genetic, shared and unshared environmental
influences.33 In general, the (economic) literature on the genetic variation in risk and time
preferences is scarce. Moreover, the results are ambiguous. With regard to risk preferences, the
heritability estimates vary considerably, from roughly 20% up to more than 60% (Cesarini et al.,
2009; Zhong et al., 2009; Zyphur et al., 2009).
Research on the heritability of time preference, however, seems to be still at the very be-
ginning. The poor availability of twin data in combination with a striking lack of reliable time
preference measures may perhaps be an explanation for this gap in the literature. Anokhin
et al. (2011) conducted a longitudinal twin study in order to estimate the heritability of delay
discounting in adolescence (initial sample at age 12: n = 744 twins; follow-up sample at age
14: n = 606 twins). The children were recruited from the general U. S. population through
a twin registry. Participants were asked to choose between $7 in cash immediately or $10 in
cash by mail in seven days. A significant heritability of delay discounting of 30% and even
51% was found at ages 12 and 14, respectively. Amongst other behavioral anomalies, Cesarini
et al. (2012) investigated the genetic variation in short-term time preference. Using data from
a subsample of the Swedish Twin Registry (n = 11,418 adult twins), survey participants had
to choose between receiving an amount of money today and a larger amount of money in the
future. While today’s payoff remained constant (SEK 5,000), the larger later reward was either
SEK 7,000, SEK 6,000 or SEK 5,500 in a week. However, the heritability estimate was not
statistically significant.34
We conduct an empirical analysis to explore if individual time preferences are under genetic
influence. Newly available twin data from Germany is used. Our final sample size is reasonably
33An alternative approach of behavioral genetic research is the adoption design. See Plomin and Daniels (2011)
for a description of the adoptee strategy.
34To the best of our knowledge, there is no other relevant literature on this specific topic.
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large and consists of roughly 3,000 twins, distributed in three age groups: children, adolescents
and adults. In addition, we introduce a new time preference measure in this context. An exper-
imentally validated survey question on general patience is used to measure time preference. The
empirical results suggest that genetic differences explain about 23 percent of the individual vari-
ance in time preference. In fact, it is the estimate of the broad-sense heritability which describes
the proportion of variance in time preference that is associated with all genetic influences. How-
ever, the non-shared environment of the twins in the same family is not only the major source of
environmental variation, but also represents the main source of the total variation. Despite the
obvious fact that more research on this important but yet under-researched topic is needed, our
findings raise awareness of the relative importance of genetic and environmental factors in the
intergenerational transmission of preferences. A rigorous understanding of the role and compo-
sition of economic preferences may also be interesting for policy makers that aim to break up
the vicious cycle of negative (health) behavior patterns and persistent inequality.
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Maternal Preferences and Child
Prevention
2.1 Introduction
Even in developed countries, where large parts of the population have reasonably good access
to health care, there is substantial variation in individual health outcomes. Although it is well
documented that health differences in adulthood can be traced back to health differences in
early childhood, at birth, or even earlier (see, e.g., Case et al., 2005), the mechanisms are not
well understood.
In principle, one can distinguish between biological, environmental, and behavioral factors
that explain observed health differences. The perhaps most important biological factor is ge-
netics. Children born with a chronic disease, for instance, will suffer from the same disease in
adulthood. Combining biological and environmental factors, Barker (1995, 1997, 1998) offered a
biological channel other than genetics. He suggested that in-utero conditions are an important
determinant not only for child health but for health over the life cycle. In his so-called fetal-
origins hypothesis, he argues that poor in-utero conditions, i.e. malnutrition, lead to a fetal
programming that, among other things, changes the metabolic system that makes individuals
more prone to develop chronic conditions later in life. Coronary heart disease and hypertension
serve as examples (see Barker, 1998). That in-utero malnutrition might have long-lasting effects
has attracted the interest of economists who asked whether the correlation underlying Barker’s
fetal origins hypothesis has a causal interpretation. The idea is to use a natural experiment that
randomly assigns malnutrition to the population and thereby to the unborn babies of pregnant
women. Famines offer such plausibly exogenous variation. Studying, for instance, the effects of
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the Dutch potato famine in the 1840s and the Dutch hunger winter in the 1940s Scholte et al.
(2015) and Lindeboom et al. (2010), respectively, find that this in-utero exposure to malnutrition
increases mortality.
While the studies on the health consequences of famines have advanced our understanding re-
garding the importance of in-utero conditions for health outcomes, there is hardly any economic
lesson learned. More interesting in this respect are behavioral factors that influence in-utero nu-
trition. One important factor is smoking during pregnancy. It is well documented that smoking
during pregnancy harms the unborn baby. Malnutrition resulting in low birth weight, stillbirth
or pre-term birth are possible consequences (see, e.g., Bruin et al., 2010). There is also evidence
for an increase in the probability of developing mental or physical disorders (see, e.g., Castles
et al., 1999; Cnattingius, 2004). The interesting question then is why disadvantaged children
never catch up when they grow older. Case and Paxson (2002) investigate how the behavior of
parents affects child health. Important factors are, for instance, whether someone in the house-
hold smokes and whether the child wears a seat-belt most of the time. The channel through
which such behaviors affect child health are more (second-hand smoke) or less (accidents) obvi-
ous.1 Case and Paxson (2002) report socio-economic differences in risky health behaviors. This
is perhaps not too surprising as socio-economic status (or education and income) is – just like
health – the outcome of investments in human capital. As was argued by Fuchs (1982) these
investments and with it the positive correlation between socio-economic status and health can
be explained by individual preferences, in particular, time preferences. That preferences indeed
matter was demonstrated by Case and Paxson (2001) who investigated health behaviors of legal
guardians. They found that legal guardians that are more likely to be altruistic towards chil-
dren, e.g., adoptive mothers and foster parents, invest more in the health of children (measured
in routine doctor visits, for instance) than legal guardians that are likely to be less altruistic,
e.g., step mothers.
In our paper we bring all this together and consider smoking during pregnancy a proxy
variable for maternal preferences and relate them to the demand for preventive health care
for children and adolescents. More precisely, we investigate how maternal preferences affect
the vaccination status of children (primary prevention) and the demand for well-child visits
(secondary prevention). We thereby shed light on the potential channel that leads from poor
health in early childhood to poor health later in life – mothers that attach a relatively low value
to the health of their offspring invest comparably few resources in health production. Using the
1Case and Paxson (2002) do not investigate potential differences in health care consumption.
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base survey from the ‘German Interview and Examination Survey for Children and Adolescents’
we find that children born to mothers who smoked during pregnancy are about 120 grams lighter
than children of mothers who did not smoke during pregnancy. There are, thus, differences in
health at birth and these differences persist in terms of parent-reported child health at the
time of the interview. More precisely, while 43 percent of mothers who abstained from smoking
during pregnancy report that their child is in very good health only 38 percent of mothers who
smoked during pregnancy do so. We demonstrate that this pattern may well be explained by
the differences in the demand for preventive health care.
We define four dependent variables, namely, two indicator variables measuring whether the
vaccination status or the screening status is up-to-date. Motivated by our theoretical frame-
work, we estimate a bivariate probit model with smoking during pregnancy being our most
important proxy for maternal preferences. We find a significant reduction in the probability of
having an up-to-date screening status of 3.5 percentage points when the mother smoked during
pregnancy. In a gender-stratified analysis it turns out that the effect is about twice as large
for boys than for girls (−4.6 and −2.3 percentage points, respectively). In the pooled sample,
there is no significant association between maternal preferences and the demand for immuniza-
tion. A gender-stratified analysis reveals that smoking during pregnancy significantly reduces
the probability of boys having up-to-date vaccination records by 3.6 percentage points. There
is no significant association between our preference proxy and the demand for immunization for
girls. We find qualitatively similar results when considering our alternative dependent variables,
the vaccination rate and the screening participation rate (both measured as the number of de-
manded services divided by the number of recommended services). We estimate this model using
a bivariate Tobit. In further analysis we use alternate proxies for maternal preferences: smoking
during the nursing period, current smoking status of the mother, and whether someone in the
household smokes in the presence of the child. Our results are largely robust. Motivated by the
growing literature on the socio-economic gradient in child health we investigate whether our sug-
gested preference channel is particularly active in low socio-economic status groups and obtain
a somewhat mixed picture. If anything boys born to mothers who smoked during pregnancy are
most at risk when their family has a low or medium socio-economic status. Interestingly, we find
that the above mentioned patterns do not obtain in families with a migration background. Our
results suggest that public policies should target primarily boys living in socially disadvantaged
families without migration background.
Our paper also relates to the literature studying the relationship between socio-economic
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status and child health. The first paper in this strand of the literature is Case et al. (2002).
The contribution of their paper is two-fold. First, by concentrating on the relationship between
child health and household income (or socio-economic status) they mitigate the problem of
reverse causality inherent in studies trying to pin down how adult income affects adult health:
While Currie and Madrian (1999) emphasized that the causality is running from health to
education (and, consequently, to income) the reverse causality is at the heart of Grossman’s
(1972) seminal paper on health production. The second contribution of Case et al. (2002) is
that they find an income gradient in child health and that the gradient steepens as children
grow older. The gradient was shown to exist in many developed countries including the UK
(Currie et al., 2007; Propper et al., 2007; Case et al., 2005), Canada (Currie and Stabile, 2003),
and Germany (Reinhold and Jürges, 2012). In some countries the gradient is found to become
steeper when children age, in other countries the gradient is persistent. Notably, in none of
the countries the gradient is found to become smaller when children grow older. Our paper
suggests that maternal preferences might contribute to understanding why the gap never closes
or, more dramatically, why the gap is persistent or even grows. Amongst these articles our
paper is most related to Reinhold and Jürges (2012) as their analysis is based on the same data
as ours. In their analysis they try to identify possible channels through which socio-economic
status affects child health. In so doing they find a socio-economic gradient in the demand for
well-child visits. Whether or not this contributes to socio-economic gradient in child health
remains unclear. By concentrating on the demand for screening exams (and vaccinations) we
zoom into the relationship between household characteristics and the demand for preventive
care and relate them to individual preferences.2 They also consider different health behaviors of
parents that might affect child health, including smoking during pregnancy or smoking behavior
more generally. Like us, they interpret these behaviors as proxies for parental preferences. They
find that these behaviors are no mediating factors, that is, the income gradient in child health
is robust to adding the respective explanatory variables in their regressions. They remain silent
about the channel through which these preferences affect child health (except for second-hand
smoke). This is where our study comes into play. As mentioned above, we argue that maternal
preferences measured by smoking behavior affect the demand for preventive child care that is
an important input in the production of child health.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we present a simple
theoretical model to illustrate how maternal preferences affect the demand for preventive child
2Note that Reinhold and Jürges (2012) only consider a subset of the screening exams we are investigating.
They look at three such exams, we look at 8.
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care. The comparative static properties of the model inform the econometric modeling and
guide the interpretation of results. The data set is introduced in Section 2.3 followed by a brief
description of the econometric framework in Section 2.4. We present our main results in Section
2.5 and offer some extensions in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical framework
We consider a model family with one parent and one child in a two-period setting. In period 1
the parent earns an income y > 0 and may invest part of this income in prevention. This effort
lowers the expected health loss EL > 0 of the child in period 2. We let the expected loss depend
on primary prevention effort e1 ≥ 0 and secondary prevention effort e2 ≥ 0. Income, health loss,
and preventive effort are measured in monetary units.
First and foremost, primary prevention is directed towards lowering the probability of disease
occurrence, vaccinations being the prime example. Vaccinations are typically imperfect: they
only offer partial protection, that is, they reduce the probability of illness but not to zero.3
If vaccinated individuals are infected, however, the course of the disease is typically milder as
compared to unprotected individuals.4 Primary prevention may thus reduce the expected loss
by lowering the probability of infection, by reducing the size of the loss conditional on infection,
or by both.
For secondary prevention the situation is very similar. Screenings primarily aim at early
disease detection. While earlier treatment likely reduces the health loss coming along with
the disease, a screening cannot affect the probability that the respective disease occurs (e.g.,
prostate cancer). If the disease is a risk factor for another disease, though, early detection of
the risk factor may reduce the probability of the other disease occurring. Consider, for instance,
well-child visits. As part of the health exam, height and weight of children are measured. This
allows the physician to assess the physical development of the child and to position the child in
the age and sex specific weight distribution. Early detection of excess body weight or obesity
may make parents aware of associated health problems like diabetes. This may induce parents to
take measures that reduce the body weight of their child which, in turn, reduces the probability
that their child develops diabetes.
3To keep the analysis focused, we abstract from potential side-effects of vaccinations.
4The mumps-measles-rubella (MMR) vaccine serves as an example. The CDC states that the efficacy of two
doses of the MMR vaccine is 97 percent for the case of measles and that the course of the disease may indeed be
milder for vaccinated individuals as compared to unprotected ones (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), 2018b).
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As primary and secondary prevention are likely to affect the expected loss via both a reduced
probability of disease occurrence and a lower loss conditional upon developing or contracting a
disease a very general expected health loss function EL = EL(e1, e2) is required. We assume that
the expected health loss is strictly decreasing with both, primary and secondary prevention, that
is, ELi < 0, i = 1, 2. As usual, we let the productivity of prevention be decreasing, ELii > 0,
i = 1, 2. We do not make any assumptions regarding the size and sign of the cross partial
derivatives ELij = ELji, i 6= j.5
To keep things simple the child is considered inactive in both periods and the parent inactive
in period 2. To get positive prevention efforts e1 and e2 the parent needs to be altruistic towards
its offspring. The parameter α ∈ (0, 1] reflects the degree of altruism with α = 1 characterizing
a parent who fully internalizes the child’s health loss. As prevention costs are incurred in period
1 while the benefits may materialize in period 2, time preferences, measured by the discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1], matter. Finally, benefits are uncertain so that risk attitudes will also impact
prevention decisions. We capture risk aversion by considering Yaari’s (1987) dual theory. This
essentially implies that risk averse individuals overstate the probability of bad outcomes. For the
sake of illustration, we consider a constant over-statement factor ρ ≥ 1 with ρ = 1 characterizing
a risk neutral individual. We arrive at the following utility function of the parent
U(e1, e2) = y − e1 − e2 − αδρEL(e1, e2). (2.1)
This simple theory nicely demonstrates that disentangling the impact of different preference
dimensions on preventive actions poses a major identification challenge. In fact, it is impossible
to independently identify the three preference parameters α, δ, and ρ. More altruism (a higher
α), more future orientation (a larger δ) and a higher degree of risk aversion (a larger ρ) all have
the same directional effect on prevention levels. This is why we summarize them in a single
parameter θ = αδρ.
The parent maximizes utility (2.1) with respect to e1 and e2. Concentrating on interior
solutions, the corresponding first order conditions are given by
∂U
∂ei
= 0 ⇔ −θELi(e1, e2) = 1, i = 1, 2. (2.2)
Both first order conditions require that the marginal cost of prevention (the respective right-
hand sides) are equal to the expected marginal benefit of prevention (the respective left-hand
5To ease notation we write ELi ≡ ∂EL∂ei and ELij ≡
∂2EL
∂ej∂ei
, i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
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sides). The first order conditions imply EL1 = −1/θ = EL2.6
To analyze how a change in θ affects prevention efforts we totally differentiate the first order
























As we made no assumption regarding the size and sign of the cross partial derivate of the
expected loss we are unable to generally sign the comparative static effects. For the case of
complements, Uij > 0, we have ELij < 0 and both, primary and secondary prevention are
strictly increasing with the parameter θ. This also applies when the cross derivative vanishes,
that is, when primary and secondary prevention are additively separable in the expected loss.
This would be the case if the different forms of prevention were directed towards different and
independent diseases.7 For the case of substitutes, Uij < 0, we have ELij > 0 and the directional
effect of θ on prevention is generally ambiguous. It is straightforward to see, however, that at
least one preventive activity necessarily must be increasing with θ. To see this, suppose that
primary and secondary prevention would drop with an increase in θ. Then EL11 < EL12
and EL22 < EL12 would have to hold simultaneously violating the second order condition – a
contradiction.8
Our simple theoretical model carries three important messages that inform the econometric
modeling of prevention decisions. First, as already mentioned above, the model reminds us of a
fundamental identification challenge when it comes to measuring the impact of different prefer-
ence dimensions on preventive actions. Second, the directional effect of a change in preference
6We assume throughout that the second order conditions for utility maximization are satisfied, that is, the
Hessian of the utility function, HU , needs to be negative definite: Uii < 0 ⇔ ELii > 0, i = 1, 2, and det(HU ) =
θ2(EL11EL22 − EL212) > 0.
7With additive separability the expected loss may, for instance, take the form EL = π1(e1)L1 + π2L2(e2),
with π′1 < 0, π
′′
1 > 0, L
′
2 < 0, and L
′′
2 > 0. Equations (2.4) and (2.5) then simplify to de1/dθ = −π′1/θπ′′1 > 0 and
de2/dθ = −L′2/θL′′2 > 0, respectively.
8An important example for substitutes is a situation where primary and secondary prevention effort target
the same disease. The expected loss may then assume the following functional form: EL(e1, e2) = π(e1)L(e2),
with π′ < 0, π′′ > 0, L′ < 0, and L′′ > 0.
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parameters on prevention decisions is not unambiguously determined so that it is an empirical
exercise to pin down their (joint) effect. Third, primary and secondary prevention may well
depend on one another calling for a simultaneous decision model.
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
2.3.1 Data source and sample selection
We use data from the base survey of the ‘German Interview and Examination Survey for Chil-
dren and Adolescents (KiGGS)’ conducted by the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) from 2003 to
2006. The survey sampled 17,641 children aged from 0 to 17 years and aimed at providing a
representative cross-section of children and adolescents living in Germany. Children and their
families were invited to participate using a two-stage randomization procedure. First, 167 com-
munities were randomly selected (primary sampling units). Second, at the level of primary
sampling units, population registries were used to randomly select families for an invitation to
participate (secondary sampling units).9 Parents were asked to answer a questionnaire as well
as children aged 11 years and above. Moreover, children had to undergo a medical exam com-
prising physical measurements, laboratory tests, and a Computer Assisted Personal Interview
by a physician. The medical exams and the interview covered, among other things, a number of
diseases and detailed vaccination records.10
In the previous section we showed how the preferences of the mother affect the demand for
preventive health care after the child is born. As the relevant preference dimensions, that is, risk
aversion, time preferences, and altruism, are not directly observed, we use the health behavior
of the mother before the child was born as a proxy for these preferences (we provide more
details below). This approach requires that the child is raised by the biological mother. This
restriction reduces the sample size by about 600 observations (see Table 2.1). We further restrict
the sample to children where at least one biological parent answered the parental questionnaire.
This guarantees more accurate information as compared to a situation where grandparents or
even nannies filled out the questionnaire. We arrive at a sample of 16,994 observations. Due to
missing information, mostly on control variables, the regression results presented in Section 2.5
are based on 11,826 observations.
9The response rate was 66.6 percent.
10For more information on the data set see Kurth et al. (2008).
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Table 2.1: Sample selection
Selection criterion N
none 17,641
child living with biological mother 17,047
biological parent(s) answered questionnaire 16,994
missings (full model) 11,826
2.3.2 Primary prevention – vaccinations
Vaccines stimulate the immune system and ideally help to develop immunity against the disease
in question. Although the efficacy of the vaccines considered in our analysis is generally high,
none of the vaccines is perfect in the sense that the probability of infection is reduced to zero.
The German Standing Committee on Vaccination (Ständige Impfkommission, STIKO) at the
RKI regularly issues vaccination recommendations.11 Based on these recommendations, survey
physicians checked vaccination records of sampled children as part of the medical exam. In
total 9 diseases were considered, namely, Diphtheria, Polio, Tetanus, Mumps, Measles, Rubella,
Pertussis, Hib, and Hepatitis B. For our analysis we concentrate on the first six diseases as
information on the latter three is subject to substantial measurement error. We construct two
variables to capture the vaccination status of the child. The first variable VUTD is an indicator
that assumes the value one whenever the vaccination status of the child is up-to-date at the time
of the medical exam (considering the STIKO recommendations and the age of the child) and
zero otherwise.12 For two reasons this measure might be considered problematic. First, one may
argue that it overstates the importance of vaccination timing. Second, the measure makes no
difference between children that never got immunized against any of the diseases we are looking
at and those who just missed one immunization. This is why we define the vaccination rate
VRATE . It is calculated by dividing the number of demanded vaccinations by the age-specific
number of recommended vaccinations considering the six diseases mentioned above.
Only 55 percent of sampled children have an up-to-date vaccination record. Figure 2.1 below
illustrates how this share relates to the age of children (the dashed line). Very young children
are closely monitored (see also the next subsection) so that it is perhaps not too surprising to
see the highest shares of up-to-date vaccination records in the group of children under 2 years.
The solid line in the figure depicts the vaccination rate which, by definition, is everywhere
11For the current recommendations see Standing Committee on Vaccinations (STIKO) (2017).
12We do not have access to vaccination dates so that we cannot assess whether immunizations were demanded
in the respective recommended age brackets.
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above the dashed line. The considerable gap between these two curves shows that most children
demand at least some immunization. While 4.3 percent of children have never received any
immunization, 55.4 percent of children demanded all recommended vaccinations. We conclude
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Figure 2.1: Vaccination status up-to-date and vaccination rates by age (in years)
2.3.3 Secondary prevention – screening examinations
The rationale behind regular screenings is that diseases or risk factors for diseases are detected
earlier than without them. Early detection allows for better treatment or for adjustments in
behavior to improve health prospects or to postpone the worsening of individual health. During
the sampling period 10 screenings were scheduled for children under the age of 18 years. Back
then participation was voluntary.13 Table 2.8 in the Appendix shows the age brackets for
screening examinations. Based on this schedule we define the indicator variable screening up-to-
date, SUTD. The variable assumes the value one whenever a child demanded the latest screening
examination and zero otherwise (considering the age of the child and the screening schedule).
Suppose, for instance, that a 4 months old child has already demanded screening U4. As this
examination is scheduled for the third or fourth month of life the screening status is clearly
13In 2008 the regional state of Bavaria passed a law making participation mandatory. For details see
https://www.stmas.bayern.de/kinderschutz/praevention/index.php (accessed on April 10, 2018). Similar laws
have been implemented in the regional states of Hesse and Baden-Württemberg. However, the major-
ity of regional states rely on reminders to inform parents and/or health authorities about screenings that
have been missed. Enforcement remains an issue, though (see Zeit Online, 2011). For more details see
https://www.bundestag.de/blob/406316/8f4c316937f69892c86fce34c6946d28/wd-3-143-14-pdf-data.pdf (accessed
on April 10, 2018).
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up-to-date. Even if the latest screening exam was U3, the status would be up-to-date as there is
still time left to demand U4 as scheduled. By contrast, a five months old child would not have an
up-to-date screening status if the latest examination was U3. We concentrate on examinations
U3 through U9 and J1. Parents can hardly decide on whether or not to participate in U1 and
U2. U1 is due in the first few hours after birth and U2 between the third and tenth day of life.
While U1 is typically conducted right in the hospital, a midwife takes care of U2.14
Like with the vaccination up-to-date variable one may argue that the screening up-to-date
variable over-emphasizes the importance of examination timing. Also children without any
examination are not distinguished from children that just missed the last one (but demanded
all other ones). This is why we define the screening rate, SRATE , as the number of demanded
screenings divided by the age-specific number of recommended screenings. Figure 2.2 shows
that, apart from J1, there is no big difference between the alternative screening measures –
compliance is generally high. Note that 2.3 percent of children never attended any screening
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Figure 2.2: Screening status up-to-date and screening rates by age (in recommended screening
brackets)
There are at least two reasons for the small difference between the two measures. First, the
nature of age-dependent screening examinations is that pediatricians assess whether the child
develops according to age. It makes no sense, for instance, to check whether a 6 year old child
can crawl. This is part of U6 which is due between the 10th and 12th month of life.15 Second,
14We only have two children under the age of 6 weeks in our sample so that this restriction is innocent.
15In Table 2.8 in the Appendix we provide details regarding the content of screening examinations.
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physicians have no incentive to conduct screenings outside the recommended age bracket as
remuneration is conditional upon timely examinations. This implies that one can hardly catch
up on missed examinations.
2.3.4 Maternal preferences and health behaviors
One of the lessons of our theoretical framework is the impossibility to independently identify
the effects of different preference dimensions on preventive behavior. Given this identification
problem, the unavailability of preference information in the KiGGS data is a minor issue as
long as proxies for our composite preference measure θ are available. We argue that a mother’s
smoking behavior is a good proxy for her individual preferences. Barsky et al. (1997), Ander-
son and Mellor (2008), and Dohmen et al. (2011) show that more risk tolerance, i.e. less risk
aversion, is associated with higher smoking participation. Fuchs (1982) was the first to empha-
size the importance of time preferences in health investment decisions. Ida and Goto (2009b),
Kang and Ikeda (2014), and Scharff and Viscusi (2011) present evidence for low discount factors
(present orientation) being associated with high smoking participation. Evidence on an asso-
ciation between altruism and smoking behavior is lacking. Khwaja et al. (2006), for instance,
find no impact of altruism on smoking behavior considering altruism between spouses.16 We are
confident, however, that smoking behavior of the mother is correlated with altruism towards its
offspring. The reason being that the case for a role of altruism in health behaviors is stronger
in a parent-child environment than in partnership or marriage.
We measure maternal preferences using four alternative proxies, namely, smoking during
pregnancy, smoking during the nursing period, whether the mother is a current smoker, and
whether someone in the household smokes in the presence of the child. Accordingly, we de-
fine indicator variables for each behavior: PREGNANCY , NURSING, CURRENT , and
PRESENCE. In our data set 14 percent of women smoked during pregnancy, 7 percent of
mothers smoked during the nursing period, 27 percent of mothers are current smokers, and in 13
percent of all households someone smokes in the presence of the child. The pairwise correlations
of our four preference proxies range from .22 to .55 and are, thus, in the medium range (see Table
2.2). Assuming the stability of preferences our descriptive statistics provide indirect evidence
for altruistic motives affecting smoking participation. While 27 percent of mothers are current
smokers much fewer women smoked when the child is directly affected, e.g., when the child is in
16By contrast, there is evidence for a positive association between altruism (or pro-social behavior) and the
demand for immunization (see, e.g., Böhm et al., 2016; Nuscheler and Roeder, 2016).
43
Chapter 2 Maternal Preferences and Child Prevention
utero. Admittedly, this pattern is also consistent with smoking being under-reported whenever
the child is directly affected.17 Even if there was under-reporting we argue that those with a
very strong preference for smoking, that is, mothers with little risk aversion, future orientation
and altruism, are more inclined to report having smoked during pregnancy, during the nursing
period, or that they smoke in the presence of the child than those with a weaker preference
for smoking. In short, we conjecture that even in the case of under-reporting the relationship
between preferences and reported smoking behavior remains intact.
Table 2.2: Pairwise correlations of preference proxies and prevention decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) PREGNANCY 1
(2) NURSING .55 1
(3) CURRENT .52 .36 1
(4) PRESENCE .35 .22 .37 1
(5) VUTD −.00 −.02 −.00 −.01 1
(6) SUTD −.03 −.02 −.06 −.11 .10 1
(7) VRATE −.01 −.03 −.01 −.01 .83 .11 1
(8) SRATE −.02 −.02 −.05 −.09 .08 .62 .09 1
In Table 2.2 we summarize all correlations between our preference proxies and the variables
measuring the demand for prevention. As expected, we find negative (but small) associations
between all preference proxies and all prevention measures. Figure 2.3 provides little more
detail on the association between smoking during pregnancy, PREGNANCY , and the four
variables measuring the demand for prevention by showing the conditional means. A clear
picture emerges: no matter how the demand for prevention is measured, the demand is always
lower for mothers who smoked during pregnancy. The differences in conditional means range
from 3 percentage points for screening up-to-date to .6 percentage points for vaccination status
up-to-date. Although the effects are small, PREGNANCY will turn out significant in most
regressions below.18
17Note, however, that Gruber and Köszegi (2001) found no under-reporting of smoking in pregnant women.
18For empirical evidence that time preferences affect the demand for prevention see, for instance, Bradford
(2010), Chapman and Coups (1999), and Picone et al. (2004). Binder and Nuscheler (2017) show that more risk
aversion is associated with a higher demand for vaccination.
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Figure 2.3: Screening examinations, vaccination decisions (both in %), and smoking during
pregnancy
2.3.5 Individual heterogeneity
The KiGGS data include extensive information on individual characteristics of children, mothers,
and fathers. We here provide a complete list of variables that we include as control variables in
our econometric models below.19
Individual heterogeneity of parents is modeled considering age, marital status, education (8
indicator variables for educational achievement) and employment status (12 indicators), sepa-
rately for mothers and fathers. Gender and age are the most important control variables for
children. To capture the different development stages of children we include Tanner scores (4
stages). Differential access to health care is captured by a variable indicating private health
insurance.20 We also include an indicator that controls for the occurrence of health problems
of the child within four weeks after delivery. Such problems are likely to affect the demand for
screening exams and might also have an impact on the demand for immunizations. Note that
we do not add any additional variables capturing the health status of children as this would –
at least theoretically – bias our estimates (we discuss in more detail in the next section).
At the level of households, we include a dummy variable for East-German residence as East-
German parents were exposed to a different health care system than West-German parents.
There was, for instance, mandatory vaccination in East Germany but not in West Germany
19For the most important variables a description of variables and summary statistics are provided in Tables
2.9 and 2.10 in the Appendix.
20All vaccines considered here are covered by all health plans no matter whether they are public or private.
Reimbursement rates are higher in the private system, though. This also applies to the screening exams.
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(except for the smallpox vaccine). An urbanization dummy captures the presumably larger
risk of infection in densely populated areas and better access to health care due to the higher
physician density. Prevention decisions of parents (or mothers) may depend on the family
structure. The number of children may play a role but also whether the sampled child has
older or younger siblings. We also include net household income (in brackets) in our regression
models. Finally, we include the migration background of the family.
2.4 Econometric framework
In our theoretical model we considered primary and secondary prevention simultaneous decisions.
To mirror this in the empirical analysis we jointly estimate the demand for the two modes
of prevention. Considering the comparative static properties, equations (2.4) and (2.5), the
optimal level of primary prevention depends on the level of secondary prevention and vice versa
unless the cross derivative vanishes. This calls for a simultaneous equation model with ej being
an explanatory variable for ei, i = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Due to the lack of convincing exclusion
restrictions we cannot identify the structural form parameters of our model so that we resort
to estimating the reduced form, that is, we regress ei on a set of plausibly exogenous variables,
i = 1, 2. We capture the potential interdependence between primary and secondary prevention
by allowing the error terms to be correlated across equations.
When considering the up-to-date variables, that is e1 = VUTD and e2 = SUTD, our dependent
variables are binary calling for a simultaneous binary response model and we opt for the bivariate
probit. Alternatively we let e1 = VRATE and e2 = SRATE . As both variables measure the actual
demand for preventive health care as a proportion of the number of recommended vaccinations
and screenings, respectively, they are continuous and naturally bounded between 0 and 1. We
already saw above that censoring matters, especially right-censoring. Accordingly, we estimate
a bivariate Tobit model taking into account left-censoring and right-censoring. In all models we
cluster the standard errors at the level of primary sampling units.
Table 2.2 showed all unconditional correlations between our preference proxies and prevention
variables. The table revealed that the correlations between the two up-to-date variables and
the two rate-variables are relatively small. This suggests that the decisions for primary and
secondary prevention might be independent rendering separate estimation feasible. We found
only minor differences between coefficient estimates of the two approaches, namely, separate and
simultaneous. As standard errors are marginally smaller for the latter we stick with the more
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efficient simultaneous equation model.21
Before we turn to the results we should remind ourselves to interpret them cautiously. The
decision to smoke during the nursing period, in the presence of the child or to smoke at all may
well be viewed as being simultaneous to the decisions to demand vaccinations and screening
exams for the child, respectively. We are confident, however, that the simultaneity bias is small
if there is any. Simultaneity is not an issue when considering smoking during pregnancy as this
behavior naturally precedes the demand for prevention. This is why we emphasize the results for
smoking during pregnancy and view the results using the alternative preference proxies primarily
as robustness checks. Differences in coefficient estimates may not be the result of simultaneity
bias but rather reflect that our proxies measure slightly different things. As already mentioned
above, when the child is directly affected by smoking behavior then altruism might play a larger
role than otherwise. If someone smokes in the presence of the child, for instance, the child
is exposed to second-hand smoke which is known to be harmful for the child. That smoking
during pregnancy might have adverse health effects for the unborn baby is perhaps less clear.
Differences between the Probit and Tobit models are likely to be rooted in the differences of the
econometric approaches. They may also reflect, at least partially, that the dependent variables
measure marginally different things: the up-to-date variables emphasize the correct timing of
prevention, the rate-variables not so much. One would expect that time preferences play a larger
role in the former than in the latter. This may translate into differences in the coefficients of
our proxies for composite maternal preferences.
Finally, a discussion regarding the role of child health in the econometric analysis is in order.
Our data comprise two prominent variables that are reasonably good measures of child health,
namely, birth weight and self-assessed health status. It is well known that smoking during
pregnancy is a risk factor for premature birth and low birth weight (see, e.g., Bruin et al.,
2010). Indeed a näıve comparison of conditional means shows that children born to mothers
who smoked during pregnancy are about 120 grams lighter than those born to mothers who
abstained from smoking during pregnancy. Birth weight may thus be considered an outcome
variable, that is, birth weight is a ‘bad control’ and including such a variable would introduce
selection bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, pp. 64-68). When using our alternative preference
proxies, birth weight is an unproblematic control variable as it is determined prior to the smoking
behaviors under consideration. To facilitate the comparison of regression estimates we refrain
from using birth weight as a control variable in these models as well. Self-assessed health would
21The results of the simultaneous equation model are shown in Table 2.4. The outcome with separate equations,
Table 2.11, is relegated to the Appendix.
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obviously introduce simultaneity bias. Both vaccinations and screening exams are inputs in
the production of child health. This is particularly so as our dependent variables measure the
demand for prevention in the past while self-assessed health measures current child health.22
It is well established that poor health outcomes at birth (or early childhood) have long-lasting
effects, including a negative impact on health (see, e.g., Case et al., 2005). But then maternal
preferences not only affect child health at birth or early childhood but also later in life so that
self-assessed health is likely to be ‘bad control’. A regression of the demand for prevention on
self-assessed health would, thus, introduce simultaneity and selection bias. We are confident
that neglecting self-assessed health and birth weight does not introduce omitted variable bias
into our analysis. The reason being that the demand for prevention is a more fundamental
decision that – as the theoretical model suggests – is driven by the preferences of parents or,
more precisely, of maternal preferences.23
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Smoking during pregnancy and prevention
2.5.1.1 Model specification
Our main results are shown in Table 2.3. The first column shows the average marginal effects
of smoking during pregnancy on the two modes of prevention without any control variables.
In columns 2 to 4 we successively add control variables. As the results are very robust, we
concentrate on our preferred specification with the full set of control variables, namely, column
4.
Considering the bivariate probit estimates for the two up-to-date variables first we find that
smoking during pregnancy has no statistically significant effect for vaccinations but for screening
exams. Children of mothers who smoked during pregnancy have a 3.5 percentage points lower
probability of having demanded the latest screening exam. A similar picture emerges for the two
rate variables. The vaccination rate is not significantly associated with the mother’s smoking
behavior during pregnancy but the demand for screening exams is. Note that we report marginal
22A simple regression of an indicator for very good child health on VUTD and SUTD shows that having an
up-to-date vaccination record increases the probability of the child being in very good health by 2 percentage
points. The effect of an up-to-date screening status amounts to 10 percentage points. Both effects are highly
statistically significant.
23Our regression results are robust to including birth weight and self-assessed health. Note that our set of
control variables includes an indicator variable for post-pregnancy health problems of children (within four weeks
after birth), e.g., jaundice. There is no significant correlation between this indicator and PREGNANCY so that
this control appears unproblematic. It just captures that such problems may make parents more health conscious.
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Table 2.3: Maternal preferences and child prevention: model specification
PREGNANCY (1) (2) (3) (4)
VUTD −0.0016 −0.0078 −0.0020 −0.0089
(0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0126) (0.0124)
SUTD −0.0282∗∗∗ −0.0386∗∗∗ −0.0369∗∗∗ −0.0347∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0096) (0.0098) (0.0099)
ρ 0.1821∗∗∗ 0.1778∗∗∗ 0.1747∗∗∗ 0.1748∗∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0193) (0.0197) (0.0197)
VRATE −0.0081 −0.0104 −0.0070 −0.0123
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0080) (0.0078)
SRATE −0.0165∗∗∗ −0.0205∗∗∗ −0.0202∗∗∗ −0.0183∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049)
ρ 0.1615∗∗∗ 0.1862∗∗∗ 0.1930∗∗∗ 0.1930∗∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0143)
Control variables:
Child yes yes yes
Household yes yes
Parents yes
N 11,826 11,826 11,826 11,826
Notes: Average marginal effects of PREGNANCY . Clustered standard errors in paren-
theses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
effects in all tables. For both the bivariate probit and the bivariate tobit we calculate the average
marginal effects. For the latter we concentrate on the marginal effects of the censored variable,
that is, the marginal effects are given by the coefficient estimate times the probability that
the dependent variable is uncensored. On average, this probability amounts to 40 percent for
vaccinations and 19 percent for screening exams, respectively. We find that the vaccination rate
is not significantly associated with a mother’s smoking behavior during pregnancy but that the
demand for screenings is: the total demand for screening exams of children with mothers who
smoked during pregnancy is about 1.8 percentage points smaller than for children of mothers
who did not smoke during pregnancy.
In Section 2.4 we argued that measures of child health would be ‘bad controls’ in a regression
like ours. One may argue that most household and parent characteristics are also bad controls.
After all, most variables measure education, income, or employment status. The robustness of
our results shown in Table 2.3 are reassuring that any selection bias would be small if there is
any. Also note that papers investigating the socio-economic gradient in child health, that ask
whether parental behaviors like smoking during pregnancy are mediators, face the same problem
(see, e.g., Case et al., 2005).
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2.5.1.2 Gender effects
It is instructive to stratify the sample by gender. Table 2.4 shows that the effects are markedly
stronger for boys than for girls. For girls the smoking behavior of the mother during pregnancy is
not significantly associated with the demand for vaccinations. By contrast, boys of mothers that
smoked during pregnancy have a 3.6 percentage points lower probability of having an up-to-date
vaccination record. For screening exams we find that the effects of smoking during pregnancy
are twice as large for boys than for girls. While boys of mothers who smoked during pregnancy
have a 4.6 percentage points lower probability of having demanded the latest screening exam,
the effect for girls is only 2.3 percentage points, though still statistically significant. The results
for the bivariate tobit model demonstrate that these gender effects are not mere artifacts of
improper prevention timing for sons but that the demand for preventive care of mothers who
smoked during pregnancy is systematically smaller for their sons than for their daughters however
measured.
Table 2.4: Maternal preferences and child prevention: gender effects
PREGNANCY all boys girls
VUTD −0.0089 −0.0355∗∗ 0.0173
(0.0124) (0.0176) (0.0206)
SUTD −0.0347∗∗∗ −0.0464∗∗∗ −0.0231∗
(0.0099) (0.0134) (0.0125)
ρ 0.1748∗∗∗ 0.1593∗∗∗ 0.1971∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0284) (0.0253)
VRATE −0.0123 −0.0246∗∗ −0.0005
(0.0078) (0.0105) (0.0125)
SRATE −0.0183∗∗∗ −0.0234∗∗∗ −0.0142∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0063)
ρ 0.1930∗∗∗ 0.1739∗∗∗ 0.2151∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0204) (0.0207)
N 11,826 5,994 5,832
Notes: Average marginal effects of PREGNANCY . Clustered standard
errors in parentheses. All regressions include the full set of controls.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
2.5.2 Alternate preference proxies
In Table 2.5 we contrast our results for our preference proxy smoking during pregnancy, PREG-
NANCY , with alternative preference proxies, namely, smoking during the nursing period,
NURSING, current smoking status of the mother, CURRENT , and whether someone in
the household smokes in the presence of the child, PRESENCE.
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Table 2.5: Alternate preference proxies
full sample PREGNANCY NURSING CURRENT PRESENCE
VUTD −0.0089 −0.0344∗∗ −0.0111 −0.0152
(0.0124) (0.0168) (0.0103) (0.0149)
SUTD −0.0347∗∗∗ −0.0234∗∗ −0.0364∗∗∗ −0.0447∗∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0109) (0.0072) (0.0083)
ρ 0.1748∗∗∗ 0.1744∗∗∗ 0.1737∗∗∗ 0.1741∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197)
VRATE −0.0123 −0.0265∗∗∗ −0.0151∗∗ −0.0153∗
(0.0078) (0.0101) (0.0062) (0.0086)
SRATE −0.0183∗∗∗ −0.0175∗∗∗ −0.0165∗∗∗ −0.0217∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0037) (0.0042)
ρ 0.1930∗∗∗ 0.1928∗∗∗ 0.1917∗∗∗ 0.1921∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0142)
N 11,826 11,826 11,826 11,826
boys PREGNANCY NURSING CURRENT PRESENCE
VUTD −0.0355∗∗ −0.0761∗∗∗ −0.0216 −0.0174
(0.0176) (0.0239) (0.0141) (0.0213)
SUTD −0.0464∗∗∗ −0.0197 −0.0408∗∗∗ −0.0482∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0168) (0.0101) (0.0108)
ρ 0.1593∗∗∗ 0.1602∗∗∗ 0.1580∗∗∗ 0.1606∗∗∗
(0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0286) (0.0283)
VRATE −0.0246∗∗ −0.0446∗∗∗ −0.0198∗∗ −0.0177
(0.0105) (0.0134) (0.0081) (0.0116)
SRATE −0.0234∗∗∗ −0.0152∗∗ −0.0177∗∗∗ −0.0212∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0075) (0.0050) (0.0053)
ρ 0.1739∗∗∗ 0.1746∗∗∗ 0.1728∗∗∗ 0.1743∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0205)
N 5,994 5,994 5,994 5,994
girls PREGNANCY NURSING CURRENT PRESENCE
VUTD 0.0173 0.0070 0.0010 −0.0102
(0.0206) (0.0263) (0.0151) (0.0186)
SUTD −0.0231∗ −0.0263∗ −0.0318∗∗∗ −0.0421∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0151) (0.0096) (0.0122)
ρ 0.1971∗∗∗ 0.1966∗∗∗ 0.1964∗∗∗ 0.1951∗∗∗
(0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0254)
VRATE −0.0005 −0.0089 −0.0100 −0.0122
(0.0125) (0.0164) (0.0099) (0.0110)
SRATE −0.0142∗∗ −0.0204∗∗∗ −0.0155∗∗∗ −0.0221∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0076) (0.0049) (0.0061)
ρ 0.2151∗∗∗ 0.2148∗∗∗ 0.2139∗∗∗ 0.2134∗∗∗
(0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0207)
N 5,832 5,832 5,832 5,832
Notes: Average marginal effects of the respective preference proxies. Clustered standard errors in paren-
theses. All regressions include the full set of controls. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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We find that the screening status of children is generally significantly negatively associated
with the smoking behavior of the mother no matter how we actually measure the demand for
screenings and the preferences of the mother. Considering the full sample and screening up-to-
date we find that the 95 percent confidence intervals overlap for all preference proxies. It should
be noted, however, that the point estimates differ by a factor of up to almost two (−0.0234 for
NURSING and −0.0447 for PRESENCE) and that there are no marked differences across
gender. As argued above, these differences might reflect that our proxies measure slightly dif-
ferent things, i.e., that the relevant preference dimensions of the mother enter the proxies with
different weights. When measuring the demand for screenings using the screening rate we find
that the marginal effects are very robust across preference proxies and across gender. As the main
difference between the two alternative dependent variables is the timing of screening demand
the higher variation in point estimates of maternal preferences when considering the up-to-date
variable provides indirect evidence that time preferences indeed enter the preference proxies
differently.
This interpretation is supported by the role of maternal preferences in the demand for
immunization. Considering vaccination up-to-date as dependent variable we find no signifi-
cant impact of maternal preferences when using the proxies PREGNANCY , CURRENT ,
or PRESENCE. By contrast, the fact that the mother smoked during the nursing period,
NURSING = 1, significantly reduces the probability of the child having an up-to-date vacci-
nation status by 3.4 percentage points. There are dramatic differences across gender. For girls
maternal preferences are not significantly associated with the demand for immunization, that is,
the effect we found in the full sample is entirely driven by boys. Indeed, when the mother smoked
during the nursing period the probability of sons having an up-to-date vaccination record is re-
duced by 7.6 percentage points. The pattern is similar but less pronounced when considering
the vaccination rate instead of the up-to-date status.
2.5.3 Sample selection based on age
In the descriptive analysis above we found that the demand for screening exams dramatically
drops once screening J1 is due. More than 90 percent of children have up-to-date screening
records when the latest scheduled exam was U9 or earlier. Looking at the oldest children in
our sample where exam J1 should have been demanded, less than 40 percent actually have. To
assess the robustness of our main results we exclude all children that are or were eligible for J1,
that is, we exclude all children aged 169 months (14 years) and above from our analysis sample.
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We find that the results based on the smaller sample are generally weaker, that is, the
marginal effects of smoking during pregnancy on the demand for preventive care are smaller
in absolute terms but, for the most part, still statistically significant (see Table 2.12 in the
Appendix). This suggests that maternal preferences have a particularly strong effect in older
children. Recall that all vaccinations considered here and screening exams (U1 through U9;
J1) are covered by all German health insurers. Thus, parents do not face any financial burden
from demanding these preventive services. As children get older, however, the gap between two
subsequent examinations increases. There are as much as 9 years between exams U9 and J1.
Parents may lose track of the screening schedule, in particular for J1, unless they are very risk
averse, future oriented or altruistic. In other words, maternal preferences play a larger role for
older children.
2.6 Extensions
In this section we briefly investigate effect heterogeneity regarding the perhaps most important
dimensions when it comes to smoking behavior and health status or, more precisely, maternal
preferences and the demand for preventive child care: socio-economic status and migration
status.24
2.6.1 Socio-Economic Status
There is an extensive economic literature on the income gradient or socio-economic status (SES)
gradient in child health (see, e.g., Case et al., 2002). The literature finds that disadvantaged
children are born in worse health than advantaged children. As this gap is rather persistent –
and in some countries even increases over the life-cycle – one wonders whether our proposed
channel is particularly active in disadvantaged groups.
Table 2.6 breaks down the association between smoking during pregnancy and the demand for
prevention by SES groups. Considering the full sample we find no association between maternal
preferences and the demand for vaccination for any SES group. It is irrelevant whether we
measure the demand for vaccination using the indicator for an up-to-date vaccination record or
the vaccination rate. Stratification by gender offers a richer picture. For boys the association
24Note that we interact the socio-economic status indicators or the migration indicator with our preference
proxy PREGNANCY . As was argued by Ai and Norton (2003) interaction terms in non-linear models only
measure the interaction effect of the respective variables over and above the interaction that is implied by the
non-linearity of the econometric approach. Stratification by socio-economic status and gender or migration status
and gender, however, is not feasible as the low number of observations per cell prevents us from obtaining the
maximum likelihood estimates in some instances.
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Table 2.6: Maternal preferences and child prevention: socio-economic status
full sample boys girls
low −0.0013 (0.0190) −0.0507∗ (0.0283) 0.0541∗ (0.0317)
VUTD medium −0.0077 (0.0173) −0.0248 (0.0245) 0.0050 (0.0264)
high −0.0313 (0.0315) −0.0320 (0.0429) −0.0305 (0.0490)
low −0.0332∗∗ (0.0145) −0.0365∗ (0.0207) −0.0323 (0.0205)
SUTD medium −0.0405∗∗∗(0.0128) −0.0619∗∗∗(0.0168) −0.0179 (0.0177)
high −0.0178 (0.0246) −0.0211 (0.0299) −0.0132 (0.0365)
ρ 0.1749∗∗∗(0.0197) 0.1599∗∗∗(0.0284) 0.1977∗∗∗(0.0253)
low −0.0155 (0.0118) −0.0441∗∗ (0.0171) 0.0163 (0.0200)
VRATE medium −0.0054 (0.0108) −0.0104 (0.0147) −0.0031 (0.0157)
high −0.0263 (0.0186) −0.0229 (0.0242) −0.0319 (0.0302)
low −0.0157∗∗ (0.0070) −0.0156 (0.0104) −0.0190∗ (0.0099)
SRATE medium −0.0220∗∗∗(0.0062) −0.0307∗∗∗(0.0085) −0.0120 (0.0082)
high −0.0126 (0.0109) −0.0195 (0.0135) −0.0057 (0.0178)
ρ 0.1931∗∗∗(0.0143) 0.1746∗∗∗(0.0204) 0.2154∗∗∗(0.0207)
N 11,826 5,994 5,832
Notes: Average marginal effects of PREGNANCY×SES-group. Clustered standard errors in paren-
theses. All regressions include the full set of controls. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
between maternal preferences and the demand for vaccinations is only significant in the low SES
group. Note that the effect is only significant at the 10 percent level and, additionally, that the
estimated marginal effects are statistically indistinguishable. Thus, our result only offers weak
evidence for a socio-economic gradient in the preference channel. Considering a uniform effect
between maternal preferences and immunization across socio-economic groups above, we found
no significant effects for girls (see Table 2.4). We here find a positive association in the low SES
group and no effect in the other two groups – a surprising result that is in conflict with the
predictions of our theoretical model. But again, the effects across SES groups are statistically
indistinguishable. When considering the vaccination rate this surprising result vanishes while
the (weak) evidence of a SES gradient in the association between maternal preferences and the
demand for vaccinations remains.
No matter how we measure the demand for screening examinations the association between
maternal preferences and prevention is only statistically significant in low or medium SES groups.
The point estimates tend to be larger for boys than for girls. For both genders the point estimates
of the marginal effects do not statistically differ across SES groups so that our results, at best,
only offer weak evidence for a SES gradient in the maternal preference channel.
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2.6.2 Migration status
About 10 percent of families in our analysis sample have a migration background. Table 2.7
breaks down the association between maternal preferences and the demand for prevention by
migration status and a very clear picture emerges. In none of the regressions maternal prefer-
ences of families with a migration background are significantly associated with the demand for
prevention. Due to the small number of observations standard errors are relatively large so that
we have somewhat imprecise zeros. Note that the signs of all marginal effects are positive rather
than negative as in our main specification shown in Table 2.4. An immediate consequence is
that the effects for families without a migration background are larger than in the main spec-
ification. Qualitatively the results remain intact, that is, maternal preferences only matter in
the demand for vaccination for boys but not girls. For screening exams there is a significantly
negative association and, as before, the effects for boys are about twice as large than those for
girls.25
Table 2.7: Maternal preferences and child prevention: migration background
full sample boys girls
VUTD MIG = 1 0.0295 (0.0358) 0.0019 (0.0517) 0.0725 (0.0638)
MIG = 0 −0.0137 (0.0129) −0.0402∗∗ (0.0188) 0.0107 (0.0208)
SUTD MIG = 1 0.0331 (0.0234) 0.0578
∗ (0.0318) 0.0144 (0.0352)
MIG = 0 −0.0450∗∗∗(0.0104) −0.0623∗∗∗(0.0145) −0.0288∗∗ (0.0129)
ρ 0.1742∗∗∗(0.0197) 0.1578∗∗∗(0.0283) 0.1967∗∗∗(0.0253)
VRATE MIG = 1 0.0167 (0.0215) 0.0055 (0.0292) 0.0367 (0.0380)
MIG = 0 −0.0159∗∗ (0.0080) −0.0288∗∗∗(0.0110) −0.0049 (0.0127)
SRATE MIG = 1 0.0173 (0.0124) 0.0227 (0.0177) 0.0127 (0.0159)
MIG = 0 −0.0242∗∗∗(0.0052) −0.0309∗∗∗(0.0071) −0.0186∗∗∗(0.0067)
ρ 0.1922∗∗∗(0.0142) 0.1728∗∗∗(0.0203) 0.2142∗∗∗(0.0207)
N 11,826 5,994 5,832
Notes: Average marginal effects of PREGNANCY×MIG. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include the full set of controls. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
2.7 Conclusion
There is a large body of evidence showing that health in early childhood has long-lasting effects.
Poor health in early childhood is, for instance, associated with low educational achievement and
poor health in adulthood. The mechanisms through which poor child health translates into poor
25It is important to note that the demand for child prevention is substantially lower in families with a migration
background. The vaccination rate (74%) and the screening rate (79%) are 4 percentage points and 15 percentage
points, respectively, smaller in families with migration background than in families without such a background.
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adult health are not well understood. In this article we suggest that maternal preferences – as
proxied by adverse health behaviors of the mother – not only explain poor health at birth or
in early childhood but also the low demand for preventive child care and with it poor health in
adulthood.
In our analysis we concentrated on the relationship between smoking during pregnancy and
the demand for vaccinations and screening exams. We found sons born to mothers who smoked
during pregnancy have a significantly lower probability of having up-to-date vaccination records
as compared to sons of mothers who abstained from smoking during pregnancy. There is no such
pattern for daughters. The demand for screening exams is significantly lower for both genders
when the mother smoked during pregnancy. The effects, however, were found to be twice as large
for boys than for girls. This pattern is remarkably robust. It holds also when using alternative
measures for the demand for prevention, namely, the vaccination rate and the screening rate,
and for alternative proxies for maternal preferences, that is, smoking during the nursing period,
current smoking status of the mother, and whether someone in the household smokes in the
presence of the child. We found weak evidence that our suggested mechanism is particularly
active in boys living in households with low or medium socio-economic status. Finally, we found
that our results only obtain in families without a migration background. There is no association
between maternal preferences and the demand for child prevention in families with a migration
background.
Our results contribute to the understanding why health differences observed in early child-
hood are rather persistent over the life cycle – maternal preferences not only affect child health
at birth and early childhood but via the demand for preventive health care also health of their
children in adolescence and adulthood. Public policies should, thus, break the link between
maternal preferences and child prevention. The most drastic measure would be to make vacci-
nations and screening exams mandatory or, in the latter case, enforce the mandate.
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2.8 Appendix
Table 2.8: Content and age brackets of screening examinations
Period Measures
U1 after birth Check skin color, respiration, cardiac rhythm, and reflexes
U2 3rd to 10th day of life Examine internal and sensory organs, child’s metabolism and hearing
U3 4th to 5th week of life Check size, weight, nutritional state; test hip joints, eye reaction and
hearing
U4 3rd to 4th month of life Examine kinesic behavior, seeing, hearing, growth; check vaccination
status
U5 6th to 7th month of life Check physical development (e.g., independent turning), teeth and vac-
cination status
U6 10th to 12th month of life Check physical development (e.g., crawling, first steps), sexual plus
sensory organs, speech development; check vaccination status
U7 21st to 24th month of life Test physical and mental development (e.g., running, fine motor skills,
body control, speaking); check vaccination status
U8 43rd to 48th month of life Test physical dexterity, hearing, seeing, speaking development; check
vaccination status
U9 within 6th year of life Test physical and mental development, correct movement, hearing, see-
ing, speaking; check vaccination status
J1 within 15th year of life Examine posture anomalies, health behavior (e.g., smoking, alcohol
consumption), motoric skills, sexual behavior, specific problems during
puberty; vaccination status review (e.g., diphtheria, tetanus, polio)
Notes: Table shows all well-child visits fully covered by mandatory health insurance. U7a, U10, U11, J2 are not
listed since not being part of the questionnaire. U1 and U2 are excluded from the analysis. Both are conducted
in the first days after birth, thus maternal preferences can hardly have any effect. For further information we rec-
ommend https://www.g-ba.de/informationen/richtlinien/15/, https://www.g-ba.de/informationen/richtlinien/14/ or
www.kindergesundheit-info.de (accessed on May 02, 2018).
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Table 2.9: Explanation of variables
Dependent variables
VUTD = 1 if vaccination status is up-to-date, 0 else
VRATE vaccination rate
SUTD = 1 if screening status is up-to-date, 0 else
SRATE screening rate
Maternal preferences
PREGNANCY = 1 if mother smoked during pregnancy, 0 else
NURSING = 1 if mother smoked during nursing period, 0 else
CURRENT = 1 if mother is a current smoker, 0 else
PRESENCE = 1 if so. in the household smokes while child is present, 0 else
Control variables
female = 1 if female, 0 else
agea, b age of child (in months of life)
Tanner four categories of physical development in children
postpregprob = 1 if specific health condition reported within first weeks after birth, 0 else
homecare = 1 if child care performed by family during preschool age, 0 else
PKV = 1 if insured in the private health care system, 0 else
MIG = 1 if child has migration background, 0 else
EastGermany = 1 if East German household, 0 else
urban = 1 if urban place of residence, 0 else
oldersibshh number of older siblings in the household
youngersibshh number of younger siblings in the household
sameagesibshh number of siblings of the same age in the household
incomec seven categories for monthly net household income ranging from 0 to 4000+ Euros
msingle = 1 if single mother, 0 else
pagea, d parent’s age (in years)
educationd seven categories for educational achievement (degrees)
unempd = 1 if currently unemployed, 0 else
pleaved = 1 if on parental leave, 0 else
parttimed = 1 if employed part time, 0 else
fulltimed = 1 if employed full time, 0 else
bluecollard = 1 if blue-collar worker, 0 else
selfempd = 1 if self-employed, 0 else
whitecollard = 1 if white-collar worker, 0 else
civild = 1 if civil servant, 0 else
homemakerd = 1 if homemaker, 0 else
a The squared age term is included as additional control variable.
b For the descriptive statistics, the variable age is represented in years.
c Income brackets (in Euros): 0-499, 500-999, 1000-1499, 1500-1999, 2000-2999, 3000-3999, and 4000+. For the descrip-
tive statistics, the variable income was assigned the middle of the income bracket except for the highest bracket where
we set household income equal to 4000.
d The set of control variables is the same for mothers and fathers.
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Table 2.10: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
VUTD 11,826 0.554 0.497 0 1
VRATE 11,826 0.779 0.298 0 1
SUTD 11,826 0.833 0.373 0 1
SRATE 11,826 0.923 0.203 0 1
Maternal preferences
PREGNANCY 11,826 0.143 0.352 0 1
NURSING 11,826 0.071 0.257 0 1
CURRENT 11,826 0.275 0.447 0 1
PRESENCE 11,826 0.127 0.333 0 1
Control variablesa
female 11,826 0.493 0.500 0 1
age 11,826 8.082 5.047 0 17
MIG 11,826 0.097 0.297 0 1
EastGermany 11,826 0.334 0.472 0 1
income 11,826 2514.291 906.348 250 4000
SESlowb 11,826 0.213 0.409 0 1
SESmediumb 11,826 0.493 0.500 0 1
SEShighb 11,826 0.295 0.456 0 1
PKV 11,826 0.132 0.336 0 1
a A selection of control variables is presented. The summary statistics on the full set of
control variables is available upon request.
b Indicator variables for low, medium and high socio-economic status (SES) were only used
for stratification purposes.
Table 2.11: Maternal preferences and child prevention: separate regressions
PREGNANCY all boys girls
VUTD −0.0092 −0.0353∗∗ 0.0167
(0.0124) (0.0176) (0.0206)
SUTD −0.0348∗∗∗ −0.0464∗∗∗ −0.0233∗
(0.0100) (0.0134) (0.0125)
VRATE −0.0121 −0.0245∗∗ −0.0004
(0.0078) (0.0105) (0.0124)
SRATE −0.0185∗∗∗ −0.0234∗∗∗ −0.0144∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0066) (0.0064)
N 11,826 5,994 5,832
Notes: Average marginal effects of PREGNANCY . Clustered standard
errors in parentheses. All regressions include the full set of controls.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 2.12: Maternal preferences and child prevention: age ≤ 168 months
PREGNANCY all boys girls
VUTD −0.0093 −0.0305 0.0098
(0.0136) (0.0197) (0.0216)
SUTD −0.0252∗∗∗ −0.0321∗∗ −0.0178
(0.0093) (0.0126) (0.0123)
ρ 0.1896∗∗∗ 0.1701∗∗∗ 0.2168∗∗∗
(0.0252) (0.0325) (0.0357)
VRATE −0.0125 −0.0210∗ −0.0056
(0.0087) (0.0120) (0.0134)
SRATE −0.0153∗∗∗ −0.0190∗∗∗ −0.0118∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0059) (0.0057)
ρ 0.2173∗∗∗ 0.1930∗∗∗ 0.2483∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0242) (0.0250)
N 9,633 4,902 4,731
Notes: Average marginal effects of PREGNANCY . Clustered standard
errors in parentheses. All regressions include the full set of controls.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Parental time discounting and child’s
smoking behavior
3.1 Introduction
Catchy phrases such as “The apple doesn’t fall far from the tree.” or “Like father, like son.” are
commonly used in the analysis of family characteristics. Fundamental attitudes and behavior
patterns are likely to be passed on from parents to their children. Besides the well-known
biological transmission of parental genetics, parents are usually the primary caregivers for their
children and act as role models. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), for instance, argue that mothers
and fathers exert vertical socialization efforts through which the child adopts parental traits.
After birth, a child’s preference structure may seem to be only loosely framed. However, parents
are supposed to be the child’s first teacher. By doing so, parental characteristics are likely to
be picked up by the child. The effects of such influences may even last for a lifetime. This may
explain why family patterns and habits often persist over multiple generations.1
Over the last decade, a growing number of studies have provided some empirical evidence
on preference and trait transmission. Dohmen et al. (2012) show that risk and trust attitudes
are passed on from one generation to the next.2 Furthermore, significant correlations exist with
regard to intertemporal choice. Hence, parental time preferences are positively mirrored in the
offspring’s preference structure (e.g., Brown and van der Pol, 2015; Gauly, 2017). Instead of
using direct survey measures such as self-assessed patience or impulsivity, some studies focus
on saving decisions as a proxy for a person’s time preference rate (Knowles and Postlewaite,
2005; Webley and Nyhus, 2006). Relying on pension participation as an approximation of
1See Section 2 of Darden and Gilleskie (2016) for a summary of the basic mechanisms of the intergenerational
transmission of (smoking) behavior.
2Amongst others, additional evidence on the intergenerational transmission of risk is provided by Arrondel
(2013), De Paola (2013) and Necker and Voskort (2014).
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time preference, an adult child’s pension participation is positively associated with the father’s
pension participation (Gouskova et al., 2010). Conducting an experiment, Kosse and Pfeiffer
(2012, 2013) show that especially the mother’s short-run patience is significantly related to the
preschool child’s ability to delay gratification.
Some authors try to capture the transmission of preferences across generations by investi-
gating preferences for distinct activities. For instance, similarities are identified for a number
of leisure time activities like doing sports, watching TV, going to the cinema or theater, food
consumption, or socializing (Volland, 2013). The transmission of adverse health behaviors such
as smoking is no exception. In the context of tobacco consumption, substantial evidence is
provided for the strong relationship between parental smoking habits and the smoking status of
the offspring.3,4 Children living in families with at least one parent who smokes are at increased
risk of becoming regular smokers themselves. The effect gets even stronger when both parents
smoke (e.g., Bantle and Haisken-DeNew, 2002). Taking Germany as an example, Göhlmann
et al. (2010) explicitly focus on smoking initiation. Using a discrete time hazard model, the re-
sults indicate that parental smoking significantly increases the probability that the child starts
to smoke. Loureiro et al. (2010) go one step further. They show that the well-established associ-
ation mentioned above is indeed causal. To identify this causal effect, they use an instrumental
variable approach in order to overcome the potential endogeneity of parental smoking. Indica-
tors of the socioeconomic status of the children’s grandparents are used as instruments. The
results provide further evidence for the transmission of smoking and highlight the importance of
both mother and father. Whereas daughters are primarily influenced by their mothers, father’s
smoking behavior is more relevant for sons. While the vast majority of the corresponding litera-
ture focuses on the transfer of smoking across two generations, Vandewater et al. (2014) analyze
the transmission link across multiple generations. In fact, they show that smoking behavior is
transmitted from the grandparents to their grandchildren. Thus, the parent generation acts as
a mediating factor. However, by identifying a transmission link across three generations, they
also validate previous findings regarding the analysis of two generations.
Another important strand of the literature has its focus on the direct association between
individual preferences and the person’s health behaviors and outcomes. In general, individuals
can improve health by positively investing in their health capital (Grossman, 1972). Here, by
3See, for example, Melchior et al. (2010), Chassin et al. (2008), Powell and Chaloupka (2005), Shenassa et al.
(2003), Bantle and Haisken-DeNew (2002), Wickrama et al. (1999).
4The intergenerational transmission of risky health behaviors is not restricted to smoking. For instance,
Schmidt and Tauchmann (2011) show that parental drinking has a significant influence on child’s alcohol con-
sumption.
62
Chapter 3 Parental time discounting and child’s smoking behavior
contrast, the consumption of cigarettes or other tobacco products represents a highly unfavorable
health investment. Instead of increasing the health stock, smoking deteriorates health gradually.
Moreover, smoking behavior involves intertemporal decision-making. Hence, a person’s time
discounting is important. A trade-off has to be made between a sooner, smaller reward (pleasure
of smoking a cigarette) and a larger, later reward (good health). Many empirical studies show
that time preference and impulsivity are significantly correlated with smoking behavior.5 In
the intrapersonal context, individuals with lower discount factors smoke more than others. For
instance, smokers discount future outcomes more steeply than non-smokers (e.g., Friedel et al.,
2014). Beyond that, discounting also influences smoking cessation.6 More specifically, quitting
smoking involves both short-term costs like suffering from cigarette cravings as well as long-
term benefits such as improvements in lung function. Those who exhibit relatively high levels
of future orientation are more likely to stop smoking successfully and keep abstaining from it
in the future. Consequently, a high discount rate impairs a person’s attempt to forgo tobacco
consumption.
Inevitably, this raises the question whether time discounting is also relevant in the in-
terpersonal context of smoking. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the inter-
generational transmission of smoking in more detail by simultaneously considering the role of
time discounting of the child and the parents. In particular, we explore the link between parental
discounting behavior and child’s probability of being a smoker.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been only one empirical study examining the role of
parental time preference in the intergenerational transmission of smoking. Brown and van der
Pol (2014) rely on data from the Household Income Labour Dynamics of Australia (HILDA).
They focus on mothers and their young adult children aged between 16 and 25 years.7 Five
waves (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2008) are selected which include information on both smoking
indicators and time preference. A question on the financial planning horizon is used as a proxy
for (long-term) time preference. A dummy variable “longer planning horizon” is created. It
equals one if time periods of one year or more are most important to the respondent and zero
otherwise. Control variables for basic offspring and household characteristics are also taken
into account. Compiling an unbalanced panel, the final sample consists of 1,901 mothers and
3,167 children. Estimating a pooled probit model, they do not find any direct effect of maternal
5See, for example, Kang and Ikeda (2014), Ida (2014), Scharff and Viscusi (2011), Harrison et al. (2010), Ida
and Goto (2009b), Khwaja et al. (2007), Reynolds et al. (2004), Ohmura et al. (2005), Baker et al. (2003), Odum
et al. (2002), Mitchell (1999), and Bickel et al. (1999).
6See Adams (2009), Goto et al. (2009), and Ida and Goto (2009b).
7The sample only consists of individuals that reside with their mothers.
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time preference on young adult smoking. After creating interaction terms of maternal time
preference and her smoking behavior, they find significant indirect effects. Hence, daughters
(sons) of mothers who smoke and have a shorter planning horizon are 7% (6%) more likely to
smoke than daughters (sons) of mothers who smoke and have a longer planning horizon.
This chapter contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, we disentangle
different aspects of intertemporal discounting. We explicitly distinguish between two dimen-
sions, self-control and time preference. For the sake of illustration, both characteristics of time
discounting can best be represented by a quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility function U with
U(x0, ..., xt) = u0 + β
T∑
t=1
δtu(xt). It assumes that an individual places higher weight on present
payoffs relative to payoffs in the future. Hence, β corresponds to present-biased preferences
(β < 1), whereas δ represents the long-run discount factor (see, e.g., Laibson, 1997). The rel-
evance of the β-δ-framework has been validated by neuroeconomics. Relying on findings from
McClure et al. (2004, 2007) and Tanaka et al. (2004), the parameter β is associated with the
limbic brain system which has its focus on immediate outcomes and instant rewards. In contrast,
the δ-component is strongly linked to the lateral prefrontal and parietal brain areas which are
responsible for the planning and making of far-sighted decisions.8 Throughout this chapter, we
relate the short-run and long-run components of this convenient and fairly realistic approach
to impulsivity and patience, respectively. Whereas impulsivity primarily refers to fundamental
self-control abilities such as the ability to delay instant gratification, a person’s general patience
is linked with today’s decisions which are followed by consequences in a more distant future (see,
e.g., Peretti-Watel et al., 2013).9
Second, when it comes to the elicitation of preferences, measurement is not straightforward.
In particular, dealing with survey data based on individual questionnaires, it is a challenge to
identify high quality measures of economic preferences. We rely on a direct survey measure
of a person’s general patience. In addition, it is validated with an incentivized experiment
(Vischer et al., 2013). Within the scope of this experiment, the question regarding impulsivity
is validated indirectly. Moreover, it forms part of common impulsivity scales such as the famous
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) (Barratt, 1959). Hence, patience and impulsivity represent
meaningful proxies for both components of intertemporal decision-making.
Third, we control for other confounding preferences that are related to discounting decisions
8See Kalenscher and Pennartz (2008) for an extensive review.
9Except for those who try it for the first time, smoking a cigarette generates immediate pleasure in the short
run. However, current smokers hazard the adverse health consequences of regular tobacco consumption that may
occur later in life (long-run outlook).
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and adverse health behavior. Above all, we argue that personal risk attitudes may be another
influencing factor. In fact, time and risk preferences measure different economic aspects but
are highly intertwined when making intertemporal decisions under uncertainty (Andreoni and
Sprenger, 2012). Whereas the present is known, the future is apparently risky. As already
mentioned above, tobacco consumption is a classic example of an intertemporal trade-off. But,
in addition, it is obvious that smoking puts a smoker’s health at considerable risk. For instance,
tobacco consumption substantially increases the probability of suffering lung cancer later in life.
Ida and Goto (2009a,b) show that the likelihood of smoking is associated with both a higher
time preference rate (lower level of patience) and a lower degree of risk aversion. Thus, taking
individual risk attitudes into account is necessary to state more precisely the influence of the
time discounting parameters in the transmission process of smoking. Omitting risk preferences
is likely to bias the effects of (parental) patience and/or impulsivity upwards.10
Forth, we analyze the impact of both mother and father. This allows us to investigate
gender-specific differences. Apart from that, merely focusing on one parent might neglect the
potential influence of the other parent. This may result in a biased estimation of the influence
of the parent who enters the analysis, regardless of whether it is the mother or the father. For
example, excluding the father would be highly questionable. Although the overall prevalence
of smoking has declined considerably over the last decades, around one in four Germans over
15 years old is a tobacco smoker (24.5%). The share of occasional and regular male smokers
is still higher than the share of female smokers. According to the 2013 Census data, 20.3%
of the female and 29.0% of the male population in Germany smoke (Federal Statistical Office
(Destatis), 2017).11
Fifth, we study the role of parental time discounting on child’s smoking behavior while
analyzing the influence of possible (health) mechanisms. We argue that parental impulsivity
and patience are likely to result in certain behavior patterns of the parents which for their part
could affect a child’s (health) behavior. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), we suppose the
presence of multiple mediating factors. Thus, possible mediators of parental time discounting
on the smoking status of the child are taken into account. Primarily, we focus on relevant health
behaviors of the parents that may be or may have been influenced by their time discounting
behavior. For instance, the smoking status of the parents is likely to be affected by their own
10Despite availability, Brown and van der Pol (2014) did not add information about other economic preferences
such as risk preferences to their analysis.
11For more information, please visit www.gbe-bund.de. The homepage of the Information System of the
Federal Health Monitoring (Gesundheitsberichterstattung des Bundes) offers abundant health data of the German
population.
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attitudes towards intertemporal choice. Controlling for the smoking status is expected to have
a direct positive effect on our dependent variable. Moreover, if the observed parental health
behaviors represent true mediating factors, we would expect a considerable reduction in size
of the coefficient estimates of our main discounting variables. Hence, we do not only show
the raw intergenerational transmission of smoking behavior but also highlight the potential
mechanism(s) of parental time discounting on child’s smoking status. Unfortunately, our analysis
of possible mediating influences is limited. Although we can control for individual heterogeneity
and parental attitudes towards health, we are not able to properly observe the influence of other
potentially relevant factors with the data available. For example, we could think of the role of
mothers’ and fathers’ parenting style as well as parental engagement in health promotion and
education. Communication about (future) health risks and consequences of tobacco consumption
may be a promising and effective determinant of child’s decision to smoke or not to smoke.12
Similarly, the potential impact of peer groups, especially at young age, cannot be investigated
properly. At the end of this chapter, we will discuss these and some other limitations of our
paper in more detail.
Sixth, we disentangle three different types of parental smoking habits. In principle, we
differentiate between current smokers, ex-smokers and non-smokers. Thus, the smoking history
of the parents is taken into account. It allows us to consider the importance of parental role
modeling when the offspring was younger and prone to start smoking. This is important because
it can be reasonably assumed that intergenerational transmission has already taken place at
earlier stages in life (e.g., in childhood or adolescence). Finally, as an extension of the analysis
of the extensive margin of smoking, we further address the role of parental impulsivity and
patience on the intensive margin of tobacco consumption. Conditional on being a smoker,
we examine how the number of cigarettes smoked per day gets affected by the parameters of
intertemporal decision-making of the parents.
In line with the literature, we show that children who are more impulsive and less patient
have a higher likelihood of being a smoker than more future-oriented individuals. But, most
importantly, our results show significant direct effects of mother’s as well as father’s time pref-
erence. Overall, a one standard deviation increase in the level of parental patience reduces the
child’s probability of smoking by 6-7%. A one standard deviation increase in father’s impulsivity
reduces the smoking probability by roughly 6%. The coefficient of maternal impulsivity is not
statistically significant. Controlling for parental smoking status, we further confirm the positive
12For instance, Kucher et al. (2014) investigate the role of family communication referring to another health
risk, namely weight misperception.
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transmission of smoking habits from parents to their child through role modeling. However, even
after adding all parental health behaviors to our regression model, the relevant preference pa-
rameters remain robust. On the contrary, parental time discounting does not have a meaningful
effect on child’s smoking intensity. In addition to the positive correlation in intergenerational
smoking habits, we conclude that parental time preferences also play a role for child’s smoking
decision. Hence, especially time preferences should be further considered by researchers as well
as public health authorities when dealing with health behavior formation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data. Section
3.3 introduces our empirical strategy. The main results are presented in Section 3.4. Finally,
Section 3.5 concludes with a discussion of the main findings.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Survey data and sample selection
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which is an annual panel survey
conducted since 1984. Each wave contains information on more than 22,000 individuals of the
adult population in Germany living in approximatly 12,000 households. The SOEP provides
both general household information as well as rich socio-economic data about each household
member (Wagner et al., 2007). We exploit the panel structure of the survey and focus on data
from waves 2006, 2008 and 2010. Whereas information on smoking is available every other
year13, the survey questions about personal impulsivity and patience are not an integral part
of the individual questionnaire. Up to now, the 2008 wave is the only wave containing precise
and comparable measures for the parents’ and offspring’s time discounting and their respective
smoking behavior. As was demonstrated by Meier and Sprenger (2015), time preferences are
rather stable over short periods of time. Assuming that this holds true for the German case, we
use the 2008 time discounting parameters for the waves 2006 and 2010 allowing us to analyze
three waves.14
We select parents and their biological children who are still living together with them in the
same household and those children who have already moved out and live in their own household
at the time of the interview.15 We drop observations that have missing information on the
variables used for the upcoming regression analysis. Our final sample contains information on
13The survey question on smoking behavior was introduced in 2002.
14See Chuang and Schechter (2015) for a literature review on the stability of time preferences. The authors
also examine the stability of risk attitudes and other social preferences such as altruism.
15Children living with foster parents or in children’s homes are not part of our sample.
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2,456 children and their parents (n=1,739). Since we have panel data, the number of observations
sums up to 5,817 individuals.
The children in our sample are 18 years of age or older at the time of the interview.16
Despite the non-availability of appropriate information of younger individuals, this circumstance
is neither a disadvantage nor problematic. At this advanced stage of life, we argue that the
intergenerational transmission of personality traits as well as smoking has already taken place.
In Germany, for instance, the average age of smoking initiation is around 17.8 years (Federal
Statistical Office (Destatis), 2014).17 This is not surprising because many young people try the
first cigarette during adolescence, but not all of them convert into regular smokers afterwards.
In general, more than 80% of adult smokers report having started regular tobacco consumption
before they turned 18 years old (Kuntz and Lampert, 2013). Thus, it is fair to say that if public
health authorities are willing and able to keep the youth tobacco free, the vast majority of these
young people will most likely abstain from smoking during adulthood.
3.2.2 Smoking
Based on the question “Do you currently smoke, be it cigarettes, a pipe or cigars?”, we generate
a binary variable (“current smoker”) to measure the smoking status of each individual. It equals
one if the survey participant reports any level of tobacco consumption and equals zero otherwise.
According to this specification, 29% of the children in our final sample smoke. On average, sons
smoke more than daughters (32% vs. 26%). The share of mothers and fathers who currently
smoke is 21% and 27%, respectively.
The parent-child smoking correlation is about 0.18 (p-value = 0.000) for both mothers and
fathers. The correlation between maternal and paternal smoking status is also positive and
highly significant (ρ = 0.28, p-value = 0.000). However, a limitation of the variable “current
smoker” is that it ignores any parental smoking history. In our sample, the average age of the
parents is about 55 years. According to the 2013 Census data, the overall smoking participation
considerably decreases after reaching the age of 50 years (Federal Statistical Office (Destatis),
2017). Therefore, we apply a second dummy variable, namely “ex-smoker”. This variable allows
us to capture parental smoking behavior in the past. It takes the value 1 if the individual has
smoked more than 100 cigarettes or other tobacco products in his/her life18 and is a non-smoker
16Strictly speaking, only persons under the age of 14 can be considered as children. However, throughout the
chapter, daughters and sons are commonly entitled as offspring or children, independent of their rather advanced
age. 50% of our sample are not older than 25 years. 75% are not older than 31 years.
17According to the latest Surgeon General’s Report, similar results are reported for the United States (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 2014).
18The exact wording of the question is as follows: “Have you ever smoked? In other words, have you smoked
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throughout the sample period and 0 otherwise. According to this definition, 36% of the mothers
are classified as “ex-smoker”. The respective share of paternal ex-smokers sums up to 49%.
Hence, we are able to differentiate between rigorous non-smokers and non-smokers that engaged
in tobacco consumption in the past.
In order to further examine the association between parental time discounting and child’s
smoking behavior, we shed some light on the intensive margin of child smoking. We replace
child’s current smoking status as our main dependent variable with the smoking intensity mea-
sured by the number of cigarettes smoked per day. Current smokers were asked to report their
daily average of cigarettes smoked in the last week. Conditional on being a smoker, the children
in our sample smoke roughly 13 cigarettes on a daily basis. Females smoke 11.5 cigarettes,
whereas male smokers have a mean cigarette consumption of almost 14 cigarettes.
3.2.3 Time discounting
The 2008 questionnaire contains two questions which enable us to elicit individual time dis-
counting. In order to identify different dimensions of intertemporal decision-making, we explic-
itly distinguish between (short-run) self-control/present bias and (long-run) patience (see, e.g.,
Peretti-Watel et al., 2013). Maximum comparability is ensured because both parents and their
children answer the exact same questions independently of each other. First, each respondent
is asked to rate his or her personal level of patience on an 11-point scale. The wording of the
question is as follows: “How would you describe yourself: Are you generally an impatient person,
or someone who always shows great patience? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value
0 means: ‘very impatient’ and the value 10 means: ‘very patient’. You can use the values in
between to make your estimate.” Hence, self-reported patience is used as a proxy for individual
time preference. In our sample, the average patience level of the child is 5.89, whereas sons are
slightly more patient than daughters (5.94 vs. 5.82). In general, mothers are more patient than
fathers (6.37 vs. 6.00).
Additionally, the second question refers to a person’s self-control abilities. The respondent is
asked to specify his or her general level of impulsivity. The wording of the question is as follows:
“How would you describe yourself: Do you generally think things over for a long time before
acting – in other words, are you not impulsive at all? Or do you generally act without thinking
things over for long time – in other words, are you very impulsive? Please tick a box on the scale,
where the value 0 means: ‘not at all impulsive’ and the value 10 means: ‘very impulsive’. You
more than 100 cigarettes or other tobacco products in your life?” We retrieve this retrospective information from
wave 2012. Unfortunately, only a few former smokers have provided details about when exactly they quit smoking.
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can use the values in between to make your estimate.” According to the descriptive statistics,
females are more impulsive than males (5.35 vs. 5.09). Overall, children show a mean level of
impulsivity of about 5.21. In comparison to fathers, mothers are more impulsive (5.03 vs. 4.85).
The behavioral relevance of our time preference measure has been explicitly validated. Vis-
cher et al. (2013) conducted an incentivized experiment with 977 participants forming a rep-
resentative sub-sample of the adult population to the 2006 wave of the SOEP. Subjects were
asked to indicate their preferences in a choice over a 12-month time horizon.19 The results show
that those who rate themselves as ‘more impatient’ in the survey in 2008 also exhibit a higher
degree of impatience in the experiment in 2006. Hence, this simple and ultra-short survey mea-
sure of patience turns out to be a meaningful proxy for time preference. The findings remain
robust even after controlling for impulsivity.20 Indeed, this shows that the questions on general
patience and impulsivity measure different parameters of intertemporal choice. Thus, a respon-
dent’s misinterpretation of the more future-oriented (long-term) aspects underlying the general
question on patience can be ruled out. Moreover, the question on personal impulsiveness is a
basic part of the most common scales used to measure this personality trait.21 Therefore, we
reasonably assume that the survey question eliciting impulsivity represents a true and rigorous
measure of present bias/self-control.
The raw intrapersonal correlation of time preference and self-control is −0.17, −0.19 and
−0.17 for the offspring, mother and father, respectively. Each correlation coefficient is highly
significant (p-value = 0.000). Considering the intergenerational correlation of these variables,
the raw correlation in parent-child impulsivity is 0.11 (p-value = 0.000) for the mother and
0.14 (p-value = 0.000) for the father. The corresponding coefficients for patience are smaller
in size: 0.06 (p-value = 0.001) for the mother and 0.09 (p-value = 0.000) for the father. In
general, these findings are in line with the corresponding literature (see Gauly, 2017). Comparing
children living in their own households with children still living together with their parents, the
19In the experiment, choice tables with the typical price list decision format were used. The participants had
to indicate their preferences by choosing between an immediate (left column) or delayed payment (right column).
The immediate payment was continuously fixed (e200). However, the delayed payment varied in each of the 20
choice situations and increased by 2.5 percentage points (compounded semi-annually) from row to row. Switching
from left to right (and sticking to the delayed payment in all subsequent rows) indicates the bounds of the discount
rate the respondent claims in order to wait an additional time period of 12 months for payout. Before the start of
the experiment, the participants were informed that one of their choices would be randomly selected for payment.
Using a second random device, one out of nine participants was actually paid by check according to the previous
choice.
20In addition, controlling for personal risk attitudes does not affect the results either.
21Examples of common impulsivity scales are the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale: see, e.g., Barratt (1959), Patton
et al. (1995), Stanford et al. (2009), Steinberg et al. (2013) and Coutlee et al. (2014); the Eysenck Impulsiveness
Scale: see, e.g., Eysenck et al. (1985); the Dickman Impulsivity Inventory: see, e.g., Dickman (1990) and Boutwell
and Beaver (2010); and the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale: see, e.g., Whiteside and Lynam (2001).
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latter show slightly higher correlation coefficients. For instance, regarding the interpersonal
correlations of patience, we obtain 0.06 vs. 0.07 for mothers and 0.07 vs. 0.10 for fathers. The
correlation coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5% level.
3.2.4 Parental and offspring characteristics
The SOEP provides rich information on the socioeconomic status and other individual and
household characteristics. We adjust for individual heterogeneity by adding a number of control
variables for the children and their parents. Summary statistics for the children are shown in
Table 3.1. Offspring characteristics include basic biological information about age and gender.
Moreover, we add information about the migration background and generate a new variable that
indicates if the child still lives together in the same household with at least one biological parent.
We further consider the educational attainment (highest school degree achieved) and the log
annual net household income as proxies for the socioeconomic status.22 In Table 3.2, descriptive
statistics for the parents’ demographics are reported for mothers and fathers separately. We
include variables such as parental age and migration background. In addition, the level of
parental education serves as a proxy for the socioeconomic status of the family.
As already mentioned above, we analyze the influence of time discounting on smoking be-
havior, taking into account the importance of personal risk attitudes. Individual risk is highly
correlated with impulsivity. For the offspring, mother and father, we find a significant correlation
of about 0.40 (p-value = 0.000), respectively. Hence, risk preferences are included as additional
control variables for both children and their parents.23 However, it could be argued that the
effects of parental risk and/or time discounting are (partly) confounded with the impact of other
preferences. Thus, we additionally control for parental altruism. It is obvious that the altruistic
attitudes of the parents are a key element of the social interactions within the family. The proxy
variable for altruism equals one if a parent has indicated that it is very important to him/her
to “be there for others” and zero otherwise. For instance, maternal altruism is significantly
correlated with her patience (ρ = 0.11). The correlation between paternal altruism and patience
is slightly lower (ρ = 0.08), but also highly significant (p-value = 0.000).24
To account for regional differences, we control for the 16 federal states (Bundesländer) in
22The annual net household income is lagged by one year. It corresponds to the household the child lives in.
23The original wording of the survey question to elicit personal risk attitudes is as follows: “How would you
describe yourself: Are you generally willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid risks? Please tick a box on the
scale, where the value 0 means: ‘risk averse’ and the value 10 means: ‘fully prepared to take risks’. You can use
the values in between to make your estimate.” In line with the implementation of our time discounting variables,
information on risk preference is retrieved from wave 2008 and also imputed to the years 2006 and 2010.
24Information on parental altruism is retrieved from wave 2008 and also imputed to the waves 2006 and 2010.
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Germany. Indicator variables for each state account for potential regional confounders. More-
over, year dummies are used to control for time trends. They account for common trends in
smoking behavior over time. Over the past decades, increased taxes on cigarettes and a growing
health consciousness among the general population are supposed to be two important factors
that have contributed to an overall reduction in tobacco consumption in Germany. By adding
indicator variables for each federal state and year, we also control for the implementation or
expansion of different anti-tobacco policies (e.g., smoking bans) that varied across states and/or
over time.
In order to further investigate the impact of role modeling, we look at parental behavior
patterns that could further represent mediating factors between parental time discounting and
the smoking status of the child. For this purpose, we focus on a comprehensive set of parental
health behaviors. On the one hand, we include adverse health behaviors such as parental smoking
and alcohol consumption.25 We use a dummy variable to measure alcohol consumption that
equals one if the parent drinks any kind of alcohol (e.g., beer, wine, spirits or mixed drinks)
on a regular basis and zero otherwise. On the other hand, we analyze two positive health
investments. First, we use information on whether the parents live a healthy lifestyle or not.
The variable equals one if the person follows a health-conscious diet “very much” or “much” and
zero otherwise. Second, we generate another indicator variable that measures physical activity.
It equals one if the individual takes part in active sports “daily” or “at least once a week” and
zero otherwise.

































Table 3.1: Summary statistics (Children)
Children (N=5,817) Daughters (N=2,788) Sons (N=3,029)
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Dependent variables
Current smoker 0.291 0.454 0 1 0.263 0.44 0 1 0.316 0.465 0 1
Smoking consumption1 12.772 7.224 1 50 11.532 6.552 1 40 13.737 7.569 1 50
Time discounting and risk
Impulsivity2 5.214 2.104 0 10 5.350 2.125 0 10 5.089 2076 0 10
Patience2 5.886 2.232 0 10 5.824 2236 0 10 5.942 2.227 0 10
Risk2 4.941 2.179 0 10 4.506 2.145 0 10 5.341 2.133 0 10
Control variables
Female 0.479 0.5 0 1
Age 27.735 7.622 18 60 27.310 7098 18 56 28.125 8.056 18 60
German 0.947 0.225 0 1 0.949 0.219 0 1 0.944 0.23 0 1
Living with parent(s) 0.506 0.5 0 1 0.437 0.496 0 1 0.570 0.495 0 1
Lower secondary school 0.162 0.368 0 1 0.120 0.325 0 1 0.200 0.4 0 1
Intermediate secondary school 0.322 0.467 0 1 0.341 0.474 0 1 0.304 0.46 0 1
Specialized upper secondary school 0.069 0.253 0 1 0.066 0.249 0 1 0.071 0.257 0 1
Upper secondary school 0.335 0.472 0 1 0.361 0.48 0 1 0.311 0.463 0 1
Other school degree 0.016 0.125 0 1 0.012 0.11 0 1 0.019 0.138 0 1
No school degree 0.011 0.106 0 1 0.010 0.1 0 1 0.013 0.111 0 1
Not yet finished 0.086 0.28 0 1 0.089 0.285 0 1 0.083 0.275 0 1
Household income3 (log) 10.485 0.679 3.912 13.346 10.443 0.711 5.273 13.346 10.524 0.646 3.912 13.010
Notes: 1 Number of cigarettes smoked per day. Number of smokers=1,657 (Daughters=725, Sons=932); 2 Information from wave 2008;

































Table 3.2: Summary statistics (Parents)
Mother Father
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Time discounting and risk
Impulsivity1 5.032 2.149 0 10 4.850 2.121 0 10
Patience1 6.370 2.125 0 10 6.002 2.232 0 10
Risk1 3.840 2.142 0 10 4.661 2.252 0 10
Health behaviors
Current smoker 0.207 0.405 0 1 0.274 0.446 0 1
Ex-smoker2 0.357 0.479 0 1 0.485 0.500 0 1
Regular alcohol 0.099 0.299 0 1 0.300 0.458 0 1
Healthy nutrition 0.603 0.489 0 1 0.410 0.492 0 1
Regular sport 0.414 0.493 0 1 0.332 0.471 0 1
Control variables
Age 54.410 8.336 35 86 57.292 8.819 35 93
German 0.919 0.273 0 1 0.920 0.271 0 1
Altruism1 0.287 0.452 0 1 0.174 0.379 0 1
Lower secondary school 0.350 0.477 0 1 0.385 0.487 0 1
Intermediate secondary school 0.371 0.483 0 1 0.273 0.445 0 1
Specialized upper secondary school 0.026 0.159 0 1 0.036 0.187 0 1
Upper secondary school 0.134 0.340 0 1 0.187 0.39 0 1
Other school degree 0.076 0.266 0 1 0.087 0.282 0 1
No school degree 0.043 0.202 0 1 0.032 0.175 0 1
Household income3 (log) 10.603 0.550 8.170 13.409 10.609 0.558 5.338 13.409
Notes: 1 Information from wave 2008; 2 Generated variable based on information from wave 2012; 3 Log
annual household income lagged by one year; number of parents=1,739.
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3.3 Empirical strategy
The empirical analysis is based on three main steps. First, we estimate the direct association
between parental time discounting and child’s smoking status using a linear probability model
(LPM). In step 2, we additionally control for parental health behaviors. This allows us to
examine if certain health behaviors of the parents (e.g., parental smoking status) act as mediating
factors between their time discounting and the smoking participation of the offspring. In the
third and last step, we use a different dependent variable. We replace the current smoking status
of the child with the number of cigarettes smoked per day. This enables us to further analyze
the intensive margin of child smoking.
3.3.1 Regression models
The regression equation for step 1 and 2 looks as follows:




it + β3Iit + β4Pit + β5X
′
it + λt + αi + uit (3.1)
where i represents the child and t the year of observation. The superscript p indicates that the
variables relate to the parents. Sit is equal to 1 if the child smokes and zero otherwise. I
p
it includes
information on mother’s and father’s general level of impulsivity, whereas P pit covers their level
of patience. Iit indicates child’s impulsivity and Pit represents child’s patience. X
′
it includes
additional offspring and parental characteristics (see Section 3.2.4). In step 1, the regression
model is estimated without controls for parental health patterns. These variables are added to
the regression in step 2. Moreover, we include year dummies (λt) in all our regressions. The
child-specific effect is represented by αi. uit is the individual-specific error term. The LPM with
random effects is implemented by generalized least squares (GLS).26 All time discounting and
risk preference variables were standardized before entering the Equation (3.1). Standard errors
are clustered at the family level because our sample includes families with one or more children.
The vectors of parameters β1 and β2 are of particular interest. They measure how parental
self-control and time preference are related to the smoking status of the child, respectively.
Finally, we estimate a two-part model to investigate the association between parental time
discounting and child’s smoking intensity (step 3). This regression approach is widely used in the
context of tobacco consumption (e.g., Kang and Ikeda, 2014). First, we estimate child’s smoking
participation as shown in Equation (3.1) with a probit model and obtain the average marginal
26Considering the well-known limitations of the LPM, we compare the results to a panel probit estimation in
Section 3.4.3.
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effects of our variables of interest. This estimation approach provides a built-in robustness check
of the LPM. Second, the number of smoked cigarettes is estimated with a truncated regression.
All non-smokers are dropped because their tobacco consumption equals zero.27 We prefer the
two-part model over the standard Tobit model because the former implements and estimates
the decision to smoke and the decision about how many cigarettes to consume daily separately.
This provides a higher degree of flexibility. For instance, the determinants of the probability of
being a smoker and the determinants of smoking intensity do not necessarily have to show the
same signs. Moreover, both parts of the model are not required to include the exact same set
of variables on the right hand side of the regression equation. However, in the tobacco demand
literature, the decision to smoke and the amount of cigarettes consumed can also be interpreted
as a joint decision and not as two separate decisions. In this case, a standard Tobit model would
be the appropriate choice from an econometric point of view (Pfeifer, 2012). In Section 3.4.3,
we provide a statistical test that supports the use of the two-part model.
3.3.2 Specifications and mediation analysis
The focus of our empirical strategy is on the relationship between parental time discounting
and child’s smoking behavior. However, we are keen to explore if there are mechanisms through
which our discounting variables might have an indirect impact on the dependent variable(s).
The influence of parental smoking behavior is of special interest in this context. At first glance,
the elimination of parental health behaviors from our baseline regression does not seem to be
particularly convincing. Previous literature has shown that a positive transmission of smoking
habits from parents to their offspring exists (e.g., Loureiro et al., 2010). However, including vari-
ables such as the smoking status or the educational level of the parents are likely to be outcomes
of their own impulsivity and/or patience. This might cause a so-called bad control problem
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Basically, the same argument can be applied to all variables that
are associated with child’s socioeconomic status (education and income). Even controlling for
child’s preferences (patience, impulsivity, risk) is not straightforward. Due to intergenerational
transmission, we have to consider that they are influenced by their parents’ preferences (Gauly,
2017).
Being aware of potential endogeneity concerns, we decide to run several specifications of
our econometric model and gradually add more (problematic) controls. Starting off with the
27For both regression equations, we use Roodman’s cmp command in Stata (Roodman, 2011). We continue
to exploit the panel structure of our data and estimate random effects models. Moreover, it allows us to obtain
clustered standard errors.
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fully specified model would mask the role of existing mechanisms driving the relationship under
investigation. Initially, we include parental preferences along with plausibly exogenous control
variables such as age and child’s gender. The regression model is extended by adding child’s
time discounting variables and the degree of personal risk aversion. In the following step, we
additionally control for educational attainment of both parents and the child. Higher education
is supposed to be a powerful determinant of positive investments in health capital. However,
we reckon that a person’s level of education may be endogenous in our context because it was
probably affected by a person’s time preference when visiting school. It is obvious that a person
with relatively high future orientation will invest more in educational attainment and, by doing
so, cumulates more years in school than someone who is more present-oriented. The latter is
likely to leave school earlier. Hence, when we control for the levels of education of the child
(and both parents), we also account for the underlying correlations between (parental) time
discounting and (parental) educational attainment. But, even if low time preference has had a
beneficial effect on the educational attainment, school education is finished for all individuals
by the end of our analysis period. This should reduce the endogeneity concerns regarding the
inclusion of education. The same considerations apply to the role of the offspring’s personal
income because it is likely to be a consequence of the educational level achieved. Therefore, it
may also represent an indirect outcome of child’s time discounting. However, when analyzing
the link between parental time discounting and child smoking, our stepwise approach takes these
econometric issues into account.
Considering the mediating effect of parental behavior patterns, time preference and/or impul-
sivity are likely to influence different health behaviors (e.g., consumption of tobacco products).
Given our data, we select four potential health mechanisms through which parental impulsivity
and patience might affect the smoking behavior of the child: parental smoking status (current
smoker and ex-smoker), regular alcohol consumption, health-conscious nutrition, and regular
physical activity (see Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.4 for detailed information on the health behavior
variables). Smoking and alcohol consumption are both examples of rather unhealthy lifestyles
which represent negative health investments.28 The commitment to healthy nutrition and en-
gagement in regular physical activity act as proxies for beneficial investments in health capital.
The attitudes towards eating a healthy diet is supposed to capture healthy eating habits and
dietary behavior in general. Thus, a person that recognizes the benefits of a well-balanced diet
is unlikely to (excessively) consume unhealthy products such as junk food or soft drinks. It can
28Smoking and alcohol consumption are closely related to each other. See McKee and Weinberger (2013) for
further reading on alcohol and tobacco co-use.
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be observed that, in general, more impulsive or less patient individuals are more likely to indulge
in adverse health investments than people who are more concerned about the future health con-
sequences of their behaviors. If living in good future health is personally important for current
decision-making, such an individual will live a relatively healthy lifestyle. Self-control and future
orientation are key components of beneficial investments in a person’s (future) stock of health
capital. For instance, a person who is future-oriented and aware of the adverse health effects
of smoking will be less likely to smoke. Evidence on this well-known intrapersonal relation-
ship between discounting behavior and smoking participation has already been given in Section
1.6.2.3 and in the introductory section of this chapter. Hence, in case of parental non-smokers,
it is likely that the same pattern is transmitted to the offspring who will neither turn into a
smoker (parental role model). The same argument can be applied to regular alcohol consump-
tion and living a healthy lifestyle. Discount rates are positively associated with frequent alcohol
consumption (see, e.g., Rossow, 2008). Moreover, relationships between obesity and high time
preference rates or even hyperbolic discounting exist (see Komlos et al., 2004; Scharff, 2009).
More specifically, we are interested in how the coefficients of parental time discounting change
after the inclusion of these designated mediating factors. Possible changes after the inclusion of
parental smoking are of particular interest because it is supposed to be a major determinant of
child smoking anyway. On the one hand, we could observe a (considerable) reduction or even
elimination of the direct effects of parental impulsivity and/or patience. In this case, we would
have identified a true mediator. Hence, we could infer that parental time discounting has an
influence on child’s health/smoking behavior (mainly) through one or several parental health
mechanisms. On the other hand, even though parental health behaviors show significant effects,
the coefficients of interest could remain robust. In this case, we would see no reason not to
control for these variables. Thus, we would have identified a meaningful influence of parental
health patterns on child’s smoking status that does not alter our estimated time discounting
effects (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Hence, our suspected control problem would turn out to be
less bad.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Parental time discounting and child’s smoking participation
Results from Equation (3.1) are presented in Table 3.3.29 Column (1) shows that father’s
patience is negatively associated with child’s probability of being a smoker. The coefficient
of maternal patience is weakly significant at the 10% level. After controlling for child’s time
discounting and risk preference in column (2), the negative effects of parental patience remain
basically the same. The coefficients of child’s preferences are all significant and show the expected
signs. Father’s impulsivity turns weakly significant when we add dummy variables for parental
education in column (3). According to the F-test on joint significance of parental education, we
can reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level (p-value = 0.005). In column (4), the incorporation
of other potentially endogenous variables such as child’s highest school degree and income has
negligible effects on the previous findings. The test on the joint significance of child’s education
variables and personal income clearly rejects the null hypothesis (p-value = 0.000).30 Since we
consider the model in column (4) as the most comprehensive specification, we interpret these
results in more detail.
Our results confirm the findings from previous studies regarding the association between
individual time discounting and smoking (intrapersonal context). A one standard deviation
increase in child’s impulsivity increases the likelihood of smoking by 2.8 percentage points or
10% (according to the mean). A one standard deviation increase in patience is associated with
an average decrease of 1.7 percentage points or roughly 6% in the probability of being a smoker.
Hence, as expected, a person that exhibits more future orientation and acts less impulsively is
significantly more likely to abstain from smoking than someone who is (very) impatient and
impulsive. But more importantly, we find direct effects of parental time discounting on the
offspring’s probability of being a smoker. For mothers, the level of impulsivity lacks statistical
29To support the choice of a random effects model, we test for random effects. Since we deal with an unbalanced
panel, we apply the modified Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for random effects (Baltagi and Li,
1990). The null hypothesis is that variances across individuals are zero. Thus, there is no panel effect because
no significant differences across individuals exist. We can reject the null hypothesis (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000).
Hence, random effects are appropriate. Alternatively, we apply the one-sided test. This supports our findings
from the two-sided test. This test is conducted for all regressions, if necessary and wherever appropriate. In each
case, the random effects model is preferred over the pooled OLS regression. Unfortunately, we cannot test fixed
effects versus random effects. Using a fixed effects model is not appropriate in our case because we rely on time
discounting parameters that are assumed to be time-invariant over the observation period.
30An additional significance test for the equality of children’s education dummies rejects the null hypothesis
of equal coefficients (p-value = 0.000). For instance, we observe that individuals with a high school degree are
significantly less likely to smoke than those who achieved a relatively modest level of education. Hence, this
finding supports the extensive evidence on the education gradient in health and health-related behaviors (see,
e.g., Conti et al., 2010).
79
Chapter 3 Parental time discounting and child’s smoking behavior
significance, while patience has a preventive effect. A one standard deviation increase in maternal
patience reduces the likelihood of smoking by 2.1 percentage points. This is a reduction of about
7%. For fathers, both components of time discounting are significant. A one unit increase in
paternal impulsivity is associated with a negative impact of 1.8 percentage points. Regarding
his long-term time preference, we also find a prevention effect. It is similar to the effect obtained
for the mother. If his level of patience increases by one standard deviation, the likelihood of
smoking decreases by 1.9 percentage points. Economically, both effects are substantial because
they imply a reduction in smoking of approximately 6-7%, respectively.31
Our results suggest that especially parental future orientation is able to prevent the offspring
from engaging in adverse health behaviors such as smoking (prevention effect). In contrast, the
effect of father’s impulsivity (negative sign) may not be that intuitive at first sight and, therefore,
needs some additional remarks. In principle, it would be delusive to expect the same sign as in
the intrapersonal context. The positive effect of impulsivity in the intrapersonal context does
not automatically imply that we get similar results when we turn to the interpersonal context.
For instance, we could think of the role of parental impulsivity for social interactions within the
family. In the family environment, there could be uncertainty about parental behavior which
might explain why the coefficient of paternal impulsivity has a negative sign. We argue that
decision-making and actions taken by impulsive parents are extremely difficult to anticipate for
the offspring. Therefore, children of parents with relatively low self-control are likely to think
twice before doing something (e.g., engaging in smoking) which might cause trouble at home.
They want to avoid negative attention because following such a lifestyle is likely to provoke
immediate but rather ambiguous reactions of the parent(s). We refer to this finding as the
‘slap-effect’. However, the coefficient is only weakly significant. We conclude that particular
caution is required when interpreting this effect.
31In order to check the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the model using dichotomous versions of
the time and risk preference measures. Individuals are classified as being patient, impulsive and willing to take
risks if their response values are greater than the median on the patience, impulsivity and risk scale, respectively.
Alternatively, we do a mean split on each of these variables. These specifications yield qualitatively similar results.
Moreover, we extend our analysis to four observation periods by adding wave 2012. Although we still get similar

































Table 3.3: Parental time discounting and child’s smoking participation
Dep. var.: child’s smoking status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Daughters Sons
Mother Impulsivity 0.005 (0.010) 0.000 (0.010) 0.001 (0.010) 0.001 (0.009) 0.014 (0.012) -0.012 (0.013)
Patience -0.016∗ (0.010) -0.017∗ (0.009) -0.018∗∗ (0.009) -0.021∗∗ (0.009) -0.025∗∗ (0.012) -0.022∗ (0.013)
Father Impulsivity -0.004 (0.010) -0.011 (0.010) -0.017∗ (0.010) -0.018∗ (0.009) -0.003 (0.013) -0.031∗∗(0.013)
Patience -0.019∗∗(0.009) -0.018∗∗ (0.009) -0.018∗∗ (0.009) -0.019∗∗ (0.009) -0.011 (0.012) -0.025∗∗(0.012)
Child Impulsivity 0.032∗∗∗(0.009) 0.033∗∗∗(0.009) 0.028∗∗∗(0.009) 0.041∗∗∗(0.012) 0.020 (0.013)
Patience -0.014∗ (0.008) -0.015∗ (0.008) -0.017∗∗ (0.008) -0.017 (0.011) -0.015 (0.012)
Parental education X X X X
Child education & income X X X
N 5,817 5,817 5,817 5,817 2,788 3,029
R2 0.037 0.050 0.060 0.106 0.140 0.102
Notes: Random effects GLS regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors at the family level in parentheses. Impulsivity, patience and
risk are measured in standard deviations. All specifications include wave and state dummies, control variables child (gender, age, age
squared, migration status, home indicator, risk preference), and control variables parents (age, migration background, risk preference,
altruism). Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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As discussed in Section 3.2.4, we want to make a brief comment on the impact of risk
preferences. With regard to the influence of individual risk attitudes, we find a significant
intrapersonal effect. Hence, a one standard deviation increase in child’s risk attitude increases
the likelihood of smoking by 2.2 percentage points (8%). However, the corresponding coefficients
of the parents are not statistically significant (results not shown).32
In order to identify possible gender differences, we estimate Equation (3.1) separately for
daughters and sons. Results are shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.3. The overall effects of
child’s time discounting and risk preference are primarily driven by women.33 For men, the point
estimates are generally smaller in size and statistically insignificant but show the same signs.
Regarding the influence of parental time discounting, we identify significant same-sex as well as
cross-sex effects. A one standard deviation increase in mother’s patience lowers the likelihood
of smoking by 2.5 percentage points for daughters and by 2.2 percentage points for sons. Again,
maternal impulsivity is not significant. The time discounting variables of the father influence
the smoking behavior of male offspring only. A one standard deviation increase of paternal
impulsivity (patience) reduces the likelihood of smoking for men by 3.1 (2.5) percentage points.
In addition to gender, Table 3.6 in the Appendix of this chapter replicates the regression from
column (4) of Table 3.3 and stratifies by child’s home. If the child lives together with the parents,
mother’s patience is associated with a significant decrease in child’s smoking probability. A
similar effect can be found with respect to children who no longer share the household with their
parents. Interestingly, father’s time discounting variables are only significant for those children
who already live in their own household. Table 3.7 in the Appendix replicates the regression
from column (4) of Table 3.3 and stratifies by different age groups. Parental patience as well as
child’s preferences show the expected signs and are significant across almost all specifications.
3.4.2 Role of parental health behaviors
Table 3.4 presents the estimation results after adding parental smoking behavior and other health
variables to the regression model. Column (1) replicates the results from the model specification
without health mediators. First, we focus on the impact of parental smoking behavior in column
(2). In line with previous findings regarding the intergenerational transmission of smoking, we
find a positive and highly significant relationship between parental smoking habits and child’s
smoking status. Furthermore, the economic significance is substantial. If the mother is a current
32As a robustness check, we replace the general risk measure with the willingness to take risks in the health
domain from wave 2009. Our results remain qualitatively similar.
33The estimated coefficient of female patience is −0.017 and the t-value is about 1.55.
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smoker, the likelihood of child smoking increases by more than 13 percentage points (or 45%).
If the mother is a former smoker, the increase is about 5 percentage points (or 17%). With
regard to father’s smoking habits, the size of the coefficients as well as the level of significance
are similar. However, in comparison to column (1), the coefficients of interest remain highly
robust.
In column (3), we control for all parental health behaviors simultaneously. Again, our main
findings remain largely unchanged. The impact of parental smoking is still highly significant.
With the exception of father’s healthy lifestyle, all other health variables are not statistically
significant.34 In comparison to the baseline regression, the overall changes in coefficients are
negligible. With respect to mother’s patience, however, it may seem that a partial mediation
effect of minor size is present. But, in fact, this is not enough evidence to infer that parental
smoking is a rigorous mediator of parental time discounting. Another valuable finding is that
the previously discussed bad control problem is obviously not that bad. In columns (4) and (5),
we stratify by gender. We find same-sex as well as slightly weaker cross-sex effects of parental
smoking status. Although the coefficient of maternal patience is no longer significant for sons,
the effects of parental time discounting show similar patterns as in Table 3.3.
Although parental smoking habits do not represent a true mediating factor of time discount-
ing, we can conclude that they are meaningful determinants of child’s smoking status. Hence,
parents’ smoking patterns should not be omitted from the regression. In general, the findings are
in line with the findings from our previous specifications without controlling for certain health
behaviors. The coefficients of interest change only marginally after taking into account parental
health variables. Irrespective of whether we control for parental smoking or parental smoking
and all the other health investments, a one standard deviation increase in mothers’ patience is
associated with a reduction in child smoking of around 6%. The effect of fathers’ patience on
child’s smoking status is very similar in sign and magnitude. The impact of paternal impulsivity
is still significant. A one standard deviation increase in fathers’ impulsivity is associated with a
decrease in the likelihood of smoking of roughly 7%.
34Joint significance tests show that the parental health variables are jointly significant for the mother and the
father, respectively. Excluding parental smoking, the remaining health variables (alcohol consumption, nutrition

































Table 3.4: Role of parental health behaviors
Dep. var.: child’s smoking status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
parental smoking all behaviors all behaviors
Daughters Sons
Mother Impulsivity 0.001 (0.009) -0.007 (0.009) -0.007 (0.009) 0.004 (0.012) -0.018 (0.013)
Patience -0.021∗∗ (0.009) -0.018∗∗ (0.009) -0.017∗ (0.009) -0.022∗ (0.012) -0.017 (0.012)
Current smoker 0.134∗∗∗(0.024) 0.136∗∗∗(0.024) 0.162∗∗∗(0.032) 0.112∗∗∗(0.034)
Ex-smoker 0.049∗∗∗(0.019) 0.050∗∗∗(0.019) 0.089∗∗∗(0.025) 0.021 (0.027)
Regular alcohol 0.004 (0.018) 0.016 (0.020) -0.011 (0.030)
Healthy nutrition -0.001 (0.010) 0.010 (0.015) -0.010 (0.015)
Regular sport -0.001 (0.011) -0.004 (0.017) 0.005 (0.016)
Father Impulsivity -0.018∗ (0.009) -0.019∗∗ (0.009) -0.019∗∗ (0.009) -0.004 (0.013) -0.033∗∗∗(0.013)
Patience -0.019∗∗ (0.009) -0.018∗∗ (0.008) -0.017∗∗ (0.008) -0.012 (0.011) -0.021∗ (0.012)
Current smoker 0.130∗∗∗(0.023) 0.125∗∗∗(0.023) 0.082∗∗∗(0.031) 0.157∗∗∗(0.033)
Ex-smoker 0.061∗∗∗(0.020) 0.059∗∗∗(0.020) 0.027 (0.027) 0.078∗∗∗(0.028)
Regular alcohol 0.017 (0.011) 0.014 (0.015) 0.022 (0.017)
Healthy nutrition -0.020∗∗ (0.010) -0.017 (0.013) -0.020 (0.015)
Regular sport -0.013 (0.011) -0.005 (0.015) -0.020 (0.017)
Child Impulsivity 0.028∗∗∗(0.009) 0.026∗∗∗(0.009) 0.026∗∗∗(0.009) 0.038∗∗∗(0.012) 0.019 (0.013)
Patience -0.017∗∗ (0.008) -0.015∗ (0.008) -0.014∗ (0.008) -0.011 (0.011) -0.014 (0.012)
N 5,817 5,817 5,817 2,788 3,029
R2 0.106 0.138 0.141 0.175 0.136
Notes: Random effects GLS regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors at the family level in parentheses. Impulsivity,
patience and risk are measured in standard deviations. Column (1) replicates the overall results from Table 3.3. All
specifications include wave and state dummies, control variables child (gender, age, age squared, migration status, home
indicator, income, education, risk preference), and control variables parents (age, migration background, altruism, risk
preference, education). Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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3.4.3 Intensive margin of smoking
In our final step, we examine the intensive margin of smoking. So far, we have shown that
parental time discounting is directly associated with child’s decision to smoke or not to smoke.
This refers to the extensive margin of smoking. In the following, we are interested in how parental
impulsivity and patience influence the actual demand for tobacco products of the offspring.
Conditional on being a smoker, child’s smoking intensity is measured as the number of cigarettes
smoked per day. A two-part model is specified to estimate child’s smoking participation and the
level of tobacco consumption.35
Results from the two-part model are reported in Table 3.5. As shown in column (1), the
average marginal effects of the probit regression are in line with the previous findings from the
LPM (extensive margin). With respect to smoking intensity, the coefficients of parental time
discounting are no longer significant (see column (2)). However, there is a positive correlation
between parental smoking and child’s cigarette consumption. Children whose mothers (fathers)
are current smokers smoke, on average, 1.6 (2.1) cigarettes more than children whose parents
have been non-smokers. If the father is an ex-smoker, child’s tobacco consumption is associated
with an increase of about 2 cigarettes. The effect of former maternal smoking is not statistically
significant. Interestingly, the stratification by gender yields substantial cross-sex effects. Fathers’
smoking habits are significant for daughters but not for sons, whereas mothers’ current smoking
status is only significant for sons. These findings differ from those presented in Table 3.4. With
regard to child’s smoking participation, we have identified cross-sex and same-sex effects. Finally,
the impulsiveness of the child is positively related to the number of cigarettes smoked on a daily
basis (see column (2)). A one standard deviation increase in child’s impulsivity is associated
with an average increase in tobacco consumption of 0.5 cigarettes. According to columns (3)
and (4) of Table 3.5, this effect is mainly driven by sons.
We infer that parental time discounting is primarily relevant for child’s smoking participa-
tion. In particular, parental future orientation plays a significant role. With regard to smoking
intensity, parents’ smoking habits represent the main contributing factor.
35We test the Tobit model against the two-part model using a likelihood ratio test. We reject the null hypothesis

































Table 3.5: Intensive margin of smoking
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Participation Intensity Intensity
Daughters Sons
Mother Impulsivity -0.004 (0.009) 0.350 (0.311) 0.107 (0.456) 0.683 (0.442)
Patience -0.018∗∗ (0.008) -0.297 (0.272) -0.362 (0.388) -0.198 (0.385)
Current smoker 0.145∗∗∗(0.025) 1.550∗ (0.838) 0.358 (1.239) 2.291∗∗(1.114)
Ex-smoker 0.062∗∗∗(0.019) 0.722 (0.721) 0.896 (1.137) 0.045 (0.931)
Regular alcohol 0.007 (0.028) 0.601 (1.236) 1.217 (1.962) -0.190 (1.516)
Healthy nutrition -0.004 (0.017) -0.301 (0.899) -0.122 (1.316) -0.316 (1.171)
Regular sport 0.001 (0.019) -0.944 (0.930) -1.000 (1.482) -0.668 (1.190)
Father Impulsivity -0.022∗∗ (0.009) -0.051 (0.309) -0.059 (0.458) -0.186 (0.414)
Patience -0.019∗∗ (0.008) 0.342 (0.290) -0.039 (0.370) 0.363 (0.411)
Current smoker 0.144∗∗∗(0.027) 2.114∗∗(0.899) 2.678∗∗(1.232) 1.502 (1.245)
Ex-smoker 0.078∗∗∗(0.022) 2.080∗∗(0.837) 2.699∗∗(1.218) 1.403 (1.164)
Regular alcohol 0.020 (0.018) 0.204 (0.835) 0.217 (1.084) 0.260 (1.204)
Healthy nutrition -0.205 (0.018) -0.268 (0.883) 0.316 (1.107) -0.532 (1.268)
Regular sport -0.018 (0.019) 0.108 (0.955) -0.276 (1.269) 0.175 (1.362)
Child Impulsivity 0.031∗∗∗(0.009) 0.539∗ (0.291) 0.065 (0.346) 0.955∗∗(0.475)
Patience -0.017∗∗ (0.008) -0.320 (0.274) -0.197 (0.377) -0.414 (0.415)
N 5,817 1,657 725 932
Notes: Two-part model: Probit regression for smoking participation (full sample). Truncated
regression for smoking intensity (subsample of current smokers). Both regressions are run separately
using the cmp command. Average marginal effects are reported in column (1). Cluster-robust
standard errors at the family level in parentheses. Impulsivity, patience and risk are measured
in standard deviations. All regressions include wave and state dummies, control variables child
(gender, age, age squared, migration status, home indicator, risk preference, income, education),
and control variables parents (age, migration background, risk preference, altruism, education).
Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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3.5 Discussion and conclusion
The main purpose of this chapter is the analysis of the link between parental time discounting and
child’s likelihood of being a smoker. We use self-reported impulsivity and patience as meaningful
proxies for self-control and time preference, respectively. We confirm previous evidence of an
association between individual time discounting and smoking (intrapersonal context). That is,
those individuals who are less impulsive and/or more patient are also significantly less likely to
smoke.
More importantly, our results show that parental time discounting, especially parental time
preference, has a significant direct effect on the likelihood of child smoking (interpersonal con-
text). A one standard deviation increase in parental patience is associated with a reduction in
the likelihood of child smoking of around 6-7%. Hence, parental future orientation has a pre-
ventive effect on child’s decision to engage in risky health behaviors such as smoking. Parents
with a high level of future orientation are supposed to be well informed about the adverse health
effects of smoking. Therefore, they may have an influence on child’s smoking status by pointing
out the negative health consequences of smoking. With regard to father’s self-control, a one
standard deviation increase in impulsivity is associated with a 7% reduction in child’s smoking
probability. However, the interpretation of this effect is not straightforward. Children whose
parents are impulsive could have difficulties in properly anticipating parental actions and/or
consequences after they have learned about specific child behaviors. Hence, those children could
act with caution and rather think twice before they indulge in the consumption of health dete-
riorating goods such as cigarettes. We admit, however, that this interpretation may be rather
imperfect.
The direct relationship between parental time discounting and child smoking remains robust
to the inclusion of potential mediating factors such as socioeconomic outcomes and different
health behaviors. When we control for parental smoking, our findings are in line with results
from the previous literature on the transmission of smoking habits from parents to their children.
Hence, we confirm the well-known positive correlation between parental and child smoking. In
general, parental time discounting and parental smoking patterns are both significantly related
to child’s smoking participation. Thus, the direct effects of parental time discounting on child
smoking do not vanish after controlling for parental smoking. However, the results from the
two-part model reveal that parental time discounting is not significantly associated with child’s
smoking intensity.
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In addition, our findings provide evidence that the influence of the father is important in
this context and should not be ignored. Hence, focusing only on mothers (e.g., Brown and
van der Pol, 2014) may result in potentially misleading inference. Stratifying by gender, we find
differences in the effects of parental time discounting. The influence of maternal patience on
child smoking is significant for both daughters and sons, whereas father’s time discounting is
primarily relevant for boys. Our findings are generalizable to the adult population in Germany
because we rely on a representative sample of adult individuals/children. Moreover, we control
for whether the offspring still lives together with at least one biological parent or if the child
has already moved out. In general, our findings encourage future research to control for both
risk preference and time discounting measures (if available) when analyzing the mechanisms of
health (behavior) transmission from one generation to another.
However, our study has some limitations. As already mentioned above, our mediating factor
analysis is only a partial one. We focus on health behaviors through which parental time
preference or impulsivity might affect our dependent variable. In fact, we are not able to identify
a true (health) mediator. But, once more, this highlights and supports the presence of a direct
relationship between parental time discounting and child smoking. Nonetheless, there may exist
other latent channels through which the direct effects of parental discounting could be absorbed.
We suggest that parenting style could be an appropriate candidate variable. Children of parents
that care about good (child) health are unlikely to smoke because their parents are likely to
properly invest in their children’s health capital. Health education and family communication
may be of particular importance. Unfortunately, we are not able to address this issue with our
data.
Another disadvantage is that we are not able to properly capture peer effects such as the
influence of friends or other social environments. Furthermore, due to data limitations, we
cannot systematically address the actual formation of time preference during childhood and
adolescence. Information on time discounting is not reported until the offspring turns into
an adult and answers the corresponding questions of the standard individual questionnaire.
However, evidence suggests that delay discounting is affected by both genetic and environmental
influences (e.g., Anokhin et al., 2011).36 But, our sample lacks sufficient information on twins
and/or adoptees to examine the role of genetic factors in more detail.
Furthermore, we only include those children in our sample for whom information on both
parents was available. First, we focus on both parents to examine if neglecting one parent (e.g.,
36For further reading, see MacKillop (2013).
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the father) is a clever idea. Obviously, it is not. Second, we do not have adequate information
on a single parent’s living circumstances. Normally, those influences are hardly observable. For
instance, we lack information on when exactly parents split up or for how long a parent is a
single mother or father. Moreover, we cannot account properly for the potential influence of a
new partner. We simply do not know if children from single-parent families still have regular
contact with the biological parent who left the family home.
Although we analyze a relatively short period of time, the assumption of stable preferences
may be another point of criticism. However, we make this assumption in order to set up a
panel data analysis. Survey questions on impulsivity and patience asked in 2008 are not part
of the standard individual questionnaires from waves 2006 and 2010. Nevertheless, we get
qualitatively similar results even after running a simple cross-section analysis based on data
from wave 2008. Finally, we cannot completely rule out potential endogeneity bias. Dealing
with preferences, it is always a challenge to identify causal effects. However, we argue that our
empirical approach of gradually adding potentially problematic control variables is able to reduce
endogeneity concerns. Obviously, our regression results remain robust, regardless of whether we
control for these variables or not.
Undoubtedly, smoking is a preventable health risk and (still) a major public health concern.
Our analysis provides new findings which are potentially relevant for public health authorities
that are concerned with the prevalence of tobacco consumption. In line with the previous liter-
ature, individual time discounting is significantly related to the decision to smoke. In addition,
we find significant associations between parental time discounting and child’s smoking status
even after controlling for parental smoking and other health mediating factors. Nevertheless,
the possibility exists that the inclusion of other mechanisms (e.g., family communication) could
wash out the direct effects of parental impulsivity and/or patience. We refrain from giving
extensive policy implications because the empirical results cannot necessarily be interpreted as
causal relationships.
However, it is important to brief parents about the influence they have when they act as role
models and primary health mentors. This information is crucial if public health services intend
to prevent (young) people from starting to smoke or to help them quit tobacco consumption.
The support of smoking cessation efforts in young adults, the next parent generation, should also
be considered. The improvement of self-control techniques may help individuals to successfully
abstain from smoking. Especially future orientation seems to be a key parameter to break
up the vicious cycle of adverse health behaviors that are passed from generation to generation.
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However, more research is needed to fully explore the role of time discounting and risk preferences
in the intergenerational transfer of smoking and to provide more rigorous advice to public health
authorities.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.6: Stratification by home
Dep. var.: child’s smoking status
(1) (2) (3)
With parents Own household
Mother Impulsivity 0.001 (0.009) -0.006 (0.012) 0.015 (0.013)
Patience -0.021∗∗ (0.009) -0.026∗∗(0.011) -0.026∗∗(0.012)
Father Impulsivity -0.018∗ (0.009) -0.008 (0.012) -0.025∗ (0.013)
Patience -0.019∗∗ (0.009) -0.012 (0.011) -0.028∗∗(0.012)
Child Impulsivity 0.028∗∗∗(0.009) 0.027∗∗(0.012) 0.021 (0.013)
Patience -0.017∗∗ (0.008) -0.027∗∗(0.011) -0.019 (0.012)
N 5,817 2,944 2,873
R2 0.106 0.116 0.148
Notes: Random effects GLS regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors at
the family level in parentheses. Column (1) replicates the results from column
(4) of Table 3.3. Impulsivity, patience and risk are measured in standard de-
viations. All regressions include wave and state dummies, control variables
child (gender, age, age squared, migration status, education, income, risk
preference), and control variables parents (age, migration background, risk

































Table 3.7: Stratification by age
Dep. var.: child’s smoking status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Under 20 Under 25 Under 30 Under 35 Under 40 Under 45
Mother Impulsivity 0.001 (0.009) -0.024 (0.016) 0.005 (0.013) 0.002 (0.011) -0.001 (0.010) 0.003 (0.009) 0.002 (0.009)
Patience -0.021∗∗ (0.009) -0.053∗∗∗(0.015) -0.026∗∗(0.012) -0.024∗∗(0.010) -0.025∗∗∗(0.009) -0.022∗∗ (0.009) -0.022∗∗ (0.009)
Father Impulsivity -0.018∗ (0.009) -0.017 (0.016) -0.018 (0.013) -0.013 (0.011) -0.016 (0.010) -0.018∗ (0.010) -0.018∗ (0.009)
Patience -0.019∗∗ (0.009) -0.018 (0.014) -0.016 (0.012) -0.023∗∗(0.010) -0.028∗∗∗(0.009) -0.022∗∗ (0.009) -0.020∗∗ (0.009)
Child Impulsivity 0.028∗∗∗(0.009) 0.043∗∗∗(0.016) 0.030∗∗(0.012) 0.025∗∗(0.011) 0.028∗∗∗(0.010) 0.030∗∗∗(0.009) 0.029∗∗∗(0.009)
Patience -0.017∗∗ (0.008) -0.026∗ (0.015) -0.020∗ (0.011) -0.010 (0.009) -0.015∗ (0.009) -0.016∗ (0.008) -0.016∗ (0.008)
N 5,817 1,101 2,740 3,989 4,790 5,369 5,700
R2 0.106 0.148 0.140 0.121 0.117 0.113 0.113
Notes: Random effects GLS regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors at the family level in parentheses. Column (1) replicates the results from column
(4) of Table 3.3. Impulsivity, patience and risk are measured in standard deviations. All regressions include wave and state dummies, control variables
child (gender, age, age squared, migration status, home indicator, risk preference, education, income), and control variables parents (age, migration
background, risk preference, altruism, education). Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Chapter 4
Heritability of time preference:
Evidence from German twin data
4.1 Introduction
In economics, individual preferences are highly important since they affect people’s decision-
making.1 Next to the exhaustively studied role of risk preferences, the economic concept of
time preference is particularly relevant. Time preferences are significantly involved in a person’s
intertemporal choices. In general, they influence decisions that include a trade-off between costs
today and (potential) benefits in the future (see Frederick et al. (2002) for an excellent review
of the concept of time discounting). Time preferences are related to a variety of crucial lifetime
outcomes such as educational attainment and personal income. For instance, Golsteyn et al.
(2014) show that patience predicts success in school as well as higher earnings in the long run. In
addition, present-biased individuals are less likely to save money for the future. They are even
more likely to run into debt (Meier and Sprenger, 2010). Moreover, a high discount rate (low
level of patience) is associated with a number of adverse health behaviors and outcomes such
as smoking (Kang and Ikeda, 2014), frequent alcohol consumption (Rossow, 2008) and obesity
(Komlos et al., 2004).2
In recent years, the empirical evidence on the intergenerational transmission of time pref-
erence has increased. For instance, Gauly (2017) finds a positive correlation between parental
and offspring time preference using representative household survey data from Germany. Other
studies show similar results.3 Despite all these findings, a fundamental question remains unan-
1This chapter is a slightly extended version of Hübler (2018).
2The expressions time preference, time discounting, discount rate, patience and future orientation are used
synonymously throughout the course of this chapter.
3See, for example, Brown and van der Pol (2015), Arrondel (2013), Kosse and Pfeiffer (2012), Gouskova et al.
(2010), Reynolds et al. (2009), Webley and Nyhus (2006), and Knowles and Postlewaite (2005).
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swered. How are time preferences actually formed? Are people born with innate time preferences
or can they be shaped by the environment? In other words, are time preferences exogenous or
endogenous? Providing answers to these questions is crucial if (behavioral) economists and
policy makers want to develop effective interventions to encourage forward-looking behavior.
Apparently, time preferences differ across individuals (e.g., Barsky et al., 1997). But where
does this variation come from? Inspired by psychology, behavioral genetics pioneered the in-
troduction of the nature-nurture debate which is concerned with the decomposition of genetic
and environmental influences on human traits and phenotypes (Galton, 1869). “Nature” refers
to the relative contribution made by genetic inheritance and related biological factors. “Nur-
ture” represents the influence that comes from external sources such as parents’ socialization
efforts, imitation/learning or unique experiences. In fact, previous studies have found that both
inherited and acquired characteristics determine behavioral traits and/or outcomes such as the
socioeconomic status (see, e.g., Björklund et al., 2007).
In this chapter, we want to shed light on the fraction of variance in time preference that
is explained by genetics. Relying on twin data from Germany, the comparison of identi-
cal/monozygotic (MZ) and fraternal/dizygotic (DZ) twins enables us to estimate the proportion
of variation in individual time preference that is due to genetic and environmental factors. In
twin studies, it is assumed that both types of twin pairs share their environments to the same
degree. But fundamental differences in the genetic relatedness exist between MZ and DZ twins.
Hence, any excess similarity of MZ twin pairs compared to DZ twin pairs with respect to a spe-
cific phenotype or trait indicates the presence of genetic effects. Studies that merely analyze the
raw intergenerational correlation in a trait are not able to adequately decompose this variation.
The literature on the endogeneity of preferences has developed theoretical frameworks which
show that nurture may be important with regard to the determination of time preference. Becker
and Mulligan (1997) argue that parents can invest resources and time to make their children more
future-oriented. Hence, teaching their children to plan for the future directly affects the children’s
time preference rate. Following a different approach, the model in Bisin and Verdier (2001) shows
the impact of the parental and social environment on children’s preferences. However, empirical
evidence on the heritability of time preference is scarce. Direct association studies link genes to
certain behavior patterns or preferences (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2011). However, these studies
are lacking to quantify the relative importance of nature and nurture with regard to the total
variation in time preference.
To the best of our knowledge, there have been a limited number of studies addressing a
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similar research question. Anokhin et al. (2011) analyze the heritability of delay discounting in
a longitudinal twin design. Using a basic delay of gratification method, they find that genetic
factors contribute 30% and 51% to the variation in delay discounting at ages 12 and 14, re-
spectively. Cesarini et al. (2012) use data from the Screening Across the Lifespan Twin survey,
Younger cohort (SALTY) which is part of the Swedish Twin Registry (STR). They find that the
heritability estimate for short-term time preference, measured using hypothetical choice ques-
tions in the monetary domain, is not significantly different from zero.4 Cronqvist and Siegel
(2015) also rely on a set of MZ and DZ twins from the STR. However, they focus on a per-
son’s saving behavior and relate it to individual time preference. According to their findings,
genetic differences explain roughly one third of the total variation in savings propensities across
individuals. Interestingly, evidence on the genetic variation in economic risk preferences is more
conclusive. However, the relative contribution of genetics to risk attitudes varies considerably
across studies. Whereas Cesarini et al. (2009) show that heritability is around 20%, Zhong et al.
(2009) and Zyphur et al. (2009) find magnitudes of 57% and 63%, respectively.
In line with the aforementioned literature, our study employs the classical twin methodology.
However, we contribute to the literature in several ways. We are the first to use a novel twin
data set from Germany to estimate the genetic variation in time preference. Cross-sectional
data are available for adolescents and young adults aged 10-25 years. In comparison to the
vast majority of twin studies, the sample size is relatively large. Our final sample contains
information on roughly 3,000 twins. Hence, we are able to address some common limitations
of twin studies based on laboratory experiments such as a limited age range of the participants
and/or a relatively modest sample size (see Anokhin et al., 2011). In general, this impairs the
statistical power and limits the scope of the empirical analysis. Moreover, we use a direct measure
of time preference which is new in this area of research. A simple and short survey question on
general patience acts as a proxy for individual time discounting. An incentivized experiment
showed that self-assessed patience is a meaningful proxy for time preference as elicited using the
multiple price list (MPL) decision format (Vischer et al., 2013). The general level of patience of
an individual is likely to evaluate the personal discount rate more comprehensively than relying
on his/her savings behavior alone. The latter is supposed to be an outcome of time discounting
rather than a straightforward measurement of time preference (see Cronqvist and Siegel, 2015).
Our empirical analysis provides evidence that time preferences are partly heritable. Accord-
ing to our best-fitting model, we find that differences in genetics explain about 23 percent of
4Benjamin et al. (2012), using the same dataset (SALTY) but different estimation techniques, also find no
support for genetic variation in time preference.
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the variation in patience across individuals. The results reveal a minor influence of the twins’
shared environment. Hence, the remaining variation in time preference is accounted for by the
unique environment of the individual. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.
Section 4.2 describes the twin data and the measurement of time preference. Section 4.3 provides
information on the basic twin methodology and the statistical analysis. Results are presented
in Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes with a discussion of the main findings.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Twin data
We use novel twin data from the German TwinLife project. The main purpose of this twin
family study is to improve the understanding of the development of social inequalities over the
life course. Next to its longitudinal design, TwinLife combines a multi-cohort cross-sequential
and an extended twin family design. It observes four birth cohorts of MZ and DZ twins over
a 12-year period. Twins born in the years 1990-1993, 1997/1998, 2003/2004 and 2009/2010 as
well as their parents and siblings (if available) are included. The project began in 2014 and is
supposed to end with the last survey wave in 2023. Interviews are conducted on a yearly basis.
Overall, this twin survey will provide data of a representative sample of about 4,000 German
twin families. In this study, we rely on data from the first household interview for the first
partial wave on 2,009 twin families. In order to prevent distortions due to gender differences,
only twin pairs of the same sex were surveyed. Furthermore, only such twins are examined that
have grown up or are still growing up in the same family. More details on the conception and
design of the TwinLife study can be found elsewhere (Hahn et al., 2016).5
For the empirical analysis, we exclude all twins from the youngest birth cohort. Twins
born in 2009/2010 were about five years old during the first survey wave in 2014 and therefore
too young to answer the survey question on time preference. Further restrictions are necessary
because not all individuals have provided information on their respective time preference. Hence,
we exclude all respondents with missing information on the variable of interest. The remaining
twins are children, adolescents and young adults aged 10-25 years. Approximately, all three
cohorts comprise a similar number of twins. The first cohort of twins contains 990 twins aged
10-12 years, the second comprises 1,034 twins aged 16-18 years and the third includes 932 twins
aged 22-25 years. It allows us to cover a wide range of ages. This is of particular interest because
this early period of life is characterized by fundamental decisions on education, employment,
5Additional information is also available online: http://www.twin-life.de/en.
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health, etc., where time preferences are frequently involved. All these decisions made will affect
lifetime outcomes (e.g., income) in the future.
The zygosity of twins was verified with a specific zygosity questionnaire. In addition, all
results obtained from the standard questionnaire items were validated with a saliva test. This
DNA test is a standard procedure to tell if the twins are monozygotic or dizygotic and is generally
considered to be highly reliable. Our final sample contains information on 703 MZ twin pairs
(1,406 twins) and 775 DZ twin pairs (1,550 twins). Hence, the total sample size sums up to 2,956
individuals. Table 4.1 shows the number of twins separated by zygosity and sex. As previously
mentioned, opposite-sexed dizygotic twins are not part of the survey.
Table 4.1: Number of twins by zygosity and gender
female male
DZ twins 856 694 1,550
MZ twins 806 600 1,406
1,662 1,294 2,956
4.2.2 Measuring time preference
The twin questionnaire contains a convenient survey question to elicit individual time discount-
ing. Each respondent has to rate his or her personal level of patience according to an 11-point
scale. The exact wording of the question is as follows: “How would you describe yourself: Are
you generally an impatient person, or someone who always shows great patience? Please tick a
box on the scale, where the value 0 means: ‘very impatient’ and the value 10 means: ‘very pa-
tient’. You can use the values in between to make your estimate.” Hence, self-reported patience
is used as a proxy for individual time preference. In our sample, the average level of patience is
5.75.
The behavioral relevance of our time preference measure has been explicitly validated. This
ultra-short survey measure of patience was first introduced in the 2008 questionnaire of the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is an annual panel survey conducted since
1984. Each year more than 20,000 individuals (12,000 households) representative of the German
population are surveyed (see Wagner et al., 2007). Vischer et al. (2013) conducted an incentivized
experiment with 977 participants forming a representative sub-sample of the adult population to
the 2006 wave of the SOEP. Subjects were asked to indicate their preferences in a choice over a
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12-month time horizon.6 The results show that those who rank themselves as ‘more impatient’
in the survey in 2008 also exhibit a higher degree of impatience in the experiment in 2006.
Hence, this simple and ultra-short survey measure of patience turns out to be a meaningful
proxy for time preference. The findings remain robust even after controlling for impulsivity.7
This shows that the measure of general patience captures (long-term) patience, and not (short-
run) impulsivity. Thus, a respondent’s misinterpretation of the more future-oriented aspects
underlying this question on patience can be ruled out. Table 4.2 reports the summary statistics
of our twin sample. Apparently, Figure 4.1 indicates that variation in self-assessed patience is
present across individuals.
Table 4.2: Summary statistics of the final twin sample (n=2,956)
Variable Mean S. D. Min. Max.
patience 5.753 2.624 0 10
female 0.562 0.496 0 1
age 17.095 5.085 10 25
MZ 0.476 0.499 0 1
4.3 Twin methodology
The classical twin design contains information on both MZ and DZ twins. This enables us to
decompose the observed variance in a specific trait (e.g., patience) into genetic and environmental
components. According to the polygenic model (ADCE model) proposed by Fisher (1918), four
latent factors can be taken into account. The genetic variation in a phenotype or trait can be
divided into two components. The additive genetic effect (A) describes the influence of different
alleles which are added up when being passed from the parents to the offspring. In other
6In the experiment, choice tables with the typical price list decision format were used. The participants had
to indicate their preferences by choosing between an immediate (left column) or delayed payment (right column).
The immediate payment was continuously fixed (e200). However, the delayed payment varied in each of the 20
choice situations and increased by 2.5 percentage points (compounded semi-annually) from row to row. Switching
from left to right (and sticking to the delayed payment in all subsequent rows) indicates the bounds of the discount
rate the respondent claims in order to wait an additional time period of 12 months for payout. Before the start of
the experiment, the participants were informed that one of their choices would be randomly selected for payment.
Using a second random device, one out of nine participants was actually paid by check according to the previous
choice.
7In addition to impulsivity, including a control variable for personal risk attitudes does not affect the results
either.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of patience with the plot of a normal-density curve
words, it is an additive function of many genes that code for a specific trait. The second genetic
component consists of non-additive/dominant genetic effects (D). These effects are characterized
by allelic interactions within genes. Hence, these genetic influences are transmitted from parents
to their offspring in a dominant/recessive way.
With respect to the environmental components, shared and non-shared environmental effects
can be distinguished. The common environment component (C) captures all influences shared
by the twins reared in the same family. Thus, both twins of a twin pair are equally affected
by this component. It comprises the same prenatal environment, home environment, parenting
style, socioeconomic status of the parents/family, and the like. On the contrary, the unique
environmental effects (E) are not shared by the twins. They are different across the twins of
a twin pair. These individual-specific influences refer to unique experiences of illness or injury,
unique experiences with friends and sexual partners, and the like.
Based on this logic, the standard twin model decomposes the total variance of patience into
the four components A, D, C, and E. The corresponding ADCE model of patience (Pat) for
twin j (j = 1, 2) in family/twin pair i can be written as a variance component model
Patij = X
′
ijβ +Aij +Dij + Ci + Eij , (4.1)
where X
′
ijβ is a set of independent covariates and their parameters, Aij ∼ N(0, σ2A) is the
additive genetic component, Dij ∼ N(0, σ2D) is the dominant genetic component, Ci ∼ N(0, σ2C)
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is the common environmental component, and Eij ∼ N(0, σ2E) is the non-shared environmental
component.8 The expected value (mean) of patience is E(Patij) = X
′
ijβ = µij . Thus, the











Genetic theory shows that differences in the genetic relatedness between MZ and DZ twins
exist (see Neale and Maes, 2004). MZ twins develop from the splitting of the same fertilized
egg into two, whereas DZ twins develop from two different eggs fertilized by two different sperm
cells. Hence, MZ twins share all their genes. On the contrary, DZ twins share (on average)
only half their genes. Among DZ twins, this results in a correlation of 0.5 for additive genetic
effects and a correlation of 0.25 for dominant genetic effects. Since the shared environment is
reasonably assumed to be the same for both members of a twin pair, the correlation is perfect
(1.0) across twins, regardless of zygosity. Non-shared environmental factors are unique to each
twin and therefore uncorrelated across twins of a twin pair, regardless of zygosity. Due to these
genetic differences, the variance-covariance matrices vary by type of twin pair. For MZ twin


















































where the variances of the twins are situated in the diagonal and the corresponding covariance
between twin 1 and twin 2 is situated in the off-diagonal of each matrix.9 Since both twin
8Throughout the biometric analysis, we use the standardized version of patience. The genetic and environ-
mental components are assumed to be uncorrelated across twin pairs. For notational convenience, the random
error term εij is replaced by Eij in Equation (4.1). Hence, the measurement error is part of the non-shared
environment component.
9It is assumed that the twin pairs are unrelated. The general notation of a variance-covariance matrix in the
twin context is ∑
=
(
variance of twin 1 covariance of twins
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types are supposed to experience the same degree of similarity in their environments (equal
environment assumption), any excess similarity in patience between MZ twins must be due to
the greater proportion of genes shared by MZ twins compared to DZ twins. The estimate of













It provides the degree to which genetic factors contribute to the total variation in patience across
individuals.
The polygenic model is estimated under the standard assumptions of biometric modeling (see,
e.g., Rijsdijk and Sham, 2002). MZ twins are considered to be genetically identical and the equal
environment assumption holds true for MZ and DZ twins. No gene-environment correlations
or interactions are present for the trait of interest. Another non-technical assumption is the
absence of non-random pairing of the twins’ parents. The most important technical assumptions
are equal mean and variance of twin 1 and twin 2 and MZ and DZ twins. This is required to
estimate the model because the same path coefficients are applied for both MZ and DZ twins.
Moreover, the maximum likelihood principle is used for estimation and inference. It assumes
bivariate normality of the paired observations (see the Appendix of this chapter for further
details).
A disadvantage of this biometric approach is that it is impossible to estimate all four com-
ponents of the ADCE model simultaneously with classic twin data alone. Normally, only in-
formation on MZ and DZ twins reared together is available. Thus, the effect of the shared
environment (C) and the influence of genetic dominance (D) are confounded in the classic twin
study design (Neale and Maes, 2004).10 Retaining the additive genetic component (A) and the
non-shared environmental component/measurement error (E), the remaining components make
opposite predictions about the relative difference between MZ and DZ correlations. Common
environmental influences make DZ correlations more similar to MZ correlations. However, the
presence of dominant genetic effects makes DZ correlations less similar to MZ correlations. The
primary reason for that is that D correlates perfectly for MZ twin pairs whereas the correlation
is only 0.25 for DZ twin pairs (Rijsdijk and Sham, 2002). Therefore, in practice, ACE or ADE
All four entries in a matrix are the same when the correlation among the twins of a twin pair is considered to be
perfect (ρ = 1) and certain assumptions are made. Assuming equal mean and variance for twin 1 and twin 2 and
MZ and DZ twins, the covariance of the twins is equal to the variance of each twin.
10When A and E are both retained in the model, the estimation of C and D at the same time results in














C . But two informative equations are not enough to solve for three unknown parameters. Hence,
we have to assume D = 0 or C = 0 to proceed with the biometric analysis.
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models and their respective submodels (e.g., AE or DE models) are estimated. For example,
the ADE model is obtained after eliminating Ci from Equation (4.1). Which model to choose
highly depends on the information directly retrieved from the twin data.
Genetic heuristics predict the existence of genetic effects when the trait correlation among
MZ twin pairs is higher than the correlation among DZ twin pairs. If the covariance of MZ
twin pairs is larger than the covariance of DZ twin pairs, but the DZ covariance is more than
half the size of the MZ covariance, C is a meaningful contributing factor to the variation in
patience (2ρDZ > ρMZ > ρDZ). Hence, an ACE model should be estimated. By contrast, genetic
dominance is present if ρMZ > 2ρDZ . In other words, a correlation among MZ twin pairs that
is more than two times larger than the corresponding correlation among DZ twin pairs suggests
a genetic dominance effect (D) on time preference. In this case, the influence of the shared
environment component is set to zero and the ADE model should be fitted (see Plomin et al.,
2013; Neale and Maes, 2004).
To provide evidence on the heritability of time preference/patience, we follow three basic
steps. First, we start with a mean comparison across MZ and DZ twin pairs. Second, we
compare the intraclass correlation coefficients across both twin types. This should provide
us with a guideline for the biometric analysis. Finally, we apply maximum-likelihood based
structural equation modeling to elicit the best-fitting polygenic model and report the relative
contributions of the variance components. The statistical tool (twinlm) in the Analysis of
Multivariate Events mets-package in R is used to conduct the structural equation analysis (Holst
and Scheike, 2017).
4.4 Results
We start with reporting basic statistics on patience for MZ and DZ twins. In Figure 4.2, we
plot a histogram of the distribution for patience, separately, for MZ and DZ twins. In general,
identical twins seem to be more patient than fraternal twins. This initial finding is supported
by the comparison of the average level of patience between both twin types. The mean levels of
patience are reported in Table 4.3.
On average, MZ twins report a general level of patience of about 5.9. DZ twins are slightly
more impatient. The corresponding level of patience is roughly 5.6. However, the difference
between means is highly significant. Testing the equality of means rejects the null hypothesis of
equal means at the 1% level.11 In Table 4.4, we report the MZ and DZ twin pair correlations
11The significant difference in patience across MZ and DZ twins may be surprising. For this reason, we run
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of patience, by zygosity
Table 4.3: Self-reported patience
MZ twins DZ twins p-value
Patience Mean 5.907 5.614 <.01
S.D. 2.522 2.707
n 1,406 1,550
Notes: p-value from two-sample t-test. Null hypothesis:
Same mean of patience for MZ and DZ twins.
of patience. Spearman’s correlation coefficient for MZ twin pairs is 0.241 and highly significant.
The respective correlation for DZ twin pairs is basically zero.12 These findings provide first
evidence that genetics seem to play a role in the variance of individual patience. The substantial
difference in MZ and DZ correlations can also be considered graphically. In Figure 4.3, we plot
twin’s patience against co-twin’s patience. It supports the calculated correlations from above.
tests of equality separately for each age group. Interestingly, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for children aged
10-12 years (p = 0.234) and young adults aged 22-25 years (p = 0.469). However, for adolescents (16-18 years
of age), we reject the null hypothesis that the MZ and DZ means are equal at the 1% level. When we exclude
the adolescents from the sample, we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. These findings may be
explained by a phase of neural imbalance between brain areas associated with time discounting in adolescence.
Cognitive and emotional changes frequently lead to poor decision-making which is likely to be responsible for the
significant differences in this cohort (e.g., Konrad et al., 2013).
12The Spearman correlations are very similar to the Pearson correlations. Pearson’s correlation for MZ twin
pairs is 0.233 (p < .01). Pearson’s correlation for DZ twin pairs is 0.021 and not statistically significant.
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Table 4.4: Correlations for MZ and DZ twin pairs
MZ twin pairs DZ twin pairs p-value
of diff.
Patience Spearman 0.241∗∗∗ 0.006 <.01
(0.170-0.310) (−0.064-0.077)
n 703 775
Notes: Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 95% confidence in-
tervals for Spearman’s rank correlations in parentheses. p-value from
bootstrapped equality test for equal correlation coefficients. Null hy-
pothesis: Same correlations of patience for MZ and DZ twin pairs. Boot-
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Figure 4.3: Twin-twin plots of patience, by zygosity (Fitted regression lines and 95% confidence
intervals are reported. Scatterplots are jittered for expositional clarity.)
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In the following, we present our findings from the biometric analysis. The results from the
model selection process and from the variance component analysis are shown in Table 4.5. All
models include control variables for age and sex.13 In order to appropriately test the overall
fit of each polygenic model, we use the saturated model as a benchmark. The saturated model
provides the means, variances and covariances without imposing any restrictions. Hence, it is
the least restrictive model since no constraints/technical assumptions are made. Comparing the
genetic twin models (e.g., the ADE model) to the saturated model allows us to evaluate the
actual model fit. If the main assumptions are fulfilled, no significant drop in model fit should
be observed.
We decide to test the ADE model against the saturated model.14 The existing differences
in correlation between the MZ and DZ twin pairs (0.241 vs. 0.006) predict the presence of
a dominant genetic effect on the variance in patience. Hence, twin theory suggests that a
standard ACE model would not be appropriate. According to Plomin et al. (2013), dominant
genetic effects preclude an influence of the shared environment of the twins. Here, we reject
the hypothesis that the fit of the ADE model is not significantly worse than the fit of the
saturated model. In other words, the ADE model shows a reduction in model fit compared
to the benchmark model (p < .05). However, we insist on the assumptions mentioned above
although our data do not fully support these.15 It is noteworthy that this issue occurs frequently
in twin studies, especially in those with relatively large sample sizes. Even minor differences
in variances between twin groups can be highly significant (see, e.g., Waszczuk et al., 2015).
Moreover, in fairly large twin samples the consideration of the BIC criterion is advised. It takes
into account the underlying sample size. The BIC criterion is considerably smaller for the ADE
model, indicating a better fit than the saturated model (see, e.g., Dale et al., 2015).16
13We treat our outcome variable as a continuous variable. The survey question on general patience is measured
on a scale from 0 to 10 (see Section 4.2.2). The response to this question represents the basic degree of patience of
the individual. Hence, we argue that the underlying concept of this variable can reasonably be interpreted as being
continuous. Moreover, the intervals between the point values are equal. However, we also conduct the biometric
analysis treating patience as ordinal. Unfortunately, this has the disadvantage that the cell probability matrix
contains some empty cells when controlling for the full set of standard covariates (age and sex). That circumstance
limits the scope of analysis. However, we are able to provide some evidence that our results are robust to the
application of alternative estimation techniques. For instance, the results are very similar after excluding age from
the regression, regardless of whether the dependent variable is treated as continuous or ordinal. The robustness
of our results is in line with the findings from Cesarini et al. (2009).
14Effectively, all theoretical twin models represent submodels of the saturated model.
15The fit of the biometrical model is better if we drop the group of adolescents from the sample. In this case,
the ADE model is not significantly worse than the saturated model (p = .103). However, our results are almost
identical if we exclude all twins aged 16-18 years (see Table 4.8 in the Appendix of this chapter).
16Table 4.9 in the Appendix of this chapter compares the ACE model with the saturated model as well as with
the ADE model. According to the Likelihood ratio test, the ACE model is clearly outperformed by the saturated
model. After comparing the ACE model with the ADE model, the ADE model gives the better fit by AIC and
BIC. As already suggested by the intraclass correlation coefficients, these findings lend additional support to the
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We continue with the model selection procedure and test the ADE model against other
more parsimonious models (AE vs. ADE; DE vs. ADE). Dropping the D component from the
ADE model significantly reduces model fit (LRT=6.077, p < .01). Eliminating the additive
genetic component (A) from the ADE model does not worsen the model fit (LRT<.01, p >
.10).17 This is not surprising because A is estimated zero in the ADE model. These findings
suggest that dominant genetic effects are present. Hence, we select the DE model as our preferred
polygenic model. It does not perform significantly worse than the less parsimonious ADE model.
Moreover, it shows a slightly better fit according to the standard criteria. In general, a lower
AIC/BIC indicates better model fit. The results of the DE model suggest a heritability of
patience of roughly one quarter. In other words, we find that differences in genetics account for
23 percent of the overall variation in general patience across individuals. Additive genetic effects
are not supported by the data. Consequently, the largest proportion of variance is attributed to
unique environmental influences (E). They account for approximately three quarters of the total
variation in patience. However, it is important to keep in mind that the measurement error is
also included in E.
notion that the ADE model suits the data better than the ACE model.
17The Likelihood ratio tests are performed unter the null hypothesis that the more parsimonious model is not
significantly worse than the ADE model. The original p-values obtained from these tests were too conservative.































Table 4.5: Results of the biometric analysis of patience
LL df LRT ∆df p-value AIC BIC A D C E
Saturated model −4155.544 18 8347.088 8442.46
ADE −4167.294 6 23.499 12 0.024† 8346.588 8378.378 0.000 0.234 —– 0.766
(0.000-0.000) (0.162-0.306) (0.694-0.838)
AE −4170.332 5 6.077 1 <.01‡ 8350.664 8377.156 0.194 —– —– 0.806
(0.127-0.261) (0.739-0.873)
DE −4167.294 5 <.01 1 >.10‡ 8344.588 8371.08 —– 0.234 —– 0.766
(0.162-0.306) (0.694-0.838)
Notes: Results from the variance component analysis. LL=log Likelihood, df=degrees of freedom, LRT=Likelihood ratio test statistic,
∆df=difference in degrees of freedom, AIC=Akaike’s information criterion, BIC=Sample size adjusted Bayesian’s information criterion.
† Compared to the saturated model. ‡ Compared to the ADE model. Adjusted p-values (Dominicus et al., 2006). 95% confidence
intervals in parentheses.
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In the following, we present the results from different sample stratifications. First of all, we
stratify by gender. According to Table 4.2, roughly 56% of all twins in our sample are female.
On average, males are slightly more patient than females (5.86 vs. 5.67). Running a t-test, the
difference between these two means is significant at the 5% level. For female twins, the results
from the biometric analysis are reported in Panel A of Table 4.6. For male twins, the results are
reported in Panel B of Table 4.6. All variance component models control for age. Again, the
DE models have the best fit in comparison to the other polygenic models. For female twins, the
heritability of patience is about 20 percent. For their male counterparts, the genetic variation
in patience accounts for 29 percent of the total trait variation.18 Our findings are similar to
the results from Cronqvist and Siegel (2015). Using the individual’s savings rate as proxy for
time preference, they find that the saving behavior among males is more attributable to genetic
factors than the saving behavior among females (35% and 23%, respectively). However, the
confidence intervals of our estimates of genetic non-additivity (D) show a significant overlap.
The heritability coefficients for male and female individuals do not differ at the 5% level.
18The intraclass correlation coefficients (Spearman) are 0.213 and −0.010 for female MZ twin pairs and DZ
twin pairs, respectively. The intraclass correlation coefficients (Spearman) are 0.277 and 0.024 for male MZ twin
pairs and DZ twin pairs, respectively. Whereas the MZ twin pair correlations are always significant at the 1%
level, the DZ twin pair correlations are not statistically significant. For both female and male twins, the MZ and
DZ correlation coefficients differ significantly at the 1% level. The ACE models are continuously outperformed






























Table 4.6: Results of the biometric analysis of patience by sex
LL df LRT ∆df p-value AIC BIC A D C E
Panel A: Female twins
Saturated model −2372.275 14 4772.551 4838.667
ADE −2376.775 5 11.671 9 0.437† 4763.551 4787.164 0.000 0.198 —– 0.802
(0.000-0.000) (0.103-0.292) (0.708-0.897)
AE −2378.111 4 2.6706 1 0.051‡ 4764.221 4783.112 0.165 —– —– 0.835
(0.077-0.253) (0.747-0.923)
DE −2376.775 4 <.01 1 >.10‡ 4761.551 4780.441 —– 0.198 —– 0.802
(0.103-0.292) (0.708-0.897)
Panel B: Male twins
Saturated model −1774.455 14 3576.909 3639.522
ADE −1784.608 5 20.307 9 0.016† 3579.216 3601.578 0.000 0.290 —– 0.710
(0.000-0.000) (0.180-0.401) (0.599-0.820)
AE −1786.672 4 4.1286 1 0.021‡ 3581.345 3599.234 0.235 —– —– 0.765
(0.130-0.339) (0.661-0.870)
DE −1784.608 4 <.01 1 >.10‡ 3577.216 3595.106 —– 0.290 —– 0.710
(0.180-0.401) (0.599-0.820)
Notes: Results from the variance component analysis. LL=log Likelihood, df=degrees of freedom, LRT=Likelihood ratio test statistic, ∆df=
difference in degrees of freedom, AIC=Akaike’s information criterion, BIC=Sample size adjusted Bayesian’s information criterion. † Compared
to the saturated model. ‡ Compared to the ADE model. Adjusted p-values (Dominicus et al., 2006). 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
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Moreover, we stratify by birth cohorts. The mean level of patience is 5.51 for children aged
10-12 years, 5.76 for adolescents aged 16-18 years and 6.01 for young adults aged 22-25 years.
We conduct a one-way ANOVA and a Kruskal-Wallis H test to analyze if significant differences
in patience exist among the three birth cohorts. The results obtained from the one-way ANOVA
show a statistically significant difference in means between age groups (F (2,2953)=8.78, p <
.001). In particluar, the Tukey post-hoc test reveals that patience is significantly higher in
the oldest birth cohort (1990-1993) compared to the youngest birth cohort (2003/2004) (p <
.001). Supporting the findings from the one-way ANOVA, the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis
H test shows a statistically significant difference in patience between the three birth cohorts,
χ2(2) = 15.477, p < .001.
Separate biometric analyses are conducted for each birth cohort.19 The results are reported
in Table 4.7. All variance component models control for age and sex. In Panel A of Table 4.7,
the results for the youngest birth cohort (2003/04) are reported. According to the DE model,
genetic differences explain about 31 percent of the total variation in patience across the members
of this age group. With respect to the other birth cohorts, the genetic influence is smaller. Panels
B and C of Table 4.7 show the results for the birth cohort born in 1997/98 and for the oldest
birth cohort (1990-93), respectively. For both cohorts, neither the AE nor the DE model is
statistically worse than the ADE model. Although the AE model is not significantly worse than
the ADE model (p > .10), we select the DE model as our preferred model because it gives the
best fit by the AIC (BIC). We obtain a heritability coefficient of roughly .17 (.20) in the DE
models that include individuals aged 16-18 (22-25) years. Hence, at young age, the proportion
of genetic variation in patience seems to be larger than at later stages in life. However, we do
not identify significant differences in heritability across the groups. Focusing on the considerable
overlaps of the confidence intervals, the coefficients of D do not differ at the 5% level.
19The intraclass correlation coefficients (Spearman) are 0.299 and −0.002 for MZ twin pairs and DZ twin
pairs in the youngest birth cohort (2003/2004), respectively. The intraclass correlation coefficients (Spearman)
are 0.164 and −0.025 for MZ twin pairs and DZ twin pairs in the mid birth cohort (1997/1998), respectively.
The intraclass correlation coefficients (Spearman) are 0.247 and 0.026 for MZ twin pairs and DZ twin pairs in
the oldest birth cohort (1990-1993), respectively. Whereas the MZ twin pair correlations are always significant
at the 1% level, the DZ twin pair correlations are not statistically significant. Across all birth cohorts, the MZ
and DZ correlation coefficients differ significantly at least at the 5% level. The ACE models are continuously






























Table 4.7: Results of the biometric analysis of patience by birth cohorts
LL df LRT ∆df p-value AIC BIC A D C E
Panel A: Birth cohort 2003/04
Saturated model −1459.305 18 2954.61 3030.292
ADE −1466.407 6 14.205 12 0.288† 2944.815 2970.042 0.000 0.312 —– 0.688
(0.000-0.000) (0.182-0.442) (0.558-0.818)
AE −1468.689 5 4.5627 1 0.016‡ 2947.377 2968.4 0.240 —– —– 0.760
(0.117-0.363) (0.637-0.883)
DE −1466.407 5 <.01 1 >.10‡ 2942.815 2963.837 —– 0.312 —– 0.688
(0.182-0.442) (0.558-0.818)
Panel B: Birth cohort 1997/98
Saturated model −1367.334 18 2770.669 2847.133
ADE −1379.485 6 24.301 12 0.019† 2770.97 2796.458 0.000 0.173 —– 0.827
(0.000-0.000) (0.044-0.301) (0.699-0.956)
AE −1380.157 5 1.3438 1 0.123‡ 2770.313 2791.554 0.137 —– —– 0.863
(0.021-0.254) (0.746-0.979)
DE −1379.485 5 <.01 1 >.10‡ 2768.97 2790.21 —– 0.173 —– 0.827
(0.044-0.301) (0.699-0.956)
Panel C: Birth cohort 1990-93
Saturated model −1299.373 18 2634.746 2709.341
ADE −1304.915 6 11.083 12 0.523† 2621.829 2646.694 0.000 0.204 —– 0.796
(0.000-0.000) (0.089-0.319) (0.681-0.911)
AE −1305.311 5 0.7923 1 0.187‡ 2620.622 2641.342 0.185 —– —– 0.815
(0.075-0.294) (0.706-0.925)
DE −1304.915 5 <.01 1 >.10‡ 2619.829 2640.55 —– 0.204 —– 0.796
(0.089-0.319) (0.681-0.911)
Notes: Results from the variance component analysis. LL=log Likelihood, df=degrees of freedom, LRT=Likelihood ratio test statistic, ∆df=difference
in degrees of freedom, AIC=Akaike’s information criterion, BIC=Sample size adjusted Bayesian’s information criterion. † Compared to the saturated
model. ‡ Compared to the ADE model. Adjusted p-values (Dominicus et al., 2006). 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
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Before we further discuss our main findings, we make some comments on the most important
assumptions underlying the polygenic models from above. First, the equal environment assump-
tion (EEA) states that environmentally caused similarity is the same for MZ and DZ twin pairs.
This seems plausible since both twin types share the womb at the same time, are the same age
and are raised together in the same family environment. But this assumption is not free of criti-
cism. Some researchers cast doubt on the general validity of the EEA. They argue that MZ twins
are, in fact, treated more similarly by their environments (parents, teachers, peers, ...) than DZ
twins (see, e.g., Joseph, 1998). This would increase their correlations relative to the correlations
of DZ twins. As a result, the genetic effects would be overestimated and the shared environ-
mental effect would be underestimated (Rijsdijk and Sham, 2002). However, many studies exist
that have rigorously tested the EEA (see, e.g., Plomin et al., 2013). Focusing on personality
traits, there is evidence that it can be considered as a valid assumption of the standard twin
method (e.g., Borkenau et al., 2002). More specifically, research has shown that any potential
bias due to violations of the EEA is not of first order importance (Bouchard, 1998). Moreover,
Bouchard et al. (1990) estimated similar heritability coefficients, regardless of whether using MZ
twins reared together or apart. Thus, although MZ twins are likely to grow up in more similar
environments than DZ twins, this is not the cause of their greater similarity regarding a specific
trait but, rather, a consequence of their genetic identity (Martin et al., 1997). Unfortunately,
the TwinLife study does not include twins that were reared apart. This would have allowed
us to directly compare the correlations for patience of MZ twins reared apart and those reared
together. Similar correlations between both groups would have lent additional support to the
validity of this assumption.
Second, we test the assumption of random mating of mothers and fathers. In comparison to
the vast majority of twin studies, we have the possibility to analyze the correlation of patience
between parents. The parents of the twins were asked to rate their level of patience on the
same 11-point scale. We merged their answers with the corresponding answers provided by the
twins. Unfortunately, our sample size shrinks drastically because many parents did not answer
the question on patience. We end up with 785 twin pairs (345 MZ twin pairs, 440 DZ twin pairs)
where full information on parental patience is present. Hence, the sample composition largely
differs from the set of observations used for the previous biometric analysis. However, the results
point towards random mating. We find a negative correlation between maternal and paternal
patience that is not statistically significant (ρ = −0.02, p > .10). In general, there is very
limited evidence on assortative mating regarding time preference. To the best of our knowledge,
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Gauly (2017) is the only study explicitly addressing this issue. Her findings suggest a weakly
significant correlation which is also negative. Hence, investigating the role of assortative mating
in the field of time discounting seems to be a promising area for future research.
In general, standard twin models assume the lack of any gene-environment interactions.
In fact, it is (almost) impossible to provide conclusive evidence that this assumption holds
completely true. To test this assumption properly, a dataset incredibly rich in information would
be needed. Depending on the subject under investigation, longitudinal trait data, information
on non-adoptees and adoptees or very precise measures of the environment may be required (see
Rijsdijk and Sham (2002) for a critical discussion of the underlying assumptions). However, as
it is common practice in the twin literature, we assume that the absence of gene-environment
interactions holds true. All in all, we are confident that our biometrical analyses are not biased
due to fundamental violations of the standard assumptions of the twin models.
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
The main purpose of this study is to provide evidence on the general formation of time prefer-
ence. In particular, we focus on the degree to which time preference is heritable (broad-sense
heritability). We rely on novel twin data from the German TwinLife project. It is a large-scale
twin study in Germany. We use self-reported patience as a meaningful proxy for individual
time discounting. Standard biometric analyses are conducted. According to the model selection
process, the DE model gives the best fit. In this model, the dominant genetic effect is estimated
around 23 percent. An additive genetic effect is not supported by the data. Hence, almost one
quarter of the total variance in patience is attributed to genetic influences. The largest propor-
tion of variance is attributed to the unique environmental effect (E). In line with the previous
literature on the genetic variation in economic preferences and behavior patterns, the shared
environment effect (C) is negligible (see, e.g., Cronqvist and Siegel, 2015; Cesarini et al., 2009;
Zyphur et al., 2009; Zhong et al., 2009). Although a series of studies has frequently estimated
ACE models, they only find marginal or even no contribution of C at all (e.g., Cronqvist and
Siegel, 2015; Cesarini et al., 2009). Stratifying by gender, the genetic variation in patience is
larger for male than for female individuals (29% and 20%, respectively). After applying the
sample stratification by birth cohorts, the largest estimate of genetic influence is found among
members of the youngest cohort (.31). However, meaningful differences between genders or birth
cohorts do not exist.
Unlike the findings from Anokhin et al. (2011) and Cronqvist and Siegel (2015), this is the
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first paper that reveals a substantial contribution of the dominant genetic component (D) to the
overall variation in time preference. According to our data, MZ correlations for patience are more
than twice the size of the DZ correlations. This is a strong indication for non-additive genetic
variation to be present. Based on their findings on risk assessment, Cesarini et al. (2009) come
to the conclusion that “there is probably nonadditive variation in personality and attitudes. The
low DZ correlations we observe suggest that a similar situation obtains for economic preferences”
(p. 833-834). Again, with regard to the genetics of risk preferences, Zyphur et al. (2009) and
Zhong et al. (2009) find similar results. Both conclude that the attitude towards risk seems to
be a non-additive trait which is genetically coded in a dominant/recessive way.
Inevitably, this raises the question about candidate genes which are related to time discount-
ing. In recent years, molecular genetics has spared no efforts to disentangle the complex genetic
architecture of human traits. For example, Eisenberg et al. (2007) and Carpenter et al. (2011)
found that the Dopamine Receptor D4 gene (DRD4) predicts impulsivity and time preference,
respectively. Furthermore, links between serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine, 5-HT) activity and
personality traits such as impulsivity have been established (e.g., Carver and Miller, 2006; Oades
et al., 2008; Miyazaki et al., 2012). We have to admit that most of these studies focus on impul-
sivity and not explicitly on (long-term) time preference/patience. However, although impulsivity
is a slightly different concept in the context of time discounting, it is directly related to patience
(see Kalenscher and Pennartz (2008) for an extensive review of the neuroeconomics of intertem-
poral decision-making). For example, Gauly (2017) shows a significant negative intrapersonal
correlation between general patience and impulsiveness. Overall, there is some evidence that
dominant/recessive genes account for differences in serotonin and/or dopamine levels that are
further related to time discounting.
Our results imply that researchers should be aware of genetic non-additivity. Especially in
the context of economic preferences, the additive genetic component (A) may not always be
the main source of genetic variation. In case of sufficiently large differences in trait correlations
across twin types, biometric models that include D seem to be the appropriate choice. But more
research is needed to provide conclusive evidence on the role of non-additivity in the genetics
of time preference. From an economist’s point of view, however, the relative contribution of A
and D to the overall genetic variation may be of minor importance. With the nature-nurture
debate in mind, we focus on disentangling the aggregate genetic variance from the variance
that is caused by environmental influences. In fact, the estimated impact of the environment
is probably what matters most from a behavior change perspective. The smaller the extent to
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which time preferences are innate, the larger the potential for modifications of people’s preference
structure.
However, our study has some limitations. As already discussed above, adherence of our data
to the technical assumptions of the classical twin model could be better. Unfortunately, we
are also not able to exploit the longitudinal design of the TwinLife project. While writing this
paper, only data on the first partial wave with information on time preference were available for
researchers. However, for future research, it could be promising to expand the cross-sectional
analysis with panel data. This would allow for further investigation of possible changes in the
degree of heritability over the twins’ lifetime.
A further limitation is that the survey question on general patience is a rather universal
measure of a person’s time preference. But the possibility exists that time preferences may be
domain-specific (Tsukayama and Duckworth, 2010). Thus, the degree of heritability of time
preference may vary across different domains (e.g., monetary vs. health domain). For instance,
Bickel et al. (1999) show that discount rates in the health domain are higher than discount rates
in the monetary domain. Researchers are strongly encouraged to dive into the genetics of time
preference in different domains.
Yet another shortcoming is that we cannot completely rule out misreporting among children.
Our youngest cohort consists of twins aged 10-12 years. The survey question on general patience
is measured on a standard 11-point scale for all respondents. In general, the possibility should
be considered that some children may have experienced difficulties in answering this question
appropriately (Mellor and Moore, 2014). Thinking about your own personality and providing
the corresponding answer on a Likert scale requires a sufficiently high level of abstract thinking
of these children. Thus, it is likely that at least some twins of this particular birth cohort
have not fully developed their abstract thinking skills at this stage of life (Maćkiewicz and
Cieciuch, 2016). However, we are confident that potential measurement bias is negligible. The
overall response pattern to the question on self-assessed patience is basically the same across
all three birth cohorts. Moreover, we exclude all twins falling into the respective age range
and re-estimate the corresponding polygenic models. Although we lose a substantial number
of observations (roughly one third of the sample size), we still obtain a heritability coefficient
of around .20. However, using a uniform measurement of patience for all respondents ensures
consistency and comparability across birth cohorts.
Despite the limitations mentioned above, we conclude that our findings provide evidence that
time preferences are considerably heritable. However, the majority of variation in patience can
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be attributed to unique environmental factors (and random error). From a policy perspective,
this is an interesting starting point. We infer that people can effectively be targeted by public
policies that intend to make them more future-oriented. For instance, traits or preferences
that are widely heritable would only leave a narrow scope for intervening actions. Appropriate
interventions may include information campaigns about the adverse health consequences of
smoking, a proper design of commitment devices to save more money for the future or school
subsidies to show children that today’s investments in education will result in higher earnings
in the (distant) future. Hence, our results indicate that public policy interventions with the
aim of nudging people towards more future orientation and away from rather seductive instant
gratification may have a good prospect of success. Since the literature on the heritability of
time preference is still scarce, we want to encourage future research to dedicate more time on
the investigation of the genetics of time discounting. However, it is already fair to say that the
role of genetics in intertemporal decision-making should no longer be ignored.
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4.6 Appendix
Maximum Likelihood (ML) Method:
• Bivariate normal density function for independent twin pair i = 1, ..., N :
f(Pat) = 12π (detΣ)
− 1
2 exp[−12(Pati − µi)
TΣ−1(Pati − µi)] ,
where ∑
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Table 4.8: Results of the biometric analysis of patience - twins aged 16-18 years excluded
LL df LRT ∆df p-value AIC BIC A D C E
Saturated model −2769.03 18 5574.061 5661.684
ADE −2778.251 6 18.442 12 0.103† 5568.503 5597.71 0.000 0.259 —– 0.741
(0.000-0.000) (0.172-0.345) (0.655-0.828)
AE −2778.251 5 4.693 1 0.030‡ 5571.195 5595.535 0.217 —– —– 0.783
(0.134-0.299) (0.701-0.866)
DE −2778.251 5 <.01 1 >.10‡ 5566.503 5590.842 —– 0.259 —– 0.741
(0.172-0.345) (0.655-0.828)
Notes: Results from the variance component analysis (n=1,922). LL=log Likelihood, df=degrees of freedom, LRT=Likelihood ratio test
statistic, ∆df=difference in degrees of freedom, AIC=Akaike’s information criterion, BIC=Sample size adjusted Bayesian’s information
criterion. † Compared to the saturated model. ‡ Compared to the ADE model. Adjusted p-values (Dominicus et al., 2006). 95%
confidence intervals in parentheses.
118
Chapter 4 Heritability of time preference: Evidence from German twin data
Table 4.9: Polygenic model selection - ACE vs. ADE
LL df LRT ∆df p-value AIC BIC
Saturated model −4155.544 18 8347.088 8442.46
ACE −4170.332 6 29.576 12 0.003† 8352.664 8384.455
ADE −4167.294 6 23.499 12 0.024† 8346.588 8378.378
Notes: Results from the variance component analysis. LL=log Likelihood,
df=degrees of freedom, LRT=Likelihood ratio test statistic, ∆df=difference in de-
grees of freedom, AIC=Akaike’s information criterion, BIC=Sample size adjusted
Bayesian’s information criterion. † Compared to the saturated model. Comparing
the ACE with the ADE model, the ADE model gives lower AIC and BIC.
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